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THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PERSONALITY

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IN THE LIGHT OF PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION

BY

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WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

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

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PREFACE

This is a book about the making of personality by, and for, relationship. All that I have learned about life, whether by reading, in which one discovers the experience of others, past and present, or through my own smaller, but—to me—more vivid experience, has convinced me that there are no such things as persons, existing in and for themselves. All personality is the result of relationship —disastrously the result of disastrous relationship, and beautifully of relationship that is beautiful.

It has seemed to me that modern psychology has something to teach us about the building of personality that is in a real sense new knowledge. I know, of course, that it is very many years since it was laid down as the second commandment of God to man that he should love his neighbour as himself. I am not sure that that has not now become the first commandment. In a world given over to the folly and sin of the preparation and practice of the modern methods of killing the bodies of our neighbours, I can imagine that God may say that we cannot love Him at all—that indeed He does not want our love—until we learn to love our neighbour, not perhaps very much, but with at least a small fraction of the love which we habitually give to ourselves. (It was once said: "Leave

there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way: first be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift.")

So that, in saying we must love our neighbour, psychology says nothing new. In telling us why we have found it so difficult, and how we may do it better, it is my belief that it gives us a new knowledge which is indeed a "good news", and that it points the way, through and beyond these terrible death struggles of our old individualisms, to a love of man for man such as the world has not yet known.

It is in this faith that I have ventured to offer this interpretation of some of the theories of modern psychology. And I find, in offering it, that the book itself is yet another proof of my thesis. Whatever there is in it of good is but the regiving of a gift—a gift most beautifully made of the selflessness and devotion of my parents, of the inspiration of great and beloved teachers, and of the love and faith of many friends—especially of that best friend of all, my husband, in whose companionship I have learned that life finds its fulfilment when there is no longer a me and a mine, but only and for ever an us and an ours.

Of those who have taught me, I would mention two with special gratitude—the late Fearon W. Halliday of the Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham, and Professor L. W. Grensted of Oxford University. There is no quotation from Mr. Halliday's work in this book, but without his friendship it would not have been written, and I should be proud to think there were in it something of his sane and courageous philosophy of life, and some

shadow of his love in which he did at last lay down his life for his friends.

There are many quotations from Professor Grensted's work, but they acknowledge only the least of my debt to him. There is to be found here, also, the reflection of much that I learned from him when I read psychology under his supervision in Oxford, and even more that I have learned of the possibilities of relationship in the friendship of the years since then.

Apart from that, I would only say that the footnotes which give the names and pages of books and authors are more than a formal acknowledgment of indebtedness. In the writing and thought of these men and women I have found myself made very rich, and if I am able to pass on anything of their gift to me, then this book will serve the purpose of its writing.

Perhaps I should say that this book was completed in manuscript some considerable time before the publication of the late Dr. Suttie's volume *The Origins of Love and Hate*. At one point Dr. Suttie makes the same threefold division of human need into the needs for love, for significance, and for security, as I had already made, quite independently. I mention this as I should not like it to be thought that I had borrowed without acknowledgment from a book which seems to me to be of the greatest value, and to which I should undoubtedly have been much indebted had it been available at the time when I collected my own material.

GRACE STUART.

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INTRODUCTION

The modern study of psychology has become very specialized and, when psychology is taken as a whole, very complicated. Even the experts are usually only experts in part of the field. A master of experimental methods may know very little about analysis, and an observer of human and animal behaviour may have little in common with the statistician. And each of these alike may have only a very dim appreciation of the relation of his particular field of study to the wider issues of philosophy, and in particular of religion. In this latter connection especially, psychologists are apt to make very sweeping assertions upon the basis of studies which are very frequently almost as irrelevant as is the use of a telescope to the apprehension and worship of God.

The matter is the more important in that modern psychologists frequently claim not only to study human character and behaviour, but also to refashion and redirect it. As a result there is an immense amount of good advice abroad, or perhaps adrift, in the world, with a kind of psychological prestige attached to it, but of very variable quality. Those to whom it is offered frequently do not know what a wide range of uncertainty and

of diverse opinion still exists among psychologists themselves, and it is not at all easy to acquire a general grasp of the subject, or to see whither the various theories are tending.

It is for this reason that I welcome such books as this which Mrs. Stuart has written, and I am glad to be given an opportunity of commending it. Its purpose is not to provide a detailed account of any particular psychological system, but rather to interpret the whole movement of thought upon which these modern developments rest. I have had the opportunity of knowing, over a number of years, the amount of reading and the practical experience which has gone to its making. The outcome is a philosophy of life which seems to me well worthy of consideration as a philosophy and stimulating alike to the imagination and to the will. I think that those who read it will be the better able to return to the systems of the psychologists and to judge their worth. It is a book in which the trees have been thinned out with a judicious hand so that the wood is plainly visible, and the paths that lead through it are clearly marked, and though it is simple and untechnical in manner it makes a case of which even the experts might well take account.

L. W. GRENSTED.

ORIEL COLLEGE, OXFORD,
October 10th, 1937.

CHAPTER I

THE LIFE-FORCE

WHAT is life? These are days of many descriptions, and beneath them all life itself lies hidden—its whence, its whither and its why a mystery only the more mysterious for the many names by which they may be called. So whether we say of it that it is the breath of God, or whether we call it a dance of whirling electrons, no one can say that we are wrong, for the very good reason that no one really knows. What we can say is that the breath of God and the dance of electrons are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and that some attempt at description, while it may not explain any more completely than any other, may yet be one step further towards understanding. Psychology, in its modern form a very new science and an even newer art, brings its own description to add to the others. This book is an attempt to discover, from the ideas and theories of only a few of the leading psychologists, something at least of what this description has to say of the whence, the whither and the why of life.

For the whence, we find that psychology, in the midst of an endless variety of dogma and conjecture, accepts, as a basis for study, the existence of organisms with some power of response, and of an environment whose stimuli call forth, or determine, that response. Or, to put it in a less dignified manner, the environment in the shape of a thorn

pricks you, and you, in the shape of a human being, yell—the prick calling forth the yell. And, if your environment consists largely of pricks, physical or otherwise, your response may consist largely of yells. In which case some psychologists (who think the idea of free-will is one of our more amiable delusions) will tell you you could do nothing else but yell, while others will tell you that in spite of the pricks, you need not, and in fact must not, yell all the time.

Those—the Behaviourists—who believe that you cannot help yelling, believe, that is to say, that the living creature is little more than a "thing" in its environment, shaped by it as the cup is shaped on the potter's wheel. It is a puppet dancing to the strings of a fate it cannot control, a clockwork toy that circumstances wind and unwind at their will. Yet, despite the crudeness of their philosophy, the Behaviourists have given us a good working definition of the beginnings of life. "The human being at birth is a very lowly piece of unformed protoplasm, ready to be shaped by any family in whose care it is first placed. This piece of protoplasm breathes, makes babbling, gurgling, cooing sounds with its vocal mechanisms, slaps its arms and legs about, moves its arms and toes, cries, excretes through the skin and other organs the waste matter from its food. In short it squirms (responds) when environment (inside and out) attacks it (stimulates it). This is the solid observational rock upon which the behaviourist view is founded."[1]

It is well put, for we can find in this conception of a squirming mass of protoplasm, an "attacking"

[1] Watson, *Ways of a Behaviourist*, p. 28.

environment, and a power of response, not only the rock on which behaviourist psychology is built, but an excellent foundation for a study of human personality. "Attacking" especially is a good word, for, if you look at it casually, the environment does often seem to have some active hostility to the creature which depends upon it, denying its demand as often as it affirms it, and that with apparent caprice. And we are often oppressed not only by the waste and disaster in the lower order of life, but by a sense of "against-ness" in those things, both human and material, with which our lives are surrounded.

But that is to anticipate. We are still concerned with our "squirming mass of protoplasm". McDougall, who has done effective battle with Behaviourism and all its ways, would at least agree with Watson that that was the beginning. But for him—even there in the beginning—it is a very different mass of protoplasm. It is a mass of protoplasm possessed in its own right of a "vital impulse or urge to action. Schopenhauer's 'will-to-live' is in it, Bergson's 'Elan Vital', Jung's 'libido'."[1]

This life-force, this hormic energy, libido, or whatever you like to call it, is one of the most interesting, and the most baffling, of psychological concepts. We do not know what it is, or much about it, but only that some power of life is there, and that it manifests itself in certain comprehensible and many incomprehensible ways—ways we can classify, and ways that come upon us suddenly out of order, and upset all classifications. For all that, practically every modern psychologist

[1] McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, p. 72.

does classify, and all the classifications differ more or less, and one has just to make of them what one can.

On the whole, the various ways in which the life-force is known to act are called, for convenience, instincts—according to McDougall's definition " innate psycho-physical dispositions which determine the organism to perceive (to pay attention to) any object of a certain class, and to experience in its presence a certain emotional excitement and an impulse to action which find expression in a specific mode of behaviour in relation to that object ".[1] The actual number of psycho-physical dispositions into which McDougall divides the instinctive life-force, though it is suggestive and in many ways helpful, is arbitrary and at best, uncertain. It differs, too, from the number suggested by such able psychologists as Thouless and Shand, Thorndike and Hocking.[2] Jung hypothesizes one main stream of life-force which he does not attempt to divide. Freud finds it convenient to differentiate

[1] McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, p. 110.

[2] Dr. McDougall's list is given in *Social Psychology*, Ch. III (pp. 45-9); Dr. Thorndike's in *Elements of Psychology* (pp. 187-191), where he says that " too little is known about the extent to which human behaviour is based upon instincts to allow their enumeration ". Dr. Thouless's classification occurs in Chapter V of *Social Psychology* (pp. 66-76). Dr. Thouless says that " some writers would allow us to speak of ' instinct ', but deny that there is any value in the conception of ' instincts ' ". Professor McDougall, on the other hand, attaches great importance to his separation of a variety of different instinctive tendencies (p. 66). Mr. Shand's list occurs in *The Foundations of Character* (Chs. III and IV), and Dr. Hocking's in *Human Nature and Its Remaking*. Dr. Thorndike has a further classification of instinctive tendencies in *The Original Nature of Man* (pp. 50-2). Dr. Rivers has a classification in Chapter VII of *Instinct and the Unconscious* (pp. 52-60).

sex and ego instincts. Tansley sees character determined by a threefold urge—sex, the ego, and the impulse to be one with the herd. Adler admits only the will to power.

Dr. William Brown, in his *Science and Personality*, admits the division of the life-force into various instinctive activities, but merely "as a helpful principle of classification". He says: "The individual comes into the world with the power to respond in various ways to stimulation from his environment, and although these various modes of response are functions of his nervous system, nevertheless it is helpful to think of them also as corresponding to different needs and fundamental tendencies of the conscious individual."[1] But they are, in fact, "none of them unconnected with one another. They are all parts of one another. They are all aspects of one vital urge."[2]

The difference of opinion is bewildering. The most we can say is that, while some division is convenient, and does help towards further understanding, psychology so far has nothing final to say about it. It is perhaps simplest and best to think of each individual creature as possessed of one stream of life-energy, and not to attempt to divide it too definitely into minor streamlets. It is quite true that one notices several main outlets—the outlet whence come the activities of sex—that whence come those concerned with self-preservation—that whence come those which care for, protect and develop the new generation—and so on. But it would be quite false—or so it seems to me—to im-

[1] Brown, *Science and Personality*, p. 72.
[2] Ibid., p. 73.

agine that there was one portion, as it were, of the life-force available for sex and nothing else, one for preserving the self, one for caring for children, or whatever it may be. When you are in love, for instance, almost the whole energy is drawn into the sex channel, and the energy you generally use for other things is sadly and amusingly depleted. Similarly when you meet a tiger—on the banks of the Congo or the Niger or elsewhere—all the available energy is directed to saving your own life. If, however, you are in love at the same time, the energy with which you kissed your girl good-bye will be temporarily diverted from the channels of sex and used to reinforce your running-away power.

UNLESS you have the girl with you. In that case various things may happen. You may forget her and in the stress of the moment run away alone. Or you may try to save both her and yourself, seizing her hand, and running with her. Or you may forget yourself altogether, and lose your own life in saving hers. Or again you may suffer a momentary but devastating conflict of interest (the tiger's great opportunity), the self-preserving instinct saying "run", and the sex instinct, "No, save Martha first!" That will all depend on the kind of person you are, and on the direction of your whole life. What I would emphasize is that the life-energy is, as it were, interchangeable. In a normal kind of life (life is only, for all of us, more or less normal) the life-energy will be flowing more or less normally in a number of channels. In a crisis, however, as, say, when Martha has pneumonia, most of the life-force will run in her

channel. When the crisis is over some of it will run back to its usual form of expression. In all of us, of course, some energy is turned back uselessly in concern for self. In the complete neurotic, moreover, the life-stream may be almost altogether dammed, but that will concern us later.

For the moment we only need this idea of a life-force that is active in many and various ways, but that, in itself, is essentially one. It matters more to us to know the *kind* of life-force which it is, than to try to define the modes of its action. And here we come to some really vital considerations. In the first place instinctive activity, even on the lowest levels of life, has in it the beginning of "mind". It is "*psycho*-physical-energy". Moreover, it is energy with a purpose. "It strives," says McDougall, "towards a goal, a change of situation of a particular kind, which alone can satisfy the impulse and allay the unrest of the organism."[1]

The activity, therefore, to which the life-force is driving the individual is directed to fulfilling a purpose, which seems for some reason good to the individual. And in this activity the individual has some freedom of choice. This is, of course, a vexed question, for much of the new psychology sees the individual as determined at every point by forces internal and external, over which he has no control. On the other hand, an increasingly large number of thinkers have built their work on the hypothesis of freedom. McDougall, admitting a power of deliberately directing and controlling the expression of the life-tendencies, says: "The power

[1] *Outline of Psychology*, p. 107.

we have of controlling, suppressing or cutting short the stirrings of our tendencies is of the utmost importance. The scientific explanation of it is a very subtle and difficult problem which leads into metaphysical depths such as the question of free-will and determinism. We need not enter upon that; it suffices to know that the power is very real and can be greatly developed by cultivation."[1] In fact, so long as we conceive of the life-force as in any sense purposive, we are bound to conceive of it as to some extent free, for the idea of purpose involves the idea of freedom as an essential part of itself. "With freedom we find correlated an awareness of purpose, expressing itself in its lower forms as a tendency or direction, and in its fuller development as the conscious and steadfast choice of an end."[2] "What we inherit is not a ready-made affair, but a wide possibility and potency of moulding ourselves in our lives. In other words, what above all is inherited is freedom, and the capacity of free and self-determined action and development in our individual lives. In our psychic nature we are raised above the bondage of organic inheritance."[3]

Accepting, therefore, the idea of an organism—low as a plant or high as a man—with some purpose and some freedom, making through the life-force within it some contact with its environment which is at least partly of its own determining, we have to ask what it (the organism) really wants. And first and foremost we find that it must keep itself in

[1] McDougall, *Character and the Conduct of Life*, p. 18.
[2] Grensted, *Psychology and God*, p. 11.
[3] Smuts, *Holism and Evolution*, p. 274.

life, and then if possible, increase that life, making it somehow into a better sort of thing. Therefore it feels out, as it were, towards its environment for such things as food, shelter, protection, the possibility of propagating its own species. It needs these things, and it sets out to get them. Its environment may not always contain them. It may, moreover, be full of actual threats to the continued existence of the organism, but if the organism is not to die (which, of course, it often does), then it must find some adjustment which will give it what it needs and protect it from what it fears. On that adjustment—on, that is to say, the establishing of a relationship—life itself depends. It is not, ever, at any stage, self-contained. The life-force is not something that, by itself, from within, secures the individual's existence. It is that which strives after the kind of relationship in which that existence is most strongly guaranteed. And this point is absolutely vital! Even in the comparatively simple levels of life which we are now considering the continued existence of any creature is indissolubly bound up with the possibility of its entering into relationship with such an object or objects outside itself as shall satisfy its need.

This brings us to another important aspect of the nature of the life-force. It will, through the instincts, predispose the individual to take interest in, to be especially alive to, those things which bear on its self-preservation. The spider will be interested in the fly, and the fly in the strawberry jam! You might, indeed, almost say that instinct has an eye to the main chance. But it does not

achieve its purpose coldly, as the machine does, for it has feeling bound up with it. The fact that some things satisfy it and others threaten it, disposes it to different kinds of emotional reaction towards those things, (and later, those people). It likes what satisfies; it dislikes what denies.

This fact, that the life-force is a life-force which "feels", is of tremendous significance, for it leads us gradually, but inevitably, from the lowest forms of liking to the highest forms of love. And there is more than liking and disliking involved. The life-force, in its instinctive activities, may be involved in a whole gamut of emotions. Let us take the very simple, but fundamental, case of hunger. Of this, Shand writes: "One of the earliest joys common to both men and the higher animals is that of satisfying hunger; as one of the earliest sorrows is that caused by the lack of food. Through hunger the young animal seeks the teat, and sucks at it when found: that is the instinct of its hunger. The enjoyment which it feels leads it to suck as long as the enjoyment is felt; that is the innate tendency of the emotion."[1]

In this same way Shand connects, not only hunger, but all the various primary instincts, according as they are satisfied or frustrated, with the primary emotions of anger, fear, joy and sorrow. "When opposed, it (the instinct) tends to arouse anger; when satisfied, joy; when frustrated, sorrow, and, when it anticipates frustration, fear."[2] Now

[1] *The Foundations of Character*, p. 30.

[2] Ibid., p. 38. I have chosen to follow Shand in believing that many emotions may be aroused, in varying circumstances, in connection with the same instinct, rather than McDougall and others in allotting a special emotion to each instinct. There

these feelings, and many others, of which the life-force is capable, seem to have many different functions. They may—as in the case of the joy that comes when hunger is satisfied—act as fulfilment. The life-force reaches outward, finds in the environment that which it seeks and needs, and experiences joy as the result of an adjustment well made. Or they may act as incentive, as when anger drives to redoubled effort, or fear to the running-away necessary for safety. Or again, as in despair, they may completely paralyse action.

It follows, therefore, that this feeling which the life-force is always experiencing is a vital part of it, may indeed be the most vital part. For if the life-force may become involved in such feeling as stops its out-reaching, contact-making activity, then sometimes feeling may make life itself impossible. Both animal and man have been known to die of a "broken heart". And it is certain that the mere success of the life-force in establishing such a contact with environment as shall ensure continued physical existence may mean—when it comes to human life—almost nothing. But whether the feeling-tone resulting from that contact be one of love, joy, peace (which an old psychologist said were the fruits of the Spirit), or whether it be one of anger, indifference, sorrow, unrest or despair, that surely makes all—literally all—the difference. It makes all the difference in so far as the individual's sense of the worth-whileness of his life is concerned, and all the difference to the direction, power and success of his future efforts. But we

may, of course, be a characteristic emotion, but life rarely runs true to "character" of this kind.

must note once more that—just as the possibility of continued physical life is the result of the establishment of a relationship—so the feeling-tone of that life is the result of relationship. The individual does not, by himself and for himself, create feelings of pleasure and pain, sorrow and joy, peace, unrest, hope, fear, despair and all the rest of them. One would rather say that these feelings are created in him, partly by the nature of his own out-going towards those circumstances and those other selves that surround him, and partly by the nature of their response to him. They arise, fundamentally, out of relationship.

Sometimes, it is true, the life and the feeling of the individual do seem to depend almost wholly on the environment. And the environment does seem often to hold that which may cripple, frustrate and destroy the individual, whether it be animal or man—a matter which, by the way, proves especially baffling to a man like Albert Schweitzer, trying to work out an ethic on the basis of "reverence for life", and which meets us all, in one way or another, in what we call "the problem of evil". It does seem—as far as appearances go—that circumstances often are "too much" for the creature. The individual, be he man, animal, or some lower creature yet, exists for the most part in an environment which is not immediately obedient to his demand, but which meets him with denials, obstacles, and difficulties. The strange and significant fact, however, is not that this should be so, but that the denials, obstacles and difficulties, while they can and may destroy, can and may also prove

as serviceable to the individual's life as the response of the environment does at other times.

"Without physical pain," Professor Julian Huxley writes, "there could be no adapted life, no progressive evolution." The individual, the species, that evades struggle, becomes parasitic or perishes. On the human level also—quoting Professor Huxley again—"it is perhaps safe to say that there must always be pain of some kind if the human being is to advance from the infantile to the mature level of mind, from wish and fantasy and castles in Spain, to desire tempered by experience, purpose, and real achievement. The world is not what our desire would have it: those who have not faced that fact and all its implications of pain are doomed to remain in the unreal world of childhood."[1] And Professor J. Y. Simpson says: "The successful species has come out of great tribulation."[2]

The life urge, increasingly active, eternally seeking new adjustments and new expressions, struggling for the being and continuity of the race, hindered and beset at every point does nevertheless find, in the very frustration and denial that impels it to effort, the way to its progress and victory. It does find, in the warning and the urge of its pain and fear, and discomfort, the way to the joy of

[1] Huxley. Quoted Standing, *Creative Evolution*, p. 234.

[2] Simpson. Quoted op. cit., p. 238; cf. also Smuts, *Holism and Evolution*, p. 294. "Personality is fundamentally an organ of self-realization. As in the case of the growing or mutilated organism, the whole manifests itself by bearing through all obstructions, and overcoming all obstacles in its efforts to realize and complete itself or its type in each individual case, so, too, Personality has, as its central end, the straightening out of all difficulties and the elimination of all elements which militate against the realization of its own immanent ideal."

living, which "announces that life has succeeded, gained ground, conquered".[1]

So we get back to "the squirming mass of protoplasm" which is our human infant, full of an energy as yet neither evil nor good, of an urgent demand as yet blind, dependent for the most elementary necessities of life upon its environment and the objects which compose it, finding even at first that this environment and these objects, may either deny or fulfil—may give food, rest, shelter, comfort or discomfort, isolation, restlessness, starvation. These are the first realities—the infant with the blind instinctive demand of its will to live, and the environment within and without, on which the fulfilment of its will to live depends, from which come pain and pleasure, affirmation and denial. From this beginning the infant, a little bundle of instinctive tendencies, must become a person, himself controlling those tendencies by which he was at first controlled, not being used by them, blindly, for the ends of their physical being, but using them, clear-sightedly, for the ends of his spiritual life; seeking, through them, not merely for adaptation to a material environment, but for at-homeness in a spiritual one.

[1] Bergson, *Mind Energy*.

CHAPTER II

THE ORGANIZATION OF PERSONALITY

PSYCHOLOGY as a social science and a healing art is a very different thing from psychology as a technical and pure science. In the latter case it must find out all the hows and whys of the working of the human mind—but it need not weep over the breakings of the human heart. If some method of psycho-analysis heal them—that is an interesting fact to be recorded! If other methods merely discover causes and do not show results in people made whole, that also is to be recorded, but in terms of discoveries yet to make rather than of human beings left unhealed. And too much psychotherapy is like that—so scientific that it dare not press into its service the realities that heal because they are not—as yet—called by scientific names.

But the psychology and psychotherapy that would attempt to heal both individuals and society is in a different position. It needs all the available knowledge—and more—but it strives with that knowledge to learn to make the broken whole. As such it has a special and a definite problem. It sees a few people (and they are comparatively few), happy and at home in life, free, active and unafraid —harmonious people because they are at one within themselves and at one with the world outside them. But the majority of people are not like that.

Life which, in the minority, bears joy as the sign of its success, in the others is marked by the pain of failure, or at least by the indifference and weariness of half success.

So the psychologist (the healing psychologist) must discover, not only why the whole people are whole, not only why the broken are broken, but, most urgently, how to make the broken whole. Why should those squirming masses of protoplasm come to ends so different? Surely the whole of their fate was not written in the cells out of whose union they were born?

We meet, in writer after writer, some recognition of the general unsatisfactoriness of human behaviour. For Jung "modern man has become merely neurotic".[1] Freud sees men asking themselves whether "this fragment (of progress in the regulation of human affairs) that has been acquired by culture is indeed worth defending at all".[2] Dr. Hadfield writes: "The increasing pressure of modern life, with its anxieties and cares, constitutes an ever augmenting tax upon our strength. It is hardly surprising that nervous breakdowns are common, and that neurasthenia, or nerve fatigue, is the most significant disease of the age. . . . The mind is the latest part of the human organism to have developed in evolution, and is therefore the least completely adapted to its environment. In the face of the chances and rebuffs of life it frequently finds itself nonplussed: it cannot live as it would because of the limitations surrounding it;

[1] *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 43.
[2] *The Future of an Illusion*, p. 29.

it turns away sick at the problems it has to face."[1]

These are the typically modern problems, and the typically modern psychology stands for judgment at the bar of humanity not for the diagnosis it makes, but for the solution it offers. Man is still asking, as urgently as ever he did, although perhaps he asks it in a different language, "What must I do to be saved?" He wants to know whether psychology has an answer, or whether it is merely a mass of descriptive knowledge which, just because of its scientific accuracy, binds more rigidly on him the fetters of his fear and self-despair.

This study is an attempt to find whether an answer is there—not so good an answer as we shall eventually find, but one that can be of some help to-day—and, if so, where among the suggested solutions it lies. If we take, first, those put forward by the psychologists who study the building of normal character rather than the remaking of abnormal, we have among others the ingenious, and—apparently—simple suggestion put forward by the Behaviourist School, and the very significant theories connected chiefly with the names of McDougall and Shand.

Dr. Watson, speaking for the Behaviourists, works from the basis that the organism contains within itself the possibility of infinite, and infinitely varied, responses to environmental stimuli. He then hits upon the remedy for all human ills that consists in constructing for all children environments, both human and material, that will provide exactly the right kind of stimuli, in the

[1] "The Psychology of Power", in *The Spirit* (ed. Streeter, pp. 70-80).

right order and the right number, to turn them into the right kind of adults. The child will do nothing but respond. It will all be done neatly, automatically, and in order, so to speak. Of course you will have to prescribe the right environments, mixed in the right proportions, for the kind of human being you want.[1]

Different environments will obviously be needed for a Shakespeare and a Hitler, if it happens to be a Shakespeare or a Hitler that you want. And you will have to construct something different again if you only want an ordinary common or garden sort of human being, who won't be liable to sulk, or be irritable or anti-social, or funk his job. A certain number of ordinary human beings would, of course, be desirable, if only to read the Shakespeares and be carefully arranged by the Hitlers. And if, when you had built up an environment exactly right for producing ordinary normal Tom Hodges, and Shakespeare, as it were, broke out at you—well, that would be up to the Behaviourists!

But it is too easy only to mock! Hitler in Germany, Mussolini in Italy, the Communistic régime in Russia, have given rather startling examples of the half truth that lies at the heart of Behaviourism. It does seem possible so to condition the mental, and, more importantly, the emotional environment, of a whole people so that the majority of them can be counted on to react in certain definite ways to certain definite circum-

[1] Behaviourism has, since the writing of this, taken much more into account—as, indeed, was inevitable—the element of purpose. The criticism here suggested is, therefore, one that has been admitted, at least in part, by the Behaviourists themselves.

stances. One has to ask, very seriously, first, how far such a state is sound, or how far it is liable to be built on a volcano, the never-quite extinct volcano of human freedom? And, second, how far we, in the interests of democracy and peace, might condition our own national and educational environment, and yet thereby might increase, rather than hinder, the growth of freedom? After all, the father who takes his children for country walks, teaching them love and reverence for life, rather than giving them toy soldiers and bloodthirsty ideas is so far a Behaviourist! But if he takes the soldiers away by force, and beats the boy who plays with them, he is merely a tyrant. Surely the solution of how far we may and must condition environment depends on what we believe to be the final nature of man, and what he of his very essence is made to love, and in loving it to find his freedom.

We must make friends with the mammon of unrighteousness—if that is not too hard on Behaviourism! The environment of many human beings ought to be better than it is; and they would then, generally speaking, be better human beings than they are. "There but for the grace of God . . ." But we know it!

If all the carts were painted gay,
  And all the streets swept clean,
And all the children came to play
  By hollyhocks, with green
  Grasses to grow between;
If all the houses looked as though
  Some heart were in the stones;
If all the people that we know
  Were dressed in scarlet gowns,
  With feathers in their crowns,

I think this gaiety would make
A spiritual land.
I think that holiness would take
This laughter by the hand,
Till both should understand.[1]

Well, anyway, it would go part of the way. Behaviourism is part of the truth. But it is partly a dream—an age-old and a bad old dream. It is the eternal "if only" of man, afraid to take his life in his hands and stand upon his legs and walk. "If only this or that were different, I should be different too. As it is, why should I be expected . . . ?" We know it. Humanity always has known it. It came in the fairy-tales that were told before books were written. It has found its way into religions and philosophies, and now it comes in psychological dress. But it is not the answer to human problem and human desire. The snake crept into Eden. Sickness, suffering, frustration and death come into the most perfectly built worlds. And man who, of his nature, can only very partially be "*made*", must learn to "*make*", out of the bricks and mortar of the denial of desire, the home in which his spirit shall live.

So, even at its best, Behaviourism cannot help us greatly here, in spite of the fact that, by the very writing of books, it apparently believes in the possibility of arousing some activity of will. For we are taking it that, in the relationship which exists between individual and environment, it is the individual and not the environment that plays the controlling part. The significant theory for us is,

[1] This poem, by John Drinkwater, is published by permission of the Author's Representatives and of the Publishers, Messrs. Sidgwick & Jackson.

therefore, the theory of sentiment-formation, as put forward chiefly by McDougall and Shand. It is difficult to describe shortly—Shand takes some 900 pages to do it—but at the heart of it is the belief that in all living things there is what might best be called a principle of organization. This works within the individual, and determines, just as much, or even more than, outside circumstance, the evolutionary progress of the various species, and the more adequate adaptation of the individual to its environment. Even in plants and animals it presupposes what Professor J. S. Haldane has called "a marvellous power of minute adaptation to environmental change on the part of the organism".

As more complex forms of life develop, the "principle of organization" works towards establishing an even more complete unity between the various parts of the individual. But this unity is not an end in itself. It is a means to the end of enabling the individual to enter more fully into its life-preserving and life-increasing relationship with its environment. And only *through that relationship* does it lead to the ultimate fulfilment of the individual. Unity, harmony, wholeness is, according to this principle, the goal of the life process, and of each individual life—harmony within, through harmony with that which is without.

That seems fairly simple, but, when we ask where, in the individual, this principle of organization resides, we are on more difficult ground, and it may be as well to put the discussions and differences aside, and say with McDougall, that it resides in what we know by the "old-fashioned word, mind".

Now, in the human infant "mind", when we take it in its ordinary sense of that in us which can consciously think, direct and control, is there only in embryo. Such principle of organization as exists is the instinctive centring of activities in the obtaining of food, warmth, comfort and security. It is true that mind, on a very simple and largely unconscious level, is already working in these activities. But there is obviously a wide gap to be bridged before one comes to that organization of instinctive impulse in which the adult individual actually does sometimes, and may always potentially, act as a whole in self-conscious, purposive striving for a goal which is deliberately chosen because it is seen to be good.

Fortunately life itself is on the side of the angels, and the principle of organization which acts so effectively in the simpler forms of life, will help in the building of personal and spiritual harmony. In seeking for it we shall have the nature of things with us! But, where the personal and spiritual are concerned, it will not just happen. It needs understanding, love and effort, both for ourselves and each other. We must find out the "law" of the process, and then make it valid.

Shand encourages us to believe that the law is there. "If it is of the essential nature of mind," he says, "and the most general fact that we can assert about it, that it always tends to organize its process, then, whenever we examine mental process, we should find some organic law."[1] This law is, for him, the law of sentiment-formation. "We owe to Mr. A. F. Shand," Dr. McDougall writes, "the

[1] Shand, *The Foundations of Character*, p. 24.

recognition of features of our mental constitution of a most important kind that have been strangely overlooked by other psychologists, and the application of the word 'sentiments' to denote features of this kind. Mr. Shand points out that our emotions, or, more strictly speaking, our emotional dispositions, tend to become organized in systems about the various objects and classes of objects that excite them."[1]

This is not only an important contribution, but a necessary one. The fact is that we, the heirs of generations of Protestantism and Puritanism, tend to look at the building of character too much from the side of mind and will and conscious effort, and to neglect the organization of the great emotional forces, which, untrained and unharnessed, may make havoc of mind and will and effort. Now the law of the unification of character through the formation of sentiments is a law which gives a place, not only important, but actually determining, to the function of emotion. And Dr. William Brown bears this out when he says that "one can subserve the activities of the mind under two very general headings of love and hate, of likes and dislikes".[2] All of this gives us a glimpse of a new way of looking at the organization of mind—not so much as an organization of capacities for thought and action, although that is part of it, but actually as an organization of a striving, outward reaching life-force, which is, of its essential nature, a love-force too.

It is easy enough in adult human beings to

[1] McDougall, *Social Psychology*, p. 122.
[2] *Science and Personality*, p. 78.

recognize this organization when it has effected real balance and sanity of character. It is easy to recognize the signs of chaos and disorder. But it is very difficult to trace it in its beginnings. It is certainly a progressive development arising out of what Shand calls "the primary systems of the emotions". By this he means that every contact with its surroundings, personal and otherwise, made by the human infant is accompanied by a feeling—momentary, maybe, but definite nevertheless. Every satisfaction of impulse brings "some degree of joy", especially if it has been somewhat delayed or obstructed. Obstruction, when it cannot be overcome, however, tends to evoke a display of anger, and as the obstruction continues, the anger amounts to a frustration which Shand considers to be "at least one of the primitive causes of sorrow". This connection—between sorrow and the anticipated frustration of some impulse—although Shand admits that it is partly acquired, is of vital importance, for in the later personal life, as in this early instinctive one, "when we make no headway against opposition, when it does not yield to our efforts, but remains immovably fixed, the anger which, perhaps, it first awakened tends to be replaced by sorrow. We feel ourselves engaged in a hopeless contest against an invincible opponent."[1] This, Shand says, the child cannot understand. It is equally true that there are many circumstances in adult life where the individual feels himself engaged in "a hopeless contest" with life, and is oppressed by his incapacity to understand.

Now, these innate dispositions to feel fear, anger,

[1] *Foundations of Character*, p. 31.

curiosity, joy, sorrow, etc., are not just feelings that arise for a moment within the infant, and then disappear, leaving no special trace, and building no special connection with life. Each of them is aroused by some definite object, and the infant will, even unconsciously, connect the feelings with the objects that call them forth. The joyful feelings will always be connected with the joyful object (or objects), the peaceful feelings with the objects that give security and protection, the frustrated feelings with the frustrating objects, the fearful feelings with the fearful objects.[1]

The feelings themselves may be momentary, but, as they are aroused again and again by the same object, they tend to form "groupings of feeling" around that object. These groupings of feelings are the beginnings of sentiments. But sentiment is not always a state of active emotion. It is a tendency to feel a special kind, or kinds, of emotion whenever, in actuality or in memory, a certain object crops up.

The significant thing here, of course, is that the "objects" of a child's world are, nearly always, persons. Its hunger is satisfied by a person, its fear (even of things, thunder, etc.) soothed or increased by a person—its sense of frustration comes from persons—its sense of security is in the shelter and rest given it by a personal environment. It finds itself in a state of complete helplessness which

[1] I have used the word "object" for anything—whether person, or inanimate object, even impersonal force, such as thunder, which makes up the environment of a child. A fearful object may therefore be a person who terrifies, or a frightening mask, a picture, a dog, a thunder-storm, or any one of a hundred things.

involves an equally complete dependence on an environment of persons. Around persons, therefore, the first organization of the sentiments take place, although, occasionally, even in young children, they may grow up around beauty in nature, or music, or some other "impersonal" value.

The predominance of the personal element in the child's environment does, however, give us a clue to the building of character. The intimate connection of things with people—of food with the mother, for instance—helps us to understand something of the transition from the physical world of the animal to the personal world of the human being, and of how that transition may be made through the organization of sentiments.

Let us suppose, for a moment, that a mother always satisfies her baby's need for food, rest, warmth, and comfort. Then successive emotions of pleasure and satisfaction which arose at first only in connection with some physical need become associated with the mother herself. She is the giver of pleasure and comfort and peace—she is something dependable, secure, and trustworthy at the back of things.

Then the infant begins to grow up. He has to find a groping, blundering and difficult way into a world that does not consist of food and sleep and bodily comfort, but of personal relationships and personal laws. Moreover, he has within himself—little animal that he is—the seed of his personality that is to be. He is a "god tho' in the germ". That unfolding seed must be helped, encouraged and trained in its growth. The orange juice and cod liver oil of the soul need as careful attention

as those of the body. And supposing that the mother still proves, in these personal matters, a real guide and help and refuge—supposing she remains the person to whom everything can be told—the trustworthy, unchanging, will-never-let-you-down heart of life, then the mother-sentiment, which is already being formed, becomes strengthened with all manner of new emotions—respect, admiration, tenderness, gratitude, etc., all of which fit harmoniously into the mother-sentiment.

So the child grows up, and the strong mother-sentiment may now either hinder its development, or help it to become a free, adult individual. This will depend largely on the mother. For the sentiment should now take its place in a group of other sentiments, which will in the end be held together in unity and harmony by a master-sentiment. If that happens, the mother-sentiment will be one of the great building-forces. For without the "feeling-sense" of love and trust given by the early mother-relationship the grown-up man will rarely have any real "feeling" conviction of the friendliness and reliability of life.

On the other hand, the mother may not encourage the growing child to have other sentiments—as for friends, social service, truth, God—united in the service of some ideal which will give meaning to them all. She may cling to, and foster, the child's dependence—encourage it to centre its interest, affection and activity too much on herself. In that case the grown man may never get the mother-sentiment into its proper place. Even if he loses his actual mother he will still go through life looking for the shelter and security, the relief from

responsibility, the physical comfort, with which she surrounded him. He will look for a mother in his wife and his female friends. He will never quite stand on his own two legs and be a man! Psychologically he will remain a child, imprisoned in a mother fixation. (A fixation might be called a sentiment gone wrong, a sentiment which absorbs all, instead of its fair share, of the individual's emotional energy.)

All that this means to parents and educators is another subject—and in any case obvious enough. We have chosen the case of a mother and son, as it is one of the most striking. And the mother, because of her early relation to the child, may stand for physical comfort and satisfaction in a way which the father rarely does. But the way in which the father-sentiment is formed is of equal and, in some ways, of greater importance. For the father in the child's small world stands for authority and even, often, for God. If the child has reason to be afraid of him (and this may happen through that very unfair way some mothers have of using " I'll tell your father " as the last and direst threat), then the father-sentiment will be tinged emotionally with fear. That may mean that—unless some force of a new character intervenes—the adult man and woman, whatever his or her rational views, may never get rid of a sense of fear towards life and the world. And it may mean a hatred of all authority. There are people who shy at the very mention of the word authority—the very thought of it in connection with themselves. The quick, emotional reaction is the father-sentiment come to life. Here, again, the case of the father is used for convenience.

It is probably true that, for obvious reasons, the father inspires fear more often than the mother. But there is no reason to make the father a sort of psychological bogey. The mother-sentiment may equally well be tinged with fear, and may equally well have, in that sense, a disastrous effect on the after-life.

There are endless other ways in which sentiments are formed. It may be that no strong or consistent mother- or father-sentiment is formed. In the case of capricious adults, arousing in children now emotional reactions of fear, now of satisfaction, there would grow up an emotional instability—a chaos of feelings ungrouped in sentiments. Even worse—the father- and mother-sentiments—generally the two first, certainly the two most determining, of the emotional life, might be antagonistic. The father-sentiment, for instance, might be built up of emotions of love and trust, the mother-sentiment of uncertainty and fear. Then the child would tend to have emotional conflict within himself, and to grow up to a sense, inexplicable to him, of conflict in the life without him. The quarrelling of father and mother before the child—or even their hidden disharmony—is a psychic disaster, leaving the child with the sense of a world at war, and nothing to rest in and trust.

These, of course, are generalisations. They indicate what tends to, and what generally does, happen in certain given circumstances. The effects, however, may be greatly changed by the impingement, later, of some fundamental emotional force —love, friendship, religious conversion, psychotherapeutic treatment. (Nearly all psychological

devils—and their name is legion—are cast out by the "expulsive power of a new affection". Unfortunately, new affections, which come through the "saints" of the earth, are not too easily come by.) The generalisation, however, is sufficient to show how important, both for the adult life of the individual, and for society, are the kind of sentiments formed in childhood, and their strength and harmony. It is sufficient to show, too, the vital influence of emotion. Long before the child learns to "know", it is being made by its loving and its hating and its fearing. Long after it "knows" it will be empowered or hampered in knowledge and action by this same loving and hating and fearing. But "love", in its lower or higher sense, will naturally dominate. Life tends to "go after" what it likes. If the human environment of a child be so poor that eating sweets and smoking cigarettes in secret is its principle source of enjoyment—then the kind of love of self that is expressed in self-indulgence may well be the master-sentiment of later life. "Emotions," says Shand, "come to be organized round all those objects that we regard as the good things of life: and without those emotions we should not pursue them; but remain indifferent and apathetic to their appeal."

We shall love, and seek, and be active on behalf of, what appeals to us as good—what satisfies us. One would imagine, then, that if there were in the environment of the child persons and ideals sufficiently lovable to call forth, in a directed activity, all the energies of the instinctive life, character would harmonize itself, not automatically, or necessarily without difficulty, but in such a way as should

save from much neurosis, ineffectiveness, unhappiness and despair. We might slightly misquote Carlyle's "learn to admire rightly", and use it as our motto. "Learn to love rightly" may well be one of the two clues to the great open secret of life —the other, of course, being supplied by the lover.

But, while we accept the theory of sentiment-formation, with the dominant place which it gives to emotion, we shall not think of emotion in the sense of continual demonstrations of feeling—the kind of thing that often seems to go with instability and ineffectiveness in what we call the "emotional" person—but rather the setting of the whole life in one definite direction, determined first and held steady throughout by love. The sentiments, it is true, are built up out of emotions, but once a sentiment is built up, it is far from being in a state of "feeling" all the time. The mother-sentiment, for instance, is made first out of many successive emotions which have been aroused in connection with the mother, but, in later life, a man with a strong mother-sentiment is not in a state of perpetual feeling about his mother. On special occasions, a visit, an illness, a birthday, a remembrance, the sentiment will wake into appropriate feeling—but it will be there all the time, a steady attitude of the mind. It is the same with the wife-sentiment, which may be infinitely more valuable than the perpetual, turbulent "feeling" of falling in love. No man can be, or should be, "feeling" about his wife all the time. But on appropriate occasions the emotions connected with the wife-sentiment (tenderness, gratitude, passion —or others not so fortunate) will be aroused. The

same thing would happen with a man whose whole life centres in and sets towards some great ideal, like justice. He will not always be in a state of emotion about it, but will always have the appropriate feelings of relief when justice is done, anger, pity, horror, when it is not, and so on. When a man's feeling capacity is organized in strong sentiments, his actual "emotions" will be far less "all over the place" than is the case with a man whose sentiments are weak and inharmonious.

But it is obvious that a man may have many sentiments — for wife, children, work, beauty, mother, father, etc.—all strong, good and well-knit in themselves, but making upon him claims of a conflicting nature, in the midst of which he may lose peace of mind and power of effective action. If he is to attain to final unity, there must be one supreme love, not so much taking love from the other sentiments as holding all their various loves within its own, harmonizing, unifying and empowering them.

Thinking along these lines we see that there must eventually be one all-inclusive system. The tendency is towards the building up of an all-inclusive system of interests, a system of sentiments with one all-inclusive sentiment. This supreme sentiment, named by McDougall the master-sentiment, will be "a system of instinctive-emotional dispositions centred about one supreme object. Such an object will be as general as possible and as all-inclusive as possible. What should that object be? Clearly it should be the universe as a perfected system, as the full realization of the Good, the Beautiful, and the True. Thinking in terms of

personality, or on the analogy of personality, one would say that the object is a personal or super-personal God."[1]

Most of the suggestions as to a possible master-sentiment are not so satisfactory as this. Shand says: "In all individuals, then, there is a love of something to give some order or unity to their lives; and the system which is found generally pre-eminent is the great principle of self-love or the self-regarding sentiment."[2]

The very debatable point as to whether "the great principle of self-love" can unify a man and set him free will be considered later. For the moment we only want to get a clear picture of the way to character building put forward by the theory of sentiment-formation. The fundamental organizing factor is "an innate disposition to love". The various love-settings of the life will be organized around persons or things as a result of past emotional experience. They will need, for their final wholeness and stability, to be subordinated to, and held together in, an effective master-sentiment. So by a right giving out, drawing out, of love might a human life be made happy and whole!

But although, so far, the theory is built up for us in a coherent and comprehensible fashion there is a gap. "Love," Shand says, "is only fully constituted when it has found its objects and is *rendered active on behalf of them*."[3] But—and here is the gap—he never considers in the whole of his long and able study, how far the nature of the object

[1] William Brown, *Science and Personality*, p. 79.
[2] *Foundations of Character*, p. 57.
[3] Ibid., p. 56.

loved might determine both the quality of the emotions it called forth, as well as their power and harmony. Yet it seems apparent, even in our very brief discussion of the building of the sentiments, that the objects (especially the human objects) with which the child is surrounded must have a great deal to do with the kind of sentiments formed. This side of the question is rarely considered by modern psychology, except, as we shall see later, by the pathologists, and then chiefly by implication. And the explanation of the fact that human life is so rarely organized according to a really desirable pattern, may have to be sought here—in the environment as well as in the individual.

We at any rate are going to seek it there. We shall use the conception of a sentiment as an "organization of primary emotions", having at its command all the tremendously vital energy of those emotions, with the very definite understanding that, while it may appear to be an organization within the individual only, it is the result of numerous interactions with the environment, and cannot exist without them. This will mean that the nature of the sentiments is to be learned best, not from the study of them in themselves, but from the study of the relationships of which they are at once the cause and effect. And even as effect, they are never "finished" organizations, for at every stage of their development their energy is directed to the forming of ever more and more satisfying relationships. The possibilities of their interaction with the world about them are, literally, inexhaustible.

So the sentiments are never ends in themselves. They grow out of relationship, and for relationship.

One might almost say that they are a living, active expression, potentially increasing, potentially decreasing, of the fact of relationship. It is precisely because the infant, in his first disconnected strivings, cannot establish so full a relationship with his environment as is necessary for his developing life, that he must find and make for himself new ways of adaptation. And it is precisely because the mature man finds ever some reach of life just beyond his present ken in which he would make his heart and mind at home, that he is enabled to go on from height to height of being.

CHAPTER III

THE NEED FOR LOVE

THE theory of sentiment-formation has given us a helpful way of thinking of the building and harmonizing of character through a love-prompted and love-directed organization of the life-force. But it left a gap. In the first chapter we saw the creature for ever driven by its life-force into closer contact with its environment so that it might the better satisfy its needs. Now it is precisely the same life-force which in human beings makes the contacts with people, activities, ideals and causes which we call sentiments, and it would seem reasonable to suppose that here, too, it is seeking the satisfaction of fundamental needs—personal needs this time. It is simple, for instance, on the physical level, to know that the need for food drives the infant to seek its mother's breast: why should it not be some need equally fundamental that impels the grown man's seeking for and offering of friendship, or his devotion to the cause of righteousness and justice?

In popular language we speak of the love-starved child, and we know what we mean by the phrase. We are admitting that the child has a need for love just as much as a need for food—and that that need may not be satisfied, may in fact be exactly like a physical hunger meeting with starvation. It is easy to understand the baby's need for the breast, but not always so easy to realize that the older child

who "makes up" to the adult does not always or only want a cream-bun. He wants—even more—the affection in look and word and touch which makes his world secure. When he brings his strange drawing of a ship or a cow it is not simply an impulse of self-display. He actually needs the appreciation which will make his small and unsure self more certain of its place in a big and bewildering world.

It may be that we are too liable to think of children in terms of needs for food and clothes and fresh air and a good education, and not enough in terms of more fundamental needs of the growing out-reaching personality. So we may be laying up neurosis, not necessarily for lack of love, though that does lay up neurosis, but more often for lack of the knowledge with which love should be armed. It may be, too, that our contacts with the grown-up world are not as creative as they should be because of that same lack of knowledge of the personal needs that must be satisfied if men are to be happy, healthy and sane.

Here, however, the psychology of the sentiments does not help us greatly. It does tell us that our power of loving must be directed outwards towards persons and things. But it does not explain to us (at least explicitly) what manner of beings we are who are fulfilled in this way. It does not tell us what needs lie right at the heart of our being driving us to seek their satisfaction in the world around us. Worst of all it has hardly a word to say of the nature of the persons, causes, ideals, activities which fulfil our needs. Therefore, it cannot tell us—what we so greatly need to know—in what ways

life may go wrong and in what ways it may be made right.

We shall find, as we go on, that pathological psychology—although at first sight it seems unlikely—can help us much more here. It does not say, in so many words, that human life, for its free and happy development, needs this thing and that. Neither life nor psychology is as simple as that, although life, fortunately, is considerably simpler than psychology. But it does tell us that this privation, this fear, this difficulty, has inhibited the contact of an individual with his environment, and that, owing to the inhibited contact, the individual is living a life unsatisfactory both to himself and to society.

This, in an inverse kind of way, gives us the information for which we are looking. For if a person be suffering from privation it means that some need is being left unsatisfied. If he is afraid it means that he foresees still further lack of satisfaction, and, therefore, that he has a sense of something in life alien and antagonistic to him—a sense that things are "again him". (All this, of course, is especially true of the unemployed.) If a person is facing a difficulty so great that it may drive him to retreat in neurosis (the part of the process which pathological psychology will describe to us), we shall infer that he needs from his environment (whether personal or spiritual) a sense of security and confidence which shall give him courage.

In pathological psychology, therefore, we shall try to find the data on which to build a more satisfying theory of the sentiments. We shall try to discover the real nature of the need or needs within

a human being which send him out into life seeking fulfilment. We shall try to discover the real nature of the "objects" in which that fulfilment may be found. Then, when we have done that, we shall be nearer to understanding the nature of the sentiment—the bridge of love—over which man sets out on his adventurous seeking for at-homeness in his world—for the meaning of his existence and for its joy.

There are obviously many of these personal needs in human life — varying infinitely in kind and degree with the infinite variety of character and circumstance. But for the purpose of this discussion it is convenient to separate and consider three, whose very vital nature we can infer from the disaster which follows their thwarting. These three are the need for love, the need for significance, and the need for security. But although we *separate* them it is only because this is necessary for any fruitful discussion and understanding. They are in reality closely inter-related, and we may come to see them in the end as aspects of one great fundamental human need. So it must be remembered throughout that the division is merely convenient —but not nearly so clear-cut, or final, as it must be made to seem. It is for convenience, too, that we shall think of the need for love in connection with the theories of Freud, of the need for significance in connection with those of Adler, and of the need for security with those of Jung. Although here the division is not only convenient; it is also in part true, for, although one may infer many needs from the works of these writers, the viewpoint of each

does seem to lead us chiefly to the particular need we have associated with his name.

To take, then, the work of Dr. Sigmund Freud of Vienna, and the need for love. Freud is in the peculiar position of having come to be hailed, in his exposition of the method of examining the springs of human nature known as psycho-analysis, at once as the arch-prophet of a quite new approach to the understanding of life, and as the arch-destroyer, among all other destroyers, of its sanctities and decencies. Both ways of regarding him obscure his real contribution. His writings may seem confused if one attempts to extract from them a coherent philosophy of life—but then he did not set out to be a philosopher. His method may need —and does seem to need—modification and addition if it is to be used as psychotherapy, as an effective way to the healing of the mind. Freud himself has not claimed that it always heals nor does he—unfortunately—seem to feel that lack as deeply as one would wish. His method is called, significantly, psycho-analysis, not psychotherapy; and that is what he does claim to do—to analyse and discover. And in that there can be no doubt that he has made one of the most vital contributions to human knowledge of our day and generation. It marked an epoch when the young Viennese doctor visited Paris to study the work that a little group of great specialists were doing in the investigation of nervous diseases. And when, further, a Viennese colleague made, almost by accident, a remarkable cure, under hypnosis, of "hysterical" deafness.

This was a "cure" which suggested endless possibilities. The man who discovered it evidently

either could not, or did not dare, to think it to its logical conclusion. Freud had the courage and the genius. He went home and thought and there was eventually let loose upon the world the beginning of the story of what repressions and complexes and such like things in the subconscious mind could do to us in the way of neurosis and nervous disease, and—to make it worse—it was all coupled with the horrible word "sex". The "scandal" started, and from that time for many years Freud fought with misunderstanding and prejudice—coming often from those who, hearing that it was all about "sex", apparently decided that it was therefore not from the devil, and never bothered to find out what he was really talking about. And it is quite remarkable how, even to-day, in books by scholars of whom one would expect better things, Freud is condemned in terms which show quite clearly that the writer has never even troubled to read him.

In spite of all that, all the theories and methods of psychotherapy which have developed since, and which may be better and completer than Freud's, have not only owed him a great debt of gratitude (possibly unacknowledged), but have actually been built on the foundations he laid. He was the pioneer—and without those foundations there would have been little building at all—either good or bad. So it is worth while to find out what he thought about this sorry state of things—for he does think it sorry.

Finding out, however, is difficult, partly because his own theory has developed without his always noting the development, partly because he is liable

at any moment to put forward a new theory to meet some interesting new discovery, without concerning himself overmuch with its relation to, or agreement with, his other theories. Consequently he uses his favourite terms, sex, sexual, ego, libido, erotic, etc., in slightly varying senses. Nevertheless there does emerge, from the whole of his published works, a certain definite and characteristic viewpoint, which the following, with many gaps and deficiencies, attempts to summarize.

The individual has within himself, at birth, a vital energy, a libido, which has not as yet any special characteristics or divisions. But it is, for Freud, more urgent in its demands than anything suggested by any other psychologist. It wants things. It wants them for itself. It wants them with almost terrifying intensity, and it is prepared to make any amount of clamour and disturbance to get them. It wants food. It wants to feel its body comfortable and warm. And soon it wants more subtle things. It wants just the right amount of attention from father or mother or nurse. And Freud upset the theological and psychological apple-cart by insisting—and continuing quite shamelessly to insist—on calling the libido itself, as well as its demands and activities, sexual.

Now there is something repulsive to the simple British mind in calling the baby's pleasure at its mother's breast "sexual". And this may be for two reasons. It may be that the repelled mind has some conscious or unconscious associations with the idea of sex which make its application to almost anything at all something shameful and vaguely

"horrid". Or it may just be that—outside its usual adult relationships—the manifestations of sex are often perverted, so we jib at the word when applied to the helpless, uncomprehending baby who looks so far from being "the polymorphous pervert" which Freud pleases somewhere to call it —or from being a candidate for the principal part in a Freudian text-book. But it all becomes a little simpler, as things quite often do, when one replaces indignation by inquiry and finds out what Freud means by the term sexual. Dr. Oskar Pfister, attempting to explain, says: "The term sexual in psycho-analysis goes below and above the popular sense. This extension is justified genetically; we reckon to the sexual life also all play of tender emotions, which have sprung from the source of primitive sexual impulses, both when those impulses experience an inhibition of their original sexual goal, or have exchanged that goal for another one, no longer sexual. We speak, therefore, preferably, of psycho-sexuality, putting emphasis on the fact that one should not overlook or undervalue the mental factor of the sexual life. We use the word sexuality in the same comprehensive sense as the German language uses the word 'love'."[1]

So we find Freud using the word sexual to describe attachments on very different levels of life. He uses it of the very primitive wants which we have already discussed, such as those for food, warmth, shelter, bodily comfort—and he uses it of the relationships established by the effort to satisfy those wants. He uses it in adolescent and adult life to describe the demand of what we should call the

[1] Pfister, *Psycho-analytic Method*, p. 63.

sex appetite, where that demand still seeks only the gratification of the self and is not subordinated to the fuller personal relationship which we call love. But he uses the terms " sexual " or " erotic " also to describe many other, in fact all grades of affectional attachment. These range from the sex-love of a higher quality than has been described above, where " the depths to which anyone is in love, as contrasted with his purely sensual desire, may be measured by the share taken by the inhibited instincts of tenderness ",[1] to all the possible ties of the emotional life. " The nucleus of what we mean by love is sexual love with sexual union as its aim. But we do not separate from this—what in any case has a share in the name ' love '—on the one hand, self-love, and on the other, love for parents and children, friendship and love for humanity in general, and also devotion to concrete objects and abstract ideas."[2] He considers that the fact that language allows the one word " love " to have such numerous uses is an " entirely justifiable piece of unification ", and asserts that " psycho-analysis has done nothing original in taking love in this ' wider ' sense. In its origin, function and relation to sexual love, the ' Eros ' of the philosopher Plato coincides exactly with the love-force, the libido, of psycho-analysis, as has been shown in detail by Nachmansohn and Pfister; and when the Apostle Paul, in his famous Epistle to the Corinthians, prizes love above all else, he certainly understands it in the same ' wider ' sense."[3]

[1] *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, p. 73.
[2] Ibid., p. 37.
[3] Ibid., pp. 39, 40.

"Psycho-analysis," he says, "gives these love instincts the name of sexual instincts, a potiori, and by reason of their origin. . . . I cannot see any merit in being ashamed of sex; the Greek word 'Eros' is in the end nothing more than a translation of our German word Liebe (love)."[1]

That is so far so good. Any kind of want, any kind of activity, any kind of relationship, that involves the feelings (especially the pleasurable feelings) is sexual or erotic. It is also a part of love. It is possible, and quite reasonable, to protest that it is equally false and misleading to use the term "love" for attachments of such differing kind and quality, as to call them all sexual. But while both objections have some justification, it may be all to the good if one gets rid of one's various emotional preconceptions to accept this startlingly inclusive use of the words sexual and love. If we are going to understand anything about living we have to understand the humblest beginnings of the highest loves. It makes nothing any worse, and, as a matter of fact, nothing any better, as far as the morality of the question goes, to say that the power-house of all our finest action and devotion—of the love that ultimately fulfils, and goes beyond, all law—is in the sex-instinct. But as far as understanding goes it makes the whole thing much clearer. We know what it is we have to deal with, and we know, too, that if things go wrong with those early so-called sexual activities—if too many repressions and frustrations and shames creep in—the higher loves may easily be made difficult or impossible.

If we are attempting to look at life as an organiza-

[1] *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, p. 40.

tion of likings and of loves, we must be ready to begin with early likings connected with early self-gratifications. And we must admit that there are small difficulties and small jealousies in the life of the quite tiny child which do arise definitely from its sex—possibly a jealousy of its mother if it is a girl, or of its father if it is a boy. When Freud calls those kind of difficulties Œdipus or Electra complexes it all sounds much worse than it is, though not worse than it may, in some unfortunate cases, become.[1] At least it justifies the word sexual, and means that the baby's life must be thought out carefully from the beginning in terms of its sex, and also that the love-life of an individual begins in very humble, very self-related, likings and dislikings.

So much for the word "sexual". Apart from seeing the libido as being, by nature, sexual, Freud sees it also as being ruthlessly egoistic; impersonal and anti-social. "Its censored wishes," he says,

[1] I have not attempted, in this chapter, to say much about the Œdipus complex, not because I consider it in any way negligible, but because other aspects of Freud's work are more immediately relevant to the argument. The fact of the existence of the Œdipus and Electra complexes—i.e. sexual jealousy in the child of father or mother—is regarded here as but one more testimony to the importance of right early relationships. On the whole I agree with the late Dr. Ian Suttie that the stress should be laid, not so much on these possible early sexual jealousies, as on the importance of expressed affection. In his most important book, *The Origins of Love and Hate*, Suttie pleaded for the raising of what he called "the taboo on tenderness", for the complete elimination of "hardness" from our training of children, and for the equally complete abandonment of the inculcation of the ideals of pseudo-masculinity which have always formed part of patriarchal civilizations—our own and others. What matters is love, in a wider sense than sexual, and the expression of that love in tenderness.

"are manifestations of a boundless and ruthless egoism." It wants pleasure and doesn't mind how it gets it. When Freud asks himself the question whether "a main purpose is discernible in the operation of the mental apparatus", he says, "our first approach to an answer is that this purpose is directed to the attainment of pleasure. It seems that our entire physical activity is bent upon procuring pleasure and avoiding pain, that it is automatically regulated by the pleasure-principle." This, therefore, is what Freud gives us as a basis for the love-life whose organization we are trying to understand—a libido, sexual in nature, urgently demanding, ruthlessly egoistic, and bent upon the attainment of pleasure.[1] Yet he says, in the passage already quoted, that he does not separate from "love" the love of parents and children, friendship and the love for humanity in general, and also devotion to concrete objects and abstract ideas. And, in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,* the most realistic of his works, he goes on to say that this same love is the bond which unites the members of a community in an effective unity. "A group," he says, "is clearly held together by a power of some kind; and to what power could this feat be better ascribed than to Eros, who holds together everything in the world."[2] And he sug-

[1] It is not necessary here to go into the question of whether this is a true picture of the libido. It looks horribly like an old theological doctrine of original sin, and we shall try to show, later, that there is in the libido, at least equally, and probably predominantly, a need to love and to give. But, for the moment, we are only trying to find what we can make of Freud's own theories in his own terms.

[2] *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,* p. 40; cf. Allers, *The Psychology of Character,* p. 136, "The bond of

gests, beautifully, that if an individual is willing to give up his distinctiveness that he may feel himself in harmony with his group, he does it perhaps after all "ihnen zu Liebe—for love of them".[1]

He suggests, therefore, a possibility of the ordering of life by love—the possibility of the liking that is connected with the gratification of a primary impulse or appetite turning into—growing into—the love for people and ideals which can control and unify the individual's life-activity. We are now concerned to discover by what process the individual, pictured as at first thus self-related and impersonal in his activities, may rise to the heights of selfless, personal being. Freud's answer, although it casts much light on the process, is not at first sight exactly complimentary to the dignity of human life, for it looks, anyway, as though the individual were sheerly driven into such selflessness as he achieves. And the driving-force is what he calls sometimes by the Greek word, ἀνάνκη—necessity—and sometimes by the phrase "the reality-principle". By this he means that the life around us is so constituted—materially, personally and socially—that we cannot always have what we want. We cry for a cream-bun, but there may not be money available for a cream-bun, or anyone willing to procure a cream-bun. We fall in love with our neighbour's wife—and society has laws which forbid our committing adultery. Or, if we do not care much about social laws, the reality-principle, in the shape of our neighbour, may step

community is love. Only where that prevails can community really exist."

[1] *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, p. 40.

in and forcibly prevent our possession of his wife. Or, for all our disregard of law, we may have inherited a Puritan conscience, or we may have some inhibition, which, in spite of us, drives us into neurosis if we commit adultery. Or, again, strange as it may seem to us, our neighbour's wife may insist on remaining in love with our neighbour. We demand the exclusive attention of our mother, to the detriment of our baby sister. Reality—in the shape of our mother—does not give it to us. We all know that part of the process of growing up by which we learn, sulkily, or angrily, or philosophically, that we can't have everything we want. And—worse than that—that we can't do anything about it. Life turns out to be like that and it is the only life we have, and we have to learn, in the end, as the Cockney suggested, "to put a geranium in our 'at and be 'appy". There is something that does not give way to all our whims and desires—something resisting, that we cannot mould or persuade or bully—the reality-principle, in fact. And the reality-principle drives us, willy-nilly, into modifying the pleasure-principle within. "It is quite plain that the sexual instincts pursue the aim of gratification from the beginning to the end of their development. . . . At first the other group, the ego-instincts, do the same, but under the influence of necessity, their mistress, they soon learn to replace the pleasure-principle by a modification of it. The task of avoiding pain becomes for them almost equal in importance to that of gaining pleasure; the ego learns that it must inevitably go without immediate satisfaction, postpone gratification, learn to endure a degree of pain, and alto-

gether renounce certain sources of pleasure. Thus trained, the ego becomes 'reasonable', is no longer controlled by the pleasure-principle, but follows the *reality-principle*, which at bottom also seeks pleasure. The transition from the pleasure-principle to the reality-principle is one of the most important advances in the development of the ego."[1]

The idea that, in adapting ourselves to the reality-principle we are still seeking pleasure, but going a more roundabout way to get it, we must discuss later. Now we go on to Freud's conception of the ego, that part of us which apparently emerges from the encounter of the libido with the pressure of external reality. The "ego" is for Freud the self-conscious, directing core of personality. It is for all of us that which we know as "I" which gives us the indescribable but quite definite sense of "me-ness", of identity, of self-hood. Sit down, like Rudyard Kipling's Kim, and try to think out what it is, and you'll get into a muddle. But, through and beyond the muddle, you'll know it's there.

Freud writes much of the ego, and the ego-instincts, but his principal study of it—or them—comes in the little book called *The Ego and the Id.* And here he uses a new terminology. The blind, demanding, egoistic, sexual libido he calls the "id". "The ego," he says, "is that part of the id which has been modified by the direct influence of the external world. . . . Moreover, the ego has the task of bringing the influence of the external world to bear upon the id and its tendencies, and endeavours to substitute the reality-principle for

[1] *Introductory Lectures in Psycho-Analysis*, p. 299.

the pleasure-principle which reigns supreme in the id."[1]

The ego, the self, is, according to this theory, put in an extremely awkward and delicate situation. It must conform to the special standards of its time, and to do this it must prevent the id having its own way in everything. But it must also not be too hard on the id, for the id is a creature of queer and unaccountable reactions, and makes a great deal of disturbance if it is too much thwarted. So the ego will generally let the id have as much of its way as possible, and at the same time will "rationalize" the id's activities—pretending to society they are not quite what they in fact are—keeping up appearances like the aspidistra and the lace curtains in the landlady's sitting-room. Or—more happily still—it may deceive itself, and not society only, as to the real nature of the desires and activities of the id. Or again it may repress them completely and pretend they are not there—living a half life, neither greatly good nor greatly ill, because in shutting off the power for ill it has shut off the only power for good. Poor Ego! But it is worse than that. For a third strange ghostly entity comes in, and assumes a kind of dictatorship in the business. This is the super-ego, or ego-ideal (we often call it the conscience, but it has many names). It is something that develops in the psychic apparatus not so much through the pressure of the external reality as through the social and moral code which the child absorbs from the various sanctions and prohibitions of its parents and teachers. So the voice of a conscience may not necessarily be

[1] *The Ego and the Id*, p. 30.

good, and an ego-ideal may need a lot of making over. And if we have the kind of conscience that, for instance, feels it wrong to be happy, then it is probably just as well to look into the matter.

The ego, therefore, is not only driven from below (to use a convenient spacial metaphor) by the blind demand of the id for gratification, but from above by the—possibly equally blind—demand of the super-ego for the attainment of such a standard of life as it may chance to approve. By "interposing the process of thinking", the ego must "mediate between the world and the id", making "the id comply with the world's demands". Somehow or other it must attempt to satisfy the id. Somehow or other it must compromise with reality. Somehow or other it must adapt itself, at least outwardly, to the requirements of one of the social codes which mankind has formulated for this very purpose of harnessing its instinctive power in the service of its aspiration.

These, then, are the terms of the problem, as presented in *The Ego and the Id.* And they do give us the elements necessary for the harmonious sentiment-formation which we are discussing—the "id", the store of emotional power, the dynamo—the "ego", the organizer and director—the super-ego, the servant of that "object" or ideal around which the master-sentiment shall be formed, and in subordination to which all the others should fall naturally into place. It gives us a vision of immense possibility—*only*, it doesn't generally work out like that. Freud's work is concerned, not with how it

might work, but with how it doesn't. And how it doesn't, he calls "neurosis".

Neurosis is a difficult word, but if it be taken to mean that for some reason or other the individual has found the task of adaptation to life too hard for him, and has therefore been driven to find some means—obvious, perhaps, to others as the symptoms of nervous disease, or manifesting themselves merely in some vague inefficiency—of saving himself from it, then we have a good enough working definition. And if we understand for what reasons the individual runs away from life, we may come to understand also in what circumstances he will go forward willingly to meet it.

Pathological psychology has given us an idea that is endlessly fruitful in this picture that it draws of the human being's encounter with reality,[1] in which encounter he finds, sometimes, that he has met with the fulfilment of his being, and at others with a menace so overwhelming that he is filled with nameless apprehension, and takes forthwith to flight. This word "flight" occurs constantly throughout Freud's discussions of his "cases", and many of the symptoms of the different neuroses have come to be known as "flight-mechanisms". The words "frustration" and "privation" occur equally often. The individual is running away

[1] "Reality" for Freud is, so far as one can gather, a sort of conception of "life as it is", life with much that is evil, painful, sorrowful and frustrating. But it must be remembered that, although we all have to make our peace with this "reality", many of us live, too, with another "reality"—the reality of life as it can be, and the reality of something, under all contradicting circumstances, which is utterly friendly to man. The psychological significance of this wider reality comes later in this study.

from the actuality or the possibility of his own unfulfilment. "People fall ill of a neurosis when the possibility of satisfaction for the libido is removed from them—they fall ill in consequence of a 'frustration' . . . and their symptoms are actually substitutes for the missing satisfaction."[1] When a conflict arises within the individual, "one of the partners is the unsatisfied libido, frustrated by reality, and now forced to seek other paths to satisfaction".[2] "It (the libido) is docile as long as satisfaction is in sight; under the double pressure of external and internal frustration it becomes intractable."[3] "There is all the unhappiness in life which we have included under the term 'frustration in reality', from which all absence of love in life proceeds—namely poverty, family strife, mistaken choice in marriage, unfavourable social conditions, and the severity of the demands by which society oppresses the individual."[4]

This frustration is not, however, of a purely negative and alienating character. It may—as we said—be the means of driving the ego to discover the terms on which it can meet the demands of reality. We have already spoken of that first primitive pain, which is felt when a primary impulse is denied satisfaction. As on the primitive level that pain may be the stimulus which urges

[1] *Introductory Essays in Psycho-Analysis*, p. 289.
[2] Ibid., p. 301. Cf. also Allers, *The Psychology of Character*, p. 349, "The neurotic is like a child who is made to stay away from school on account of stomach-ache, but is made to pay in some way for this privilege by being deprived of his favourite dishes and placed on uninteresting diet."
[3] Ibid., p. 301.
[4] Ibid., p. 361.

the organism to a more effective adaptation, so on the higher level of psychic life it may be the means by which the individual learns that there is in him a higher need to be satisfied than that of his primary impulse to the pleasure of self-gratification, and that it can only be satisfied according to its own nature. "It is indubitable," Freud says in *Beyond the Pleasure-Principle*, "that the replacement of the pleasure-principle by the reality-principle can account only for a small part, and that not the most intense, of painful experiences. Another and no less regular source of 'pain' proceeds from the conflicts and dissociations in the psychic apparatus driving the development of the ego towards a more highly co-ordinated organization."[1] For there is within us, as well as our desire for ease and pleasure, our ego-ideal—our aspiration to mould ourselves in the likeness of someone admired and loved, which literally will not let us rest content with a quality of life below that which it has come to see as good. The pain of the conflict which it arouses in us is the pain of psychical—spiritual—growth.

What, then, is the secret? What is the difference between psychological and personal life and death? Here we go back to *The Ego and the Id* and one of the most complicated problems—so far as terminology goes—in the whole of Freud's work. In *The Ego and the Id* Freud suggests that it is the function of the ego to make a satisfactory contact with reality. If the ego fails then the id, as it were, runs amok with resulting injury or disaster to the personality. So he sees what he calls the death

[1] Op. cit., p. 5.

principle — the power to bring destruction — as residing in the id, and the life principle—the principle of contact with reality—as a function of the ego. But in other works, notably in *Group Psychology*, he makes a distinction between the ego-instincts and the sex-instincts, seeing now in the sex-instincts (the love-instincts) the principle of life, and in the ego-instincts the principle of death. "The sexual instinct became for us transformed into the Eros that endeavours to impel the separate parts of living matter to one another, and to hold them together; what is commonly called the sexual instinct appears as that part of the Eros that is turned towards the object."[1] And the Eros—the love—turned towards the object is obviously the principle of life.

Later still, in *Beyond the Pleasure-Principle*, Freud modifies both these ideas, and makes a third distinction. The contrast is now "between egoistic and object-instincts, both libidinous in nature"—by which, he means (using "instincts" in a very illegitimate sense) that the life-force, which is libidinous (sexual, loving) may be turned in upon the self in narcissism, or self-love, in which case it is a death-principle, or turned out to an object in which case it is a principle of life.

It is all very difficult, but one feels that Freud is always trying to describe the same kind of conflict. One would like at least to imagine that the logical conclusion of all his arguments is not that there is one group of instincts that makes for life and another that makes for death, but rather that one way of expressing and using the libido makes for

[1] *Beyond the Pleasure-Principle*, p. 79.

life, and another for death.

It would seem that the libido, to be life-giving, must be attached to an adequate object in reality. Either sex or ego—whichever he sees at that moment as directing the libido to the non-ego—is the life-principle. Life on the level of the pleasure-principle, love seeking its own, is actually the death-principle. It is not only that the individual must not live so. It is, literally, that he cannot. The new psychology, discovering here a law of life, has perhaps reaffirmed an old statement that "the wages of sin is death", giving to the words sin and death a connotation intelligible to the modern world. Living to yourself is sin—a sin that is quite likely to kill someone else and almost certain, unless you renounce it, to kill you.

It is essential, therefore, that the libido should not suffer a narcissistic inversion, being turned back upon itself. It must not suffer fixation, but must be ready to leave the objects which satisfied its infantile condition, and go on to those adequate to its adult life. It must not attach itself to the "objects" of a fantasy-world of its own creation. On its freedom from repression and fixation, its capacity to function as a unity and in its entirety, depend the individual's achievement and joy in life. The libido is indeed Eros, the love-force, but the measure of its life is the measure of its capacity for attachment to objects other than itself, and for ends other than its own.

It is these attachments which bridge the gulf between the early self-related activities and the later fully personal life. But it would seem to be so difficult for most people to make them in a form

productive of any such joy as shall compensate the individual for his giving up of the pleasure-principle that he seems very often to abandon the effort in fear and despair, or to make it in some half-hearted fashion that leaves his life divided and his feeling after relationship continually frustrated.

It is here that we come to the great difficulty, from our point of view, in all Freud's theories. It is helpful to accept his insistence on the importance of sex, and on that base the possibility of looking upon the life-force as a love-force. It is even more helpful to realize that that love-force, to express itself fully, freely and happily, must be turned outward from the self. But, when that has been said, it is only half the truth—the same half as we found in the doctrine of sentiment formation. The problem is thought of from the point of view of the self —the ego—alone. Yet obviously, as the world of the human being is a personal world, and as the frustrations which drive to neurosis are connected, not with material privations, but with unfortunate personal relationships, then surely the psychological difficulties of any human being are not the difficulties of a self, *but the difficulties of a self in contact with other selves.* Yet as you read Freud's work you might well get the impression that the sole function of those other selves was to provide satisfactory points of attachment for the libido. Taken at its lowest—as in prostitution—the other self is convenient because it serves to receive a discharge of emotional energy, and so to lessen a disturbing tension. At its highest even, where, for example, in *Group Psychology* Freud discusses the

function of the hero—a Jesus or a Napoleon—the hero is important, because, in attachment to him, the libido finds itself drawn out in a selfless and devoted activity.

But this is not good enough. One must ask what effect it has on any one self whether the love-force of some other self or selves is turned outward or inward? Love, Freud says, is the healing power. "Every psycho-analyst treatment is an attempt to set free repressed love which has found a miserable compromise outlet in a symptom."[1] But might it not be that the possibility of setting repressed love free depended, not on some "magical" psycho-analytic pressing of a button in the subconscious mind, but on whether there were some person or persons without the individual—and through them some lovable causes and ideals—which would attract and help and hold that freed libido, so that it could express itself in the ways of physical health and human happiness?

Or, more plainly, how much is any one of us responsible for the fact that the principle of another person's life is a principle of death and not life? And may it even be that, in seeking life for others, we find, and only so, our own life? This, however, leads us far from Freud. For him there is the libido, the love-force, seeking for its object, and finding its integration in the wholeness with which it can give itself to that object when it is found. But the part played by the object is left out. He sees life in terms of ego—other relationships, but the other is the passive recipient of the ego's activity. He erects a stage on which the soul

[1] *Gradiva*, p. 78.

of the self struggles with the overwhelming burden of its destiny throughout a drama in which the other on whom his victory depends stands inactive, and unconcerned, a lay figure with a mask upon its face. It is a drama of intolerable struggle and intolerable courage, but a drama without an end.

We are left with the sense that Freud has given us a half-truth, but it is a valid half-truth. From it Dr. Oskar Pfister has worked out what might almost be called a psychological philosophy of the love-life. "Disturbances of the love-life (refusal of tenderness, slighting, too great severity, the loss of dear ones, etc.) do often lead to illness."[1] "Freud rightly claims that the curtailment of the personal valuation leads to capture by the infantile subconscious powers, only if there is at the same time a loss of love affects."[2] And again: "Analysis shows that without love man's life is poverty-stricken, disordered and contrary to his own nature. . . . Love in the sense of voluntary devotion to others with the intention of furthering their interests, is an indispensable necessity for the individual as for the communal life. Love transforms the severe 'must' of the Kantian doctrine into a joyful 'will', without, however, any detriment to the purity of its intentions. . . . There is a vital law of love to which the individual dare not refuse recognition either in the development of his own life, or in the acquisition of the highest communal forms."[3]

[1] *Some Applications of Psycho-Analysis*, p. 55.
[2] Ibid., p. 144.
[3] Ibid., p. 55.

Love, for Pfister, is therefore primary. "All hate," he says, "arises from an inhibition of the life-will—it may be from envy, revenge, jealousy or unpleasant identification. Love alone is primary." And from this he draws the conclusions that "evil is biologically useless, good the healthy condition", and that "the art of proper, morally superior loving becomes thus the substance of the art of living. Self-love without love for neighbours, the absolute egoism, we perceived to be a force hostile to self and destructive of self. We were compelled to postulate the inwardness of mind, but of THE MIND LIGHTED WITH LOVE FOR ONE'S FELLOWS, in the name of mental health."[1]

That is a vitally important claim, that "mental health", sanity, the balance and power of integrated personality, lies in the mind "lighted with love for one's fellows", and it is a claim that can legitimately be made from a study of Freud's work. Had Freud done nothing else for modern psychotherapy than suggest that the life-force might be looked upon as a love-force, and that disorganizations of life should be treated as disorganizations of love, he would have made a vital contribution. But he has done much more in his emphasis on the fact that organization, or reorganization, means the turning of the libido out from itself, and its attachment to an object in reality—with the inference, therefore, that an individual can be whole only as part of a whole relationship, the inference, that is to say, that man, who must of such strong necessity be man the lover, must also be man the beloved.

[1] Pfister, *The Psycho-Analytic Method*, p. 570.

CHAPTER IV

THE NEED FOR SIGNIFICANCE

From our study of the writings of Freud, it seemed not unfair to assume that mental health depended on the individual's capacity for loving people and things outside himself. But we had to add to that, as Freud did not say much about it, that it depended also on his receiving love in return. If man were to be lover, he must also be beloved. This, obviously, meant using the word love in a very wide sense. Freud himself said that this was legitimate, but it was only occasionally, and at the height of his vision, that he used it in that wider sense himself. On the whole, and to most people, he gave the impression of talking of the importance of "sexuality", not of love. And while it was at that time very necessary that people should be made to realize that that much suspected thing, sex, was a very vital force, it still seemed to be stretching a point—if not several points—to look upon it as the basis of all life's activity.

And, in fact, some of those who were at one time among Freud's most devoted disciples did break away from him because of difference of opinion about this very matter. Among them were notably Dr. Adler of Vienna, and Dr. Jung of Zurich, who proceeded to build up on their own account largely different theories from Freud's to deal with the same problems as he was tackling—the causes

and cure of neurosis. I say largely different because there are, as would be expected, many points of similarity between the three; but as, in a general way, we may say that Freud's work makes us think of life mainly in terms of the love needs of the human being, so Adler makes us think of his need for significance—for a feeling of being valued and worth while—and Jung, of his need for some sense of security to give him courage to face the manifold and difficult demands of life. It is, at best, a rather arbitrary division, and makes the whole matter look very complicated, but life is complicated. It presents not one face but many facets; and although the facets are still parts of a whole, we need to know as many of them as we can before we attempt to understand the whole as something of a final unity and harmony.

Adler, of the three writers whose works we are discussing, does seem to be the most one-sided. He sees one facet only of the whole called life, and hardly catches even glimpses of the others. But this one-sidedness has the virtues of its defects—it gives us a very thorough and adequate description of that one facet, the facet which is generally called "the will to power", but will be called here "the will to significance". Adler recognizes one, and only one, principle for the interpretation of personality. The meaning of life for him lies in its effort to overcome the sense of inferiority which is an essential part of infancy, and to find instead scope for the will to significance. "The individual is ceaselessly striving to assert himself upon the level of human intelligibility . . . the fundamental

striving of the soul for self-existence demands this. The individual must feel himself to be a being with *meaning*, for he cannot have human importance without."[1]

For Adler this need for human importance is fundamental, and yet he sees the individual as oppressed from infancy by a sense of his own helplessness. In fact he insists that the mental life of the child is largely made up of three groups of inferiority feelings: the feeling of helplessness, the feeling of being weaker than adults, and the feeling of dependency upon adults. That being so, every life will, he suggests, make some effort at compensation for the helplessness of childhood, and the type of adult life which emerges, social or anti-social, balanced or neurotic, will depend partly on the type of compensation desired by the individual, and partly on the possibilities of making it offered by the environment. If you make a good compensation you will be a well-behaved, useful, desirable member of society. If you make a bad one you may be a menace to it. (One might make an interesting study of the compensations of dictators.) If you can't make any at all you will be a neurotic.

According to his special theory of the mind, each of the leading psychologists has built up his theory of neurosis. For Freud it was a flight from life caused by what he calls " loss of love affects "—that is, by some disturbance, repression, or starvation of the love-life. For Adler it is liable to befall any individual who has achieved—or had given him—no sense of his own value, and who must therefore

[1] Mairet, *A.B.C. of Adler's Psychology*, p. 65.

find some way of avoiding the task in which he might fail, the relationship which he dare not undertake, the situation which threatens his self-esteem. Every neurosis, he says, "can be understood as an attempt to free oneself from a feeling of inferiority in order to gain a feeling of superiority . . . the impression obtained is that of some magic circle drawn around the sick person, preventing his coming into closer contact with the facts of life, of confronting truth face to face, of permitting either an examination of his work or a decision . . . we find definite exertions to kill time—protection against failure."[1]

The neurotic is, in fact, completely engrossed in his struggle for recognition, which he attempts actually to enforce, not by working for achievement in a real world, but by illness or other neurotic symptoms. And Adler tells us that we need not be surprised if every neurotic behaves, before anyone ventures either to doubt or to question him about it, as if he simply must "furnish evidence for his own superiority in general, and that over his own environment in particular."[2] Witness the pathetic type of person who goes about saying that he or she has reached a spiritual level higher than that of the rest of humanity—an assertion never made by anyone of real spiritual development. The same type of remark asserts that the individual is more sensitive than, or not so strong as other people, the tone of voice always conveying an impression of superiority to the common herd.

[1] Adler, *Individual Psychology*, pp. 23 and 105.
[2] Ibid., p. 77.

We find, because of this intense need for significance, that the neurotic will tend to live largely in imagination and fantasy; lacking self-confidence, he will feel himself obliged to fly from the thankless tasks in which a man is often without honour, to the world of make-believe. He will attempt to cheer his timorous and discouraged self with some form of self-gratification; to keep it employed with futilities lest it should find itself with time for something real, and no excuse for not doing it. So, in one way or another, but always, according to Adler, with lack of self-confidence at the bottom of it, will come all the horribly real and disastrously wasteful suffering of nervous disease.

The fact that frustration in real life will lead, not only to illness, but to the finding of compensation in dream, day-dream and fantasy making, is one of the most important findings of modern psychology, and is developed by all the greatest psychologists. But it is not, as one would imagine from some of the critics, a phenomenon that psychologists have wished on to humanity by talking about it. It is as old and older than the first far-away tellings of the Cinderella story. It is as young and as reasonable as a kitchen-maid's imagining herself the Countess in the threepenny novelette. It comes out in the story written by the poor school child about the little girl who is adopted by the rich lady, as well as in the dark and dashing heroes of the Brontë novels. Whole nations which have suffered unusual hardships have dreamed their mass dreams of Gardens of Eden,

Nirvanas, Lands of Heart's Desire, where there shall be an end of conflict, and an environment that shall no longer deny. The whole, or almost the whole, of the modern film industry is built up on it—the age-old, terrible, beautiful desire of a man to find that life is splendid, and that his part in it is splendid too.

But it is a tragedy that so many individuals for whom reality has proved too hard, who, for some reason or other, dare not face its demands, do live a kind of double life. Their hearts are in a dream world where, effortlessly, they find their ambition and desire—and they live only half-heartedly in the world that is, and they are cheated both ways, for no human being with a divided heart has ever yet found the splendour of life. And it may be worse than that. Dr. Bernard Hart, whose little book on *The Psychology of Insanity* is the most startling commentary on the ways of the "sane", shows at every point of his argument how urgent is the need for some adequate self-valuation, for life, and life more abundantly. And how—for the human heart was not made to find its heart's desire in a dream—the frustration of this need drives to fantasy, repression, dissociation, and, in the last resort, to insanity. "The patient who believes herself to be a queen, but who, nevertheless, cheerfully and contentedly carries out her daily task of scrubbing the ward, is not perturbed by the incongruity between her beliefs and conduct."[1] Her mind has got rid of its conflict by a final destruction of its contact with reality.

The human being, then, has needs and hungers

[1] *The Psychology of Insanity*, p. 82.

so urgent and so desperate, needs not physical and hungers not for bread alone that, when the environment does not answer or satisfy them, the individual is driven to find some form—any form—of self-satisfaction. The fact itself, however, is not the most significant thing. What is significant is that any attempted form of self-fulfilment which is at the same time a form of escape from reality is really a form of self-destruction. It works rather like the old Irish legend of the Land of Heart's Desire. The individual, thinking he is going to escape the ordinary humdrum lot of every day, finds that he is being lured, not to life, but to death. "It is often," Adler says, "by the establishment of a condition of frightful suffering and piling upon himself of additional loads that lead finally either to a partial or a complete exemption from normal duties."[1] We referred to what Freud called "the advantage through illness", but it is only an advantage in so far as it relieves the individual from the demand or denial which he dare not face. "For," Freud says, "this is only one side of the matter . . . as a rule it is soon apparent that by accepting a neurosis the ego has made a bad bargain. It has paid too heavily for the solution of the conflict; the sufferings entailed by the symptoms are, perhaps, as bad as those of the conflict they replace, and they may quite probably be much worse."[2]

So much for the importance of neurotic fantasy making, and the acceptance of neurotic symptoms

[1] *Individual Psychology*, p. 206.
[2] *Introductory Lectures in Psycho-Analysis*, p. 321.

as compensations, excuses and escapes. From that we go on to what follows quite naturally, and what is, incidentally, Adler's greatest contribution to the understanding both of personality and society. It is this—that he defines the need which may drive a man to neurosis as the need for significance *in a community*—the demand which he cannot or dare not face, as the demand of *human communal life*. "The immense social value of Adler's work lies in its detection of the strict correspondence between sanity and social orientation, so that we see the soul's integrity and happiness as features of its social functioning."[1] Adler has, in fact, given us the modern psychological formulation of the old truth that we are members one of another. "We cannot," he says, "escape from the net of our old relatedness. Our sole safety is to assume the logic of our communal existence upon this planet as an ultimate and absolute truth which we approach, step by step, through the conquest of illusions arising from our incomplete organization and limited capabilities as human beings."[2]

For Adler, therefore, there is only one possible cure for neurosis. The neurotic must, somehow or other, be brought out of his isolation and turned into a social being—a member of a community. He must be turned back, "definitely and unconditionally" on human society. He must be made willing to leave his world of fantasy, and to take up his responsibilities in the real world. That "will to power" and hatred of society which were unconsciously ruling his life must be brought into

[1] Mairet, *A.B.C. of Adler's Psychology*, p. 41.
[2] *Individual Psychology*, p. 24.

consciousness, so that, having recognized them, he may consciously substitute for them a feeling of goodwill and a desire for the common weal.

Great stress is laid on the making conscious of that which was before unconscious in the neurotic. The power to share in an ordinary communal life was unconsciously lost. Having understood how and why that came about, he must then try consciously to regain it. This has obvious difficulties. He has got used to exercising power over his environment through his illness or other neurotic symptoms. All that power to which he has become accustomed must be given up. He must be willing, instead of seeking to dominate, simply to serve. This, Adler points out, will eventually bring him real power. "Not," says Mairet in his interpretation of Adler, "that this feels like power; nor is it exercised with any relish of dominion. It feels like peace, for it is the true goal of the will, and the right compensation for the weakness of individual existence."[1]

"It feels like peace." This is surely vital, for peace, ultimately, is the hall-mark of satisfying and satisfactory living; the goal of the neurotic, the dissatisfied, the unhappy. And this peace, Adler says, comes through service. Individual fulfilment comes through self-losing in the service of the life of the community. In his *Human Nature and Its Remaking* Dr. Hocking suggests this same fulfilment of the individual will to power. "The pursuit of power over," he says, "must become the pursuit of power for. At the limit, the exercise of

[1] *A.B.C. of Adler's Psychology*, p. 63.

power is indistinguishable from service; it consists in giving, or in adding to, the being of another."[1]

Adler's statement, as given above, of the cure for neurosis seems not only simple but eminently "common-sensible". And the common sense holds good whether one takes as true Adler's idea, or Freud's, or both, of the cause of neurosis. If, for one reason or another, the individual is unable to share the communal life, he must be turned back to it. He must be willing "simply to serve". But when you actually get the neurotic the simplicity vanishes. To serve, to lose himself in the common weal, is the last thing he is able or willing to do. And that for a very good reason. He is neurotic simply because he feels that society is "in a conspiracy", as it were, to deprive him of his rights. Why, then, should he bother to serve it or wish it well?

Adler does not make the question any easier by stressing, as he rightly does, the numerous discouraging possibilities of life as it is at the moment. When he speaks, for instance, of "demoralized" children, he asks us to compare the general feeling about life that must be roused in a child whose parents are not only poor, but also socially "unwanted", with that of a child who has had no reason to find life hostile or frustrating. Dr. Wexberg, interpreting him further on this point, emphasizes the unfortunate effect which undue poverty may have on the development of character. "An eternally unsatisfied desire and a furious greed produce a materialistic philos phy of life which

[1] *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, p. 375.

expresses itself in the desire to make as much money as possible; and to transform this money into pleasure as soon as possible." Even the love-life, he says, "becomes no more than a means of attaining pleasure, and people are used as things to its end".[1] "The feeling of inferiority is exaggerated in the life of the poor child, and his intensified striving for significance becomes crystallized as a great hunger for pleasure."[2]

And it is no good merely to decry—as is so often done—this hunger for pleasure, as though it were some queer characteristic belonging to the poor. People with satisfying lives do not rush desperately and continually to the pictures. Nor do they keep themselves glued to their chairs at home by some superhuman effort of will, or by some special virtue inherent in themselves. They quite simply do not need to go, and so they do not want to go. And it would be better, if considerably less comforting, if we stopped considering the "pleasure-hunger" of the disinherited as a queer characteristic of theirs, and looked instead for the queer characteristics of a society which leaves so many human lives so greatly frustrated.

Nor is the material greed—the demand for "bread and circuses"—which arises out of material deprivation, the worst feature of a frustrating social system. A society which cannot give any real fulfilment of life to many of its members—which has no use for them as persons, but only as statistics of an overburdened dole—cannot expect to find in most of them any real personal develop-

[1] *Individual Psychology*, p. 156.
[2] Ibid., p. 157.

ment; but it may expect to find, and, except in certain exceptional circumstances, will find, that if more privilege and opportunity is given, it will be at first misused. The disinherited will not say, as seems strangely to be expected of them, " now here is an opportunity to serve "; they will say, " here is a chance of getting my own back ", and why, under present social conditions, should they not? One remembers how, after the freeing of the slaves in America, opponents pointed the finger of scorn and said: " You see. Of course we were right. They don't know how to use freedom." Why should they have known, as they had never had any to use? The materially starved will become snatchers in the sphere of personal life. For it is terribly true of all personal values that, unless you have had *something* given you, of love, of value, of happiness, of service, you will not be able to give anything of these to others.

The new psychology, if it is to help and lighten the burden of suffering, must help towards a deeper understanding of the psychological causes and results of wrong social conditions. Freud made some contribution, but Adler's is undoubtedly more important. He asserts dogmatically that greed and selfishness are not, as we so often please to think, just qualities that happen to belong to the make-up of certain people who are much less desirable than we are ourselves. They are personal, in that they are manifested in persons; but they are results in most persons of denials of the social and personal environment. And we have to ask ourselves how far any one of us is responsible, not so much for his own selfish-

ness, as for the selfishness of somebody else, and how far society as a whole is responsible for selfishness when it appears in special groups of people.

It is illuminating to see egocentricity, as Adler does, as a disease of the mind, a lack of sanity. It works, moreover, in a vicious circle. It has arisen because life has, in some way or other, not responded to the needs of the individual: and it has the effect of making the individual less and less able to respond to the demands of life upon him, life (which means people) which was in the first place unresponsive, then becomes more unresponsive than ever. It cannot be bothered with the neurotic. And so it goes on, unless, and until, the vicious circle is broken, as vicious circles can only be broken, by some other individual who is ready and able to go in and save, to be a friend in the real, the often difficult sense of the word. But that does not belong to this part of the book. For the moment we have the neurotic in the vicious circle, caught in it, and therefore an egoist. "All psycho-pathology is of the nature of egoism. Egoism in all its innumerable forms is the attempt of the individual to compensate for an illusory loss of individuality."[1]

This is not only important in itself, but it corroborates the suggestion we found in Freud that the turning inwards on to the self of the life-force is destructive and anti-social—a death-principle. It does, in fact, emerge more and more clearly, that love ought not to be given by the self to the self. The love which each individual self needs so desperately for its health and balance must

[1] Mairet, *A.B.C. of Adler's Psychology*, p. 70.

come to it from the other selves which surround it. There must be established between self and others a love-relationship of give and take on which the lives of all depend.

We must go back here and take up a thread whose end we left lying. Adler said that the neurotic could only escape from the vicious circle into which social denials and consequent lack of self-confidence had shut him, by being willing to serve. Though he was discouraged, he must be turned back unconditionally to the—hitherto, and to his mind—discouraging environment. Therefore, says Adler, he needs courage. And, having listened to all the difficulties, we feel that indeed, and indeed he does! But Adler says it, quite unconcerned. "All the neurotic needs is to find a small initial capital of courage."[1] Just like that. "We designate the social feeling in general terms as the *courage to be interested,* and consider it a task the ego imposes upon itself."[1] What Adler does not point out with anything like sufficient clearness is, exactly whence comes the courage to be interested in that which had proved itself discouraging and uninteresting. We are reminded of Jung's theory that it is the libido (the interest and love) that we direct to people and things, which gives them meaning and beauty. If we want a meaningful and beautiful world we must set to work and love it. We are reminded, too, of Freud's suggestion that repressed love must be set

[1] These two quotations are taken from Wexberg's *Individual Psychology,* pp. 294 and 142. They give the exact sense of Adler's opinion, but in somewhat simpler language.

free from within the individual. These are all excellent half-truths, but the halfness is just as apparent as the truth.

It is as though psychology here moves like the neurotic in a vicious circle. It shows quite clearly that adaptation to environment has two factors—the self, and the environment to which that self must be adapted. But it tends to look at the environment in one way only. It is the bogey of the piece, the cause of repression, the power making for maladaptation. That is, of course, so long as the *causes* of neurosis are being considered. As soon as one comes to the cure, the scene changes. Our environment, our active, blustering bogey man, straddling the stage—has become the merest of lay figures. The leading part in the drama has been thrust upon the poor, neurotic, discouraged self. It is the self that must be courageous, the self that must be interested, the self that with its own freed love-power must colour for itself an otherwise colourless world. And the psychological theories do not, on the whole, stay to ask whether there might be, in the environment, not only that which may cause discouragement, indifference, and withdrawal of the life-force, but that also which can inspire courage, which is worthy of interest, which has in itself a colour and attraction that can hold the life-force and hold it securely. Or whether, even more importantly, the end of the healing of the neurotic—the beginning being the analysis, the laying bare of the causes of the trouble—may not be the finding, or making, of some point of contact between the once neurotic who is willing to make a new venture, and someone, or some-

thing, outside himself which will encourage him to do it.

This raises a vital point, and a vital criticism, of much psychotherapeutic method. Adler, in his own books, as we said, lays great stress on the making conscious in the patient's mind of that which was before unconscious, after which he, the patient, must produce the courage to be interested, the willingness to serve. But Adler himself confessed with amazing ingenuousness how, time after time, his method has not affected a cure, and he has no satisfactory reason to give. And anyone who knows much of modern clinical psychological work knows that, among numerous successes, there are numerous and unfortunate failures. The analysis has been all right. The patient has learnt all the hows and whys of his mind—he has seen the wheels go round. Then he goes off, rather burdened with the knowledge of his own disabilities, and doesn't necessarily make a job of living after all. It is a little like those operations which are perfectly successful—but the patient dies, of the anæsthetic, or heart-failure, or something else. Which may be interesting scientifically, but is not much good to the patient.

Actually, to be fair, one does get the impression that the operation—the analysis—has been successful. It is obviously better to know the facts than to be dominated and frustrated by hidden motives and forces. No, the trouble seems to be that " this also ye should have done, and not left the other undone ". And the " this also " is the putting of the patient into contact with some form of " helping hand ".

It is most unfortunate that the late Dr. Suttie, who almost alone among practising medical psychologists had begun to work this out, should have died so untimely. But in his last book, *The Origins of Love and Hate,* he does make a most important contribution. He points out how personal psychology, beginning very unsurely, very experimentally, dealing with such queer, hitherto unscientific things as motives and springs of behaviour, and facing much criticism as it felt and fumbled its way along, did feel that it must be strictly " scientific " in its methods. Therefore the analyst must be strictly " scientific " in his attitude to the patient. Suttie, beginning his work as firmly convinced as any of the others, found himself having some clinical failures. When he thought those over, he decided that the patient, for full recovery, had needed a " friend ", and that he, owing both to the " scientific " attitude of psychotherapy, and the obvious difficulties of taking the risk and trouble of being friends with one's patients, had not been able to provide the one thing necessary.

This set Dr. Suttie thinking. Apart from the rather frenzied mania to be looked upon as " scientific ", psychotherapy had been, and is, in a real difficulty here. The neurotic is liable to have what is known as a " Transference " to the psychotherapist. That is to say that all the affection which has somehow been dammed up will be poured in an absolute spate on this person who is now taking an interest in him. It is quite clear that the doctor must not let all this affection, for the first time, perhaps, set free, become fixated to himself. It must be turned back on the wider

world of people from which it had been withdrawn. But he may have to be the jumping-off ground, as it were—he may have to be friend as well as doctor.

Several things suggest themselves here. This may, for one, be the reason why a pastor-psychologist, with less scientific knowledge and clinical experience than the psychotherapist, may quite often be successful where the latter fails. For one thing, he is willing to be a " friend " in a very wide sense, and to accept the burdens and difficulties consequent upon that willingness. For another, he does not find it unscientific to suggest to his patient that, apart from human friends, there is, at the heart of life, an " Active Lover of All ".

Suttie might not go so far as this. But he did go farther than any medical psychologist had done before. He said that these needs of the human being—for friendship, for a philosophy of life—must be regarded as " scientific " however heretical that might seem, and that until they were, psychotherapy as a clinical practice would go on being incomplete. I do not want to suggest that Suttie was the first psychotherapist to investigate this aspect of " transference ", but that he is the first who has ventured to say definitely that the " scientific " attitude is not enough. Which involves further that he was the first to admit that the environment is not only the villain of the piece, driving the individual away, but may be the " friend " welcoming him back. It is insufficient to call it the enemy, unless one adds that it is the beloved enemy, the enemy who may be friend.

This new theory is, of course, much more difficult than the old—as the knowledge of the methods of destruction is always easier than knowledge of the way to create, and far easier than the putting of them into practice.

It would be quite impossible for the most disinterested psychotherapist, the most devoted pastor, to be "friends" with everyone needing friendship, for the friendship that goes into unfriendly places is a difficult thing and needs time and energy. And one sees here a place where, in the end, real psychotherapy must take hands with real religion. For what *is* real religion but the making of friends for the friendless because it has found the friendship of God?

But all this reprehensibly unscientific suggestion that the environment may, and must be, friend as well as enemy, is far from the mind of most psychological theory. And so Adler finds that the mere making conscious of unconscious conditions does not always cure his patients. And while he himself offers no satisfactory reasons for this, there are two that suggest themselves immediately. From the above discussion it would seem that the "courage to be interested" will not spring spontaneously to life as a result of the analysis. Nor will effort and training always produce it. It will have to be helped from outside—not only given out but drawn out, and Dr. Wexberg, whose work is an interpretation of Adler's, does indeed, in one place, point this out. "In the last analysis," he says, "education is encouragement. Only a courageous man, however, can make others courageous." It is strange that he should have put

the matter in a nutshell like that, and not thought out the further implications of the statement.

But that—the general disregard of the need of something outside to help—is only one reason for possible failure. The other, in Adler's case, may easily be that he had repudiated Freud's belief in the importance of the love-life. The one-sidedness that in some ways was a virtue, here becomes a fault. Adler stated categorically that, "so long as the soul feels that it is moving towards intelligibility, no other kind of privation can fatally affect its health". Freud said, equally definitely, that so long as the love-life was harmonious, no outward misfortune could upset the balance of the mind. These seem very divergent claims, but it may be that they are two ways of saying the same thing. "To be loved," says Dr. Hocking, "is a high order of validation,"[1] and therein lies the solution. Indeed, Dr. Wexberg says, "The social feeling" (and therefore self-confidence) "cannot develop in the child who has never experienced love."[2]

Might one not, therefore, draw the conclusion that the need for significance is, as Adler says, fundamental, but that he has made a mistake in not seeing that the need for significance is one with, and not other than, the need for love. And if we are piling up an ever-increasing weight of evidence that the law of the life-force is that it shall be outgoing and reckless of itself, and that, in fact, he that saveth his life does lose it, we are also learning that, before men can lose themselves, go beyond themselves, and live outside themselves, they must have

[1] *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, p. 287.
[2] *Individual Psychology*, p. 254.

selves to lose and go beyond. They must possess the souls they have to give, or the word give means nothing at all. The open secret of living is two-fold—it consists in that which we must give, but also in that which we must receive. Psychotherapy needs more than the analyst and the striving patient, it needs also the warm and encouraging friend. And if man the lover must also be man the beloved, so man the significant must be man, the valued of his friends. "L'ame n'est quelque chose que sous le regard qui l'aime, mais alors elle est beaucoup."

CHAPTER V

THE NEED FOR SECURITY

If Adler was the most one-sided of the great psychologists whose names are associated with special schools of thought, Dr. Jung, of Zurich, is the most inclusive and many-sided. He, like Adler, was a devoted disciple of Freud, and broke away from him for much the same reason, although, after the break, he went a different way. He, too, felt that Freud had over-emphasized the importance of sex, but, in the theories which he later developed, he did not, like Adler, omit almost completely to consider the influence of the love-life. In fact, he was willing to take into consideration so many sides of human nature, that he often seems the most acceptable of the three. This makes it difficult to isolate one aspect of his work, and say that it deals largely with the human being's need for security. But his theories do seem to imply that, more than the need for love, more than the need for significance, man has a deep craving for a sense of security, and, although a generalisation is always incomplete, it will not be unfair to associate Jung's work with this craving.

First, however, one must understand Jung's theory of the nature of the libido. He sees it, not only as Adler did, as concerned with the will to power; not only as Freud did, with the ego and sex instincts, but as one great stream of life-energy,

manifesting itself in and through all the various activities of the instinctive life. It is "a concept of unknown nature comparable to Bergson's *élan vital*, a hypothetical energy of life, which occupies itself, not only in sexuality, but in various psychological and physiological manifestations such as growth, development, hunger, and all the human activities and interests".

This libido of Jung strives, of its very nature, for the unification of life, and it does more than this. It is forward-looking and creative, and it strives, also, for the increase of life. One has the feeling that there is something static and limited about Freud's libido. There it is. It can be attached to various objects. It can be sublimated in scientific and social devotion. It can be divided, inhibited, or turned inward upon the self. It can destroy, or it can function at its full activity. One would almost say that it can destroy or that it can fulfil, were it not that fulfil is the one word that could not be used of Freud's libido, for fulfilment suggests a quality both joyous and victorious—a quality which does not seem, so far as Freud is concerned, to be within the possibility of adaptation. For him, what he calls the reality-principle is but the lesser, though certainly much the lesser, of two evils. Adaptation to reality is making the best of a bad job. It demands a lot of courage, and there is not much to show for it but the hope of a happier race in a far-distant future.

The idea that life might fulfil itself in its own activity, creating its very being as it goes along, proceeding from birth to rebirth, from adaptation to readaptation, is alien to him. But it is the

quality which is of the very nature of Jung's libido. The libido is, indeed, the hero of Jung's story, and it wrestles with itself, as Hiawatha did,[1] for its own creation, and emerges from the struggle crowned with the joy of victory. The fight itself is worth while. "The fight of the individual depths against the paralysing longing for the mother gives creative strength to man . . . it demands heroic courage to fight against these forces, and to wrest from them the treasure difficult to attain. . . . Hiawatha wrestled with himself for his own creation."[2] The call for courage is, therefore, no less insistent for Jung than for Freud, but for Jung, the courage to meet reality wrests from it the treasure which is the meaning of life.

This idea of Jung's makes the effort of adaptation worth while in a quite new way. The denials of environment are no longer merely the forces making for neurosis. They may be that, but they may also be the very stuff of a fuller and completer life. Jung has, indeed, something of the vision of the poet, and has ventured to say that, in spite of all difficulties, within and without, a man may, if he will, be the master of his fate. This avowal is interesting, partly because it is less deterministic than

[1] According to the American Indian myth, Hiawatha, the hero, wrestles, almost to the death, with Mondamin, the supernatural "Friend of Man", in order that he may win the gift of corn for his people. Jung uses this myth repeatedly. According to his interpretation, Hiawatha represents the libido, or, one might say, the spirit of Man, wrestling with that in himself which would hold him back from effort. The victory is difficult, but it brings with it the mastery of life. The possibility of another interpretation complementary to this, will be suggested later in the chapter.

[2] Jung, *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 204.

much modern psychology, but even more because Jung suggests that, as a way to this possible mastery, men would do well to keep what he calls "the great wisdom of life" of the Christian faith, "which, for two thousand years has been proven to be efficacious".[1] And that is largely what he himself has done.

The wisdom of the Gospels and, to some extent, that of the Epistles, is essentially forward-looking and creative. There is no end to the possibility of man's achievement. He is to be no less than perfect as his Father in Heaven is perfect. He is, even now, a son of God. Yet there is no point at which he has reached the limit of his growth. He must be constantly born anew. And even at the height of his achievement, he knows not yet what he shall be. For Jung, too, "the dead past must bury its dead".[2] His libido turns its back on yesterday, and takes to-morrow in its hands. It leaves the things that are behind, and seeks those that are before. And it is the future which holds for it the promise of life. "It was of the most profound psychological significance," he says, "when Christianity first discovered, in the orientation towards the future, a redeeming principle for mankind. In the past, nothing can be altered, in the present little, but the future is ours and capable of raising life's intensity to its highest pitch."[3] Jung would regard

[1] *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 45.

[2] Cf. *Analytical Psychology*, p. 395: "Life is not made up of yesterdays only, nor is it understood nor explained by reducing to-day to yesterday. Life has also a to-morrow, and to-day is only understood if we are able to add the indications of to-morrow to our knowledge of what was yesterday."

[3] Jung, *Analytical Psychology*, p. 277.

the human psyche " as a becoming and an ever new experiencing ". " Only on one side is the mind a has-been. . . . On the other hand the mind is a becoming. . . . The casual standpoint (Freud's) asks how it is this actual mind has become what it appears to-day? The constructive standpoint asks how a bridge can be built from this actual psyche to its own future? "[1] " Be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind, that ye may find your own fulfilment," says Jung; " that ye may prove what is the good and acceptable and perfect will of God," said St. Paul.[2]

But this " becomingness ", this power in the human being to create himself as he goes along, is for Jung no easy automatic process. It works certainly according to the principle that " to him that hath shall be given ", but also that from him " that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath ". The life-task has for him something of the urgency of those Gospel stories that show such extraordinary insight into the law of life itself, and express the very nature of the " reality-principle ". Man sees the treasure which he knows to be good, but he must sell all that he has to buy the field where it is hidden. The foolish virgins are locked out. The man with the one talent is left destitute. " The entire libido is demanded for the battle of life, and there is no remaining behind."[3] There is a life-principle, and a death-principle, but no convenient compromising principle of a half-life—a straight and narrow way that leads to life, a wide

[1] Jung, *Analytical Psychology*, p. 341.
[2] Rom. xii. 2.
[3] Jung, *Analytical Psychology*, p. 187.

and easy one that leads to destruction. "If the libido is not permitted to follow the progressive life, which is willing to accept *all dangers, and all losses,* then it follows the other road, sinking into its own depths."[1]

Dr. Yellowlees has an interesting "psychological" interpretation of the Parable of the Talents, in which he uses the word libido much in Jung's sense. "Instinctive energy must be fluid capital, not merely there, but there for use, and usable. That is the deep psychological reason for the inevitable condemnation of the man with one talent, who was so afraid that he might make a mess of things. He had his one chance of doing something with his money, but, because he had heard that instincts were dangerous or sinful—that is to say, in terms of the parable, that some men wasted money on drink or gambling, and some made bad investments, he said to himself, 'Safety first. I will do nothing,' and thereby damned himself."[2]

It is interesting to find, in modern psychology, this restatement, as condemnation by the nature of things, of what may have been dismissed as "merely" a religious condemnation. And it is interesting to find also the reaffirmation of the principle of sacrifice. "If the adult personality is to have anything to develop, the infantile, pleasure-seeking, egotistic personality must be ruthlessly sacrificed, and it is sometimes not pleasant. But he that loseth that life, shall save his real life."[3]

[1] *Psychology of the Unconscious,* p. 241.
[2] Yellowlees, *Psychology's Defence of the Faith.*
[3] Ibid., p. 118.

Here again Yellowlees uses the conception of the libido closely akin to Jung's, for Jung, too, says: "This sacrifice (of the infantile hero) is best accomplished through a complete devotion to life, in which all the libido, unconsciously bound up in familiar bonds, must be brought outside into human contact."[1] One must notice that it is never a negative sacrifice. The Christian symbol (of the Cross) is, according to Jung, "the frank admission that, not only are the lower wishes to be sacrificed, but the whole personality. It demands complete devotion; it compels a veritable self-sacrifice to a higher purpose."[2]

So far, then, Jung has given us a conception of the libido as an outward-reaching and creative force which strives to make the individual ever better and better adapted to the reality without him, but which finds that adaptation a process of effort and sacrifice it is not always willing to make. When we go further and ask on what grounds he formed his conception, we find in his theory what we have already found in Freud's. The individual lives at first on the level of satisfying the immediate desires and demands of his physical impulses, and there would seem to be something within him which finds this way of living easy and satisfactory. But two things prevent his giving way to this lazy, trouble-avoiding something. One of them is the fact that life just does not give him all he wants, but the other, and more important, is that there is in him another something, every bit as real as the lazy one, which urges him to get up and make

[1] *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 251.
[2] *Analytical Psychology*, p. 265.

a job of life. Here is how Jung describes the two tendencies. "Whoever gives himself unsparingly and carefully to self-observation will realize that there dwells within him something which will gladly hide and cover up all that is difficult and questionable in life, and thus procure a free and easy path. Insanity grants the upper hand to this something."[1] But on the other hand: "He who lives thus soon painfully perceives that he is not living along the line of least resistance, for he is also a social being and not merely a bundle of egoistic impulses." For Jung, therefore, the cause of neurosis is failure to progress from the first self-related level of life to the higher one in which the whole libido is brought into contact with reality. "The psychological trouble in neurosis," he says, "and neurosis itself, can be considered as an act of adaptation that has failed."[2]

Here, however, with Jung's theories we come to a new aspect of the problem. It is not because of some denial or inhibition of the sexual libido, or even of the love-life in the widest sense; it is not because the self-confidence of the individual has been injured or broken, that the act of adaptation has failed. It is always because of some lack of courage to go on, because of some backward pull of indolence and indifference. "Life calls man forth to independence, and he who gives no heed to this hard call because of childish indolence or fear, is threatened with a neurosis."[3]

It is difficult but essential to be quite clear about

[1] *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 246.
[2] *Analytical Psychology*, p. 234.
[3] *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 187.

this. According to the theories of all these three psychologists, it is as if there was something "given"—an impersonal, universal quality—in the make-up of each individual human being, something there apart from all subsequent influences of environment, all subsequent denials and fulfilments, which *may* at some time, and in some circumstances, be the cause of neurosis. For Freud it is the ruthlessly demanding libido. For Adler, it is the will to power. And for Jung it is this backward pull of indolence; the unwillingness to make an effort. The existence of these three tendencies is not affected by relationship, but the influence they may have on any individual life will, I believe, be determined almost entirely by relationship. And the criticism one would make of Jung's theory—as of the others—is that the indolence, indifference, and fear, as hindrances to adaptation and progress, are considered too much as existing of themselves. One would even like to ask whether any of the difficulties inherent in the make-up of human nature is sufficient in itself to cause neurosis; or whether it can only do this when something, somewhere, has gone wrong with the relationship. When, therefore, we read that "Jung does not ask from what psychic experience or point of fixation in childhood the patient is suffering, but what is the present duty or task he is avoiding, or what obstacle in his life's task he is unable to overcome",[1] we feel that he ought to ask both. His looking to the future is a great addition to Freud's

[1] Beatrice Hinkle, Introduction to *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 24.

backward-looking analysis. But one would question whether there could ever be enough indolence and fear to cause neurosis without a wrong relationship somewhere in the past.

However, if we take it, with Jung, that indolence and fear, from whatever cause, may lead to neurosis, we shall find that these are also for him the causes of compensatory fantasy. "The elaborate fantasies and dreams produced by the patients are really forms of compensation or artificial substitutes for the unfulfilled adaptations to reality."[1] And, like Freud, Jung sees clearly that the escape into fantasy and neurosis does not deliver, but lays upon the escaping individual a much heavier burden than the feared reality could ever have been. "The neurotic who seeks to get rid of the necessities of life, wins nothing, and lays upon himself the frightful burden of a premature age and death which must appear especially cruel on account of the total emptiness and meaninglessness of his life."[2]

It follows that the cure of neurosis for Jung is the achievement of the willingness and courage to accept the whole necessity of life. He, like Adler, would "turn the neurotic back unconditionally on human society", not in the least because such a turning back escapes effort and suffering, but because it means the exchange of those efforts and sufferings which paralyse and destroy for others which build up and fulfil. "We do not help the neurotic patient by freeing him from the demand

[1] Beatrice Hinkle, Introduction to *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 22.

[2] *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 265.

made by civilization; we can only help him by inducing him to take an active part in the strenuous task of carrying on the development of civilization. The suffering which he undergoes in performing this duty takes the place of the neurosis. But, whereas the neurosis and the complaints that accompany it are never followed by the delicious feeling of good work well done, of duty fearlessly performed, the suffering that comes from useful work, and from victory over real difficulties, brings with it those moments of peace and satisfaction which give the human being the priceless feeling that he has really lived his life."[1]

There is, therefore, a sacrifice to be made, and it is not even a sacrifice once and for all. "Again and again the troubles of the hero are renewed . . . the libido of mankind is always in advance of his consciousness: unless his libido calls him forth to new dangers he sinks into slothful inactivity . . . and having reached the noonday heights, he must also sacrifice the love of his own achievement that he may not loiter."[2]

This—the view of a "new" psychologist—can be paralleled over and over again from the works of modern Christian apologists. To quote only two, the late Baron von Hügel said of what he called the gaining and conquering of personality, "Up to the end, there will be no standing still, but only the alternative between shrinkage and expansion; between the deteriorating ultimate pain of self-seeking and self-contraction, and the ennobling immediate pangs of self-conquest, and

[1] Jung, *Analytical Psychology*, pp. 224 and 225.
[2] *Psychology of the Unconscious*, pp. 214 and 215.

self-expansion."[1] And Dr. L. P. Jacks, in *The Challenge of Life*, stresses the need for "Untiring resourcefulness, inexhaustible patience, invincible valour, indifference to wounds, loyalty to the end —these are the qualities on which man must rely at every stage of his progress to carry him forward to the next."

Religion in the modern world can no longer be separated from other human knowledge. If certain of its teachings—like, for instance, an idea of God which loaded the individual believing in it with a sense of guilt—do not "work" psychologically, that is to say, if they cause neurosis, we must believe that they have been, however well-meaningly, mistaken. And it is for that reason all the more valuable to find the places where modern psychology and the modern interpretation of Christianity fit in so closely as they do, for instance, in many of Jung's theories. His creative view of life is definitely a gospel of hope, as is his faith that a sense of morality is fundamental in human nature. "Morality is not inculcated from without. Man has it within himself—not the law, indeed, but the essence of morals."[2] And it is this essence of morals that drives him to dissatisfaction, and thence to self-knowledge, and, finally, to self-creation. "It is, after all, a person's moral qualities that make him assimilate his unconscious self, and retain it in consciousness, whether he be forced to it by a recognition of its necessity, or by a painful neurosis."[3]

[1] Von Hügel, *Collected Letters*, pp. 89 and 90.
[2] *Analytical Psychology*, p. 262.
[3] Ibid., p. 449.

So far, it is all simple enough, as if one had at last found a psychological theory that might also be a good news for the modern world. And Jung does see humanity as in need of a gospel. "The world of to-day has not only lost its God, as the sentimentalists of the nineteenth century bewail, but also, to some extent, has lost its soul as well."[1] But when one attempts to discover exactly whence comes this strange pull of indolence which holds man back from the finding of his soul, Jung's theories are more difficult. He divides the human unconscious mind into a personal and racial unconscious. In the first are stored personal experience and memory; in the second, the experience and memory of the race. And this second unconscious, the racial, is peopled by Jung with all kinds of images and arch-images, types and arch-types, which are very difficult to understand. One thing, however, is clear. Jung feels, from his examination of the experience and memory of the race, there is that in the human being's make-up which longs for the security of infancy, for the protection of the mother, for freedom from all responsibility. As the race has grown, it has embodied and personified this fact in its epics, myths, and legends. The hero of all the stories, by whatever name he has been called—Hiawatha, Jacob, St. George, or another—has been the personification of the life-force; and he has always had to prove himself by doing battle almost to the death with some force or demon, some god or monster. And this enemy has been the representative, not of something external, but of man's own longing for

[1] *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 45.

the mother. (It must, of course, be understood that it is not the mother herself who is the enemy, though she may be, but the longing in man for the irresponsibility which she represented to him in his childhood.) When the hero has vanquished the monster, at whatever cost, he has won his manhood.

This age-old longing for peace and security reappears in each individual as he grows up, and manifests itself as fear or indolence—the Peter Pan and Mary Rose unwillingness to grow up and be responsible. And Jung, in fact, generally speaks of neurosis as " the longing for the mother ", and the sacrifice that the neurotic must make as the renunciation of the mother. " Sacrifice means renouncing the mother. That is, renunciation of all bonds and limitations which the soul has taken with it from the period of childhood into adult life."[1] Quotations which say this, in one way or another, could be taken almost indefinitely from Jung's writings. And it is helpful that he should show us this backward pull of indolence that all of us know, not only as an individual, but as a racial and universal hindrance to the development of man. It makes for humility and sanity that the individual should know his particular problem for a universal one.

Beset, therefore, with a deep longing for security, hindered by his dreaming of the Edens out of which he is shut by the flaming sword of the reality that in the sweat of his brow he shall not only eat his bread but save his soul alive, Jung sees man making for himself religions in whose shelter he may seek the peace and protection of his infancy.

[1] *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 186.

"The benefits of religion are the benefits of parental hands; its protection and its peace are the results of parental care upon the child." And not only so—by the exaltation of his hero into god or demi-god, man acquires vicariously the sense of his own mastery over fate. "The identification with God necessarily has as a result the enhancing of the meaning and power of the individual against his all too great weakness and insecurity in real life. . . ."[1]

It is here that Jung's theories become strangely contradictory. If man is to grow up into health and sanity and the possibility of a fruitful life activity, he must give up the shelter of his religious beliefs. For, Jung says, "every man has eyes and all his senses to perceive that the world is dead, cold and unending, and he has never yet seen a God, nor brought to light the existence of one, from empirical necessity". Yet so necessary is the strength that springs from religious faith that "one can say that should it happen that all traditions in the world were cut off with a single stroke, then with the succeeding generations the whole mythology and history of religion would start over again. . . . Explanations are of no avail; they merely destroy a temporary form of manifestation but not the creating impulse."[2]

For all the hopefulness of one part of his theory, then, Jung sees mankind as fleeing from the hard-

[1] *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 53.

[2] Ibid., p. 30. In his later book, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, Jung becomes even more definite about the place of religion, suggesting, in fact, that in later middle age it is only some kind of faith that will save men and women from breakdown.

ship of the reality which it knows, to the unreality of its religious myths. Moreover, strangely, he suggests that the religious faith which he deprecates has so strong a healing power that at least the psychological attitude implicit in it must be awakened or reawakened in the neurotic. "I do not mean that the belief in a religious or philosophical dogma should be thrust upon the patient: I mean simply that he has to reassume the psychological attitude which, in an earlier civilization, was characterized by the living belief in a religious or philosophical dogma. . . . This attitude is in itself an achievement of civilization; exceedingly valuable from a biological point of view, for it gives rise to the incentives that force human beings to do creative work for the benefit of a future age."[1]

The psychological attitude, then, which sets man free into the full possibility of creative activity is a "living belief". Yet, having said all this, he seems to see no significance in the fact that, demanding a "living belief", he leaves no object for the belief beyond the "creative possibility in the individual life, and the good of a future age". "The aim is to educate the person so that he will get well for his own sake." Man must bear, and be willing to bear, suffering, hardship, labour and loss, for the creation of his future self, and for the creation of the generations to come, and yet the very faith that makes it worth while is faith in a chimera, in a mere projection of his own desperate need for some security in which his power may be set free. Surely here, more than ever before, we are shut in to a

[1] *Analytical Psychology*, p. 224.

limiting subjectivity. It would seem on the whole that for Jung faith is something wholly within the man—a force necessary for adaptation to environment, but neither called forth nor created by the environment. " Christ, the fulfilment of prophecy, put an end to this fear of God and taught mankind that the true relation to the God-head is love. . . . Not without cause, therefore, does modern theology speak of ' inner ' or ' personal ' experiences as having great enfranchising power, for always the ardour of love transmutes the dread and constraint into a higher, freer type of feeling."[1]

It is an extraordinary situation. A man must have faith, but there is nothing but a force within himself in which to trust. He must have love, but its transmuting ardour has no relation to the nature or the lovableness of the reality. He may, indeed, as we saw, wrest from reality " the treasure difficult to attain ", but the treasure would seem to grow within himself as the result of his wrestling, rather than to be some wealth actually within the objective reality into possession of which he may enter. And one would like to suggest that the more popular and (Jung would probably say) the more superstitious interpretation of the Hiawatha and Jacob myth, according to which, in one case, the hero wrestles with Mondamin, the friend of Man, and in the other with God Himself, may be a necessary complement to Jung's. It may truly be that the hero wrestles with something in himself but it may still be something in the nature of the reality outside him that prompts the wrestling. And it may also be that external reality which

[1] *Analytical Psychology*, p. 261.

blesses the victory with the treasure difficult to attain. A divine urging that were no more than immanent, no matter to what victory it prompted, would be rather like a human love affair in which one brought the love-power within oneself to its highest perfection—if one could do that alone—but found no lover without, either to arouse the love or to reciprocate and fulfil it.

It is a strange position, but it is almost exactly that which Jung himself puts forward. "Whenever one moves in the territory of the erotic," he says, "it becomes altogether clear how little the object and how much the love means."[1] One feels more and more that he is speaking of a relationship which is essentially two-sided, but that he insists on one side only. He is right so far. Even the most lovable object unrelated to the self by love is as indifferent as if it were not lovable. There is no "needs must" about loving the highest when we see it, though it may very well be that that highest will come to us with love, and so break down our indifference and win our recognition. But Jung seems to consider no possibility of his problem of the extraversion of the libido, of the development of the capacity "lovingly to include an object outside ourselves"—being solved by some drawing power of the object, some beauty and aliveness that is there, apart from any recognition of it.

All this seems far from the preliminary statement that from Jung's theories one might infer in the individual a fundamental need for security. But surely, if the individual, for his completer

[1] *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 51.

adaptation to reality, needs so much faith, so much courage, so much humility and sincerity and self-sacrifice, then, unless the reality towards which he reaches has something in it to inspire these things and make them worth while, it is a demand which merely imposes upon man a burden not to be borne. One is driven to ask whether, if it is certain, as Jung says, that, though manifestation after manifestation of religion should pass away, the impulse to build a new one would remain, there must not be something in the universe to inspire and respond to that impulse? Is it not possible that there are two kinds of security—one self-related and bred of fear, that must seek shelter from life at whatever cost—and one that sets the individual free from fear for himself and so makes it possible for him to leave all the shelters of his infantile life, and risk all dangers and all losses, simply because he knows that he is part of a universe in which he matters. And that, because of his nature and its, he is safe, whatever may befall him of external circumstances. In such a safety he could go out, secretly armed against all the apparent hostility and the actual difficulty of life. In such safety he could stand upon his feet and gird his loins for a conflict whose issue was sure.

CHAPTER VI

THE MORAL CONFLICT

We have suggested, through a study of the work of three leading psychologists, that every human being asks of his environment the satisfaction of three fundamental needs—for love, for significance, and for security. But we found that these needs were considered too much from the point of view of the individual and too little from the point of view of a relationship in which they might be fulfilled. In so far as the environment was considered at all, it was largely as a kind of denying force, driving the individual either to flight or, by the learning of hard lessons, to some kind of acceptance. "The ego finds that it must inevitably go without immediate satisfaction, postpone gratification, learn to endure a degree of pain, and altogether renounce certain sources of pleasure. Thus trained, the ego becomes reasonable, is no longer controlled by the pleasure-principle, and follows the reality-principle."[1]

This training is, we are given to understand, drastic in the extreme. In answer to his need for love, the reality-principle tells a man that he may not seek it for himself, but must instead give it unsparingly and unconditionally, spending his whole life-energy in service and devotion. When

[1] Freud, *Introductory Lectures in Psycho-Analysis*, p. 299.

he asks for significance, reality points to the fact that the sun shines on the just and on the unjust; suggests, as was suggested long ago, that he who would be greatest must be the servant of all; and that, far from being a special person, he is only one of a vast community, all of whom are potentially and by the same right as special as he. He longs desperately for some sense of security. He is told that he must face all dangers and all losses, going on from step to step of responsibility and hardship. This, in itself, were a big enough demand, but it is only the beginning. The dangers and losses must be faced "willingly and gladly", and that is much more. The mature personality does "willingly and without complaint everything demanded by necessity".

The psychological demand is, therefore, for the willing acceptance of effort, hardship, suffering and denial. And the psychological story is that man, faced by this demand, is all too often liable to run away. That would, in many circumstances, be understandable enough. What is startling is not the fact of evasion, but the fact that, when he flees to them, man is never happy in any of his refuges. It seems as if something within him is continually urging him, saying—perhaps only in the unconscious, but still saying—"This won't do, and you know it. You are at war with yourself. You were never made for indolence and fear and flight. You were made for a real life, for effort and hardship, danger and loss, responsibility and sorrow, service and love. And through them all—and well do you know it, though you pretend you don't —for joy and fulfilment and peace." Something

like that says the insistent urge in man—something like this:

> I say that man was made to grow, not stop;
> That help, he needed once, and needs no more,
> Having grown but an inch by, is withdrawn:
> For he hath new needs, and new helps to these.
> This imports solely, man should mount on each
> New height in view.[1]

Yet for all the urging of that persistent something which is perhaps the "god, tho' in the germ", man does not find it at all easy to make the transition from his infantile, pleasure-seeking, impersonal self to his mature, serviceable, personal one. Not only must he make friends with the necessity of life without him, but with a certain something within which apparently does not like effort and unselfishness. This, of course, is not *new* psychology. St. Paul, long ago, wrote of the difficulty. "The good that I would, I do not, and the evil that I would not, that I do."

To-day people, tormented by this same sense of conflict, go to the psychotherapists with St. Paul's difficulty. And the more far-sighted among them, if not in religious terms still in quite unmistakable ones, reaffirm the fact that the conflict is in essence a moral one. Jung's language is, in fact, almost Pauline in its emphatic morality. "A sincere man knows that even his bitterest opponent or any number of them, does not by any means equal his one worst adversary. That is, his other self who bides within his breast."[2] Says Dr. Pfister: "He who has a poor opinion of the power of conflict, will

[1] Browning, *A Death in the Desert.*
[2] *Analytical Psychology*, p. 384.

be taught a better one by the analytic method of consideration. Many maladies are nothing else than flight from a severe ethical conflict."[1] Dr. William Brown speaks of a sense of obligation which we can only ignore at our cost: "A feeling which seems to go deeper than mere human feeling, something which seems absolute—namely, obligation. We can ignore it, but we suffer from ignoring it, and find ourselves falling to a lower level of spiritual development."[2]

Psychology has very often been accused of upsetting accepted standards of morality, and, in some cases, this is not only true but good, for some of them should never have been accepted. But so far as morality itself is concerned, psychology has not only affirmed its existence in man, but has said that it works, not only in the conscious, but also in the unconscious part of his nature. "If anyone were inclined to put forward the paradoxical proposition that the normal man is not only far more immoral than he believes, but also far more moral than he has any sense of, psycho-analysis, which is responsible for the first half of the assertion, would have no objection to raise against the second half."[3] So deep, in fact, does this sense of morality go, that if the conscious self is acting in some way which the whole self does not really approve, the unconscious self will impose a punishment in the form of an illness. "Many maladies," Dr. Pfister says, "represent expiations for past shortcomings."[4] "In the

[1] *Some Applications of Psycho-Analysis*, p. 239.
[2] *Mind and Personality*, p. 293.
[3] Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, p. 47.
[4] *Psycho-Analytic Method*, p. 96.

end," says Freud, speaking of some specially difficult cases, "we come to see that we are dealing with what may be called a moral factor, a sense of guilt, which is finding atonement in the illness, and is refusing to give up the penalty of suffering."[1]

The existence of all this moral conflict should therefore be taken, not as proof of man's sinfulness, but of his essential, one might say his original, goodness.

> No, when the fight begins within himself,
> A man's worth something——

"Conflict only begins when a conscious personal development of the mind has already started, whereby the reason becomes aware of the irreconcilable nature of the pairs of opposites. The struggle to repress is the consequence of this realization. Man wants to be good, therefore the bad must be repressed."[2]

"Man wants to be good." That is the most important admission of all. Not only is the imperative of goodness one of the deep compulsions of his nature; it is, too, one of his deep desires. *He likes it.* "Precisely the highest morality, even if it is based on a fight against the lowest passions, comprises the highest inclinations . . . the severe must of the Kantian doctrine may be turned"—in the light of psychological understanding of human nature—"into a joyful will."[3] The new psychology, which has been criticized as being destruc-

[1] *The Ego and the Id*, p. 79.
[2] Jung, *Analytical Psychology*.
[3] Pfister, *Some Applications of Psycho-Analysis*, pp. 198 and 339.

tive of moral values, does, on the contrary, show man as haunted eternally by the sense of his high destiny, and happy only when he understands and fulfils it.

Psychology, then, not only affirms a morality of a more absolute and essential kind than the morality of the moral code, it also gives, either explicitly or implicitly, a new interpretation of various old ways of describing man's moral conflict. Moreover, strangely enough—for it is in so many places attacking not only Christianity but all religions—it has its own doctrine or sacrifice, arrived at, evidently, from its observation of the phenomena of conflict. Jung, as we saw, has much to say of it. The word sacrifice recurs perpetually in the discussion of the neurotic condition, and indeed, of all conditions of incomplete adaptation to life. Freud, too, despite his avowed determinism, has things to say of the way to health of mind which presuppose freedom both of choice and will. "We tell him (the patient) that success depends upon his own endeavours, upon his understanding, his adaptability and his perseverance—we explain the trials and sacrifices which will be required of him."[1] He contends further that "civilization has been largely built up of sacrifices in the gratification of the primitive impulses, and is to a great extent being for ever recreated, as each individual, successively joining the community, repeats the sacrifice of his instinctive pleasures for the common good".[2] Dr. Pfister says: "A moral fact, a renunciation of ease, of

[1] Introduction to Jung's *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 24.
[2] Ibid., p. 17.

cheap pleasure, of unproductive fantasy, is needed for the purpose of the higher application of the life-force. Thus psycho-analysis reveals to us the necessity and beauty of that idea which finds such exalted expression in the Christian symbol of the Cross, in the Christian doctrine of sacrifice."[1] Dr. Hadfield, in *Psychology and Morals,* devotes a section of the chapter on psychological development to "Sacrifice and Rebirth". "At every phase of life the old has to be sacrificed for the new; the old Phœnix must die; the blossom must pass to admit of the new life. . . . Sacrifice is the surrender of the old for the new: it is necessary to biological development, and to psychological and moral progress."[2]

Here, gradually, a new note is creeping in. Sacrifice must, in fact, never be a mere negation of life, but an affirmation. Unless it be undertaken for the sake of a greater good it is morbid and useless. "The only commendable sacrifices are those which we gladly make."

"Man wants to be good." Why, then, does he not simply *be* good? What does all the struggle mean, and why should the word sacrifice be used at all?

It is in any case a vexed word. Already in the passages quoted it is used in different senses, and further quotation would only multiply the shades of meaning. Two, however, stand out fairly clearly. There is something to be given up. "The infantile pleasure-seeking personality must be ruthlessly sacrificed." There is something to be given. Life

[1] *Psycho-Analytic Method,* p. 482.
[2] Op. cit., p. 122 *et seq.*

demands of us a "veritable self-sacrifice to a higher purpose".

There is obviously a difficulty here. How are we to give up part of the self? How, in any case, can giving up, and giving, both make for the realization of our truest personality? The trouble would seem to be that, not only in endless religious literature, but also in psychological discussions the word sacrifice suggests a duality. It suggests that there are two parts of us—a higher and lower nature if you will—and that one of them, an actual, integral part of us, so to speak, has to be suppressed, cut off, got rid of in some way or other. That is what makes the "giving up" idea in the sacrifice motive so difficult to accept. It is the "giving" idea that suggests a way out of the difficulty. For there are not two forces in us, but one. *The duality is not in the power within us, but in the ways in which that power may be used,* and the ends to which it may be directed.

The meaning of our moral conflicts would seem to be, not that there is something evil in us which must be cut off ruthlessly, but rather something—an energy of life—which must be used in a new way, and yet which does not always lend itself gladly to this new using. Just because there is that in us which, at any given moment, would rather not make the effort involved in rising to the next level of life, our growth in, and conquest of, personality demands a "sacrifice". And the sacrifice lies in the fact that, in the very regiving of ourselves to a higher purpose, we must give up, not part of ourselves, but the satisfaction that our whole self was receiving in its direction to a lower or a lesser

end. Even though this may be, and should be, the giving up of a lesser, for a more adequate satisfaction, the old satisfaction was nevertheless a satisfaction. It may even have been, at that moment, a perfectly legitimate one. (One does not, for instance, ask of the child the adult's full responsibility for his life.) So there may be a moment of conflict, a sense of giving up, a call for effort. It is surely in this sense that Dr. Hadfield uses the word sacrifice when he says that "at every phase of life the old has to be sacrificed to the new".[1] But it is perhaps more helpful when he uses another word, "transference"—a directing of instinctive emotions and instinctive power from one use to another. "Every transference involves a sacrifice of the old love to the new love, of the old ideal to the new ideal."[2]

We are not, therefore, giving up any part of ourselves, yet the giving up has its place, as indicative of a law, against which we may hurt and break ourselves, but which we cannot evade—the law that we cannot have it both ways. Egotism and altruism are not in any way compatible. A man cannot serve two masters. He may try to do so all his life, but all the time he is being hurt and crippled by the attempt. In fact, it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that it is the judgment of the new psychology, implicit always and often explicit, that we can only have it one way. Life is of its very nature so made that only in unselfish living can a man find happiness, wholeness and peace.

Looking at it so we can see more clearly the

[1] Cf. Hadfield, *Psychology and Morals*, p. 118 *et seq.*
[2] Op. cit., p. 167.

places in life of giving and giving up. We may at any stage of development be faced with the fact that some new thing which we have suddenly come to see as desirable can only be gained by the giving up of some other thing that we also want. It may be that we love the new thing so much that we cease automatically to desire the old, but often it is not so easy as that. Often we perceive only dimly and afar off that there is a more excellent way than that in which we are walking. Often we want only half-heartedly to walk in it, and there has then to be made the effort involved in the transference of our desires. And we shall find it an effort often to be renewed unless, sadly, we come to lose our vision of the hill-top ahead.

Life itself demands of us that we move from stage to stage of growth and achievement, that we never stop and say it is enough. The effort of going on, of meeting the demand of the new stage, and abandoning the satisfaction of the old, is therefore an effort that has to be made and remade throughout the whole course of any individual life. It is, strangely enough, in view of some psychological descriptions of religions as places of imagined comfort and refuge from fear, religion itself which calls us to this ever-renewed effort. "What if the God of our worship bestows on us not peace, not the solution of our conflict, but growth, and a warfare ever renewed in our growing."[1] The quality of "becomingness", of imperfection, of growth, seems to belong to the very nature of life. Nothing is finished, nothing is static, nothing perfect. Life is for ever reaching out after something that

[1] Grensted, *Psychology and God*, p. 65.

is before it, for ever travailing in its effort to create out of the imperfection of itself and its circumstance, the perfection it sees. And the effort it makes is the condition of its going on.

How, then, are we to distinguish between the conflict that is the means of growth, and the conflict that limits growth, or even makes it impossible? Perhaps the difference lies in the interpretation of the word sacrifice as a giving, or as a regiving. To be effective it must be a giving of the whole self, a devotion of the whole libido. If, therefore, the whole life-force is redirected, or redevoted, turned from the lower end, and attached to the higher, then the effort has borne its fruit of growth, and the whole man is living on a higher level of life. But if, in the effort to grow, to accept new development, and meet new circumstance, the difficulty is for some reason too great, the effort too overwhelming, if fear, consciously or unconsciously, creeps in, then one of two things takes place. Either the life-force is divided, and part of it diverted to the new end, and part of it left hankering for the old, or part of it is repressed and the individual goes on living with only half the life energy which should be at his command. In the first place there arises the conflict, not of growth, but of the refusal (not necessarily conscious) to grow. In the second place there arises some neurotic disorder, or life is lived without any real vitality.

So we may say that, if the effort to rise from height to height brings man ever nearer to the destiny of his high calling, so the conflict that prevents his rising brings him unhappiness and unrest,

but—if he can find some solution to the problem—may urge him in yet another way to realize the fulness of his manhood.

In the above discussion it may seem that we have fallen into the error which we have already imputed to much modern psychology, the error of looking at every problem from an egocentric point of view. This chapter would certainly make it seem that the integration of personality depended on the solution of conflicts that took place wholly within a man, and were not especially connected with the world without him. And although this is convenient and even necessary, if we are to understand the separate aspects of personality, it is false in that it seems to set man as an individual against the world and the other individuals outside him, whereas actually no such isolation is possible. Man is not even a self-contained being in a certain relationship with his environment. He is much more truly that relationship itself. When he is in disunity within, it is because he is not, or at some time has not been, at one with the environment without. His internal conflict is actually conflict with his environment.

So when we come to ask why the effort and conflict involved in the solution of man's various maladjustments is so difficult as it is made to seem by some of the foregoing quotations, we may discover (in this very fact that internal conflict is also conflict with the environment) that it is not actually so difficult after all. It may be that, from step to step, effort is made possible, and conflict solved, not only by the going out and the seeking of the

self, but by the coming in, and the response, of the other. If the demand of reality is so hard, if the backward pull of the "id" is so strong, why should we bother to make all the effort, why should we accept as the condition of our life "a warfare ever renewed in our growing"? Is it enough that we see before us "the self that is to be", and through our love of it are willing to accept the travail involved in its birth? Do we "devote our whole selves" only as a means to our own health and happiness and peace? Or are we not driven to ask again whether the thing we fight for be not the meaning and the worth of the battle?—whether the object that receives rather than the self that gives does not determine the measure of the devotion, and the joy of the giving?—whether man is unified within because something without him is worthy the direction toward it of all his power, nay, is even more than worthy, is intrinsically lovable so that it draws and allures that power till there is no effort left in the giving? Does this new consideration of conflict only force upon us again the conclusion which we drew before—that man to be whole must love and give, but that man the lover must also be man the beloved?

CHAPTER VII

LIFE-ENERGY AND LOVE-ENERGY

MAN must love, and he must be beloved. He finds his personal fulfilment only when the love within him, given out and drawn out in its entirety, meets with a love coming in from without whose response is adequate to it. Out of the meeting of love and love man, the living soul, is born. But to say love and love is not sufficient. Rudolf Eucken once said that "we do not by any means become personalities by pronouncing the word with affection and emphasis". And that is true of the love that makes personality. It is an easy word to say, but we do not by any means become lovers by pronouncing it with affection and emphasis! So we shall attempt here to discover, first the nature of the love with which a man must love, and the power of that love in his life, and then the nature of the love which he may receive, and the power of that love upon him. Of the first love psychology has most to say, and we have already found hints here and there concerning its nature and power. These we must now try to gather together into some kind of whole.

We are taking it, for the purpose of this argument, because we believe it to be a fundamental truth about life, that the power with which we may, and so far as is humanly possible should, love, is the whole of the life-energy. That means that the ordinary life-force, which we share with all other

creatures, with its ordinary instinctive activities and interests, which at first we use—legitimately enough—to keep our bodies alive, is that which, later, must be used as the love-power of the mature personality. There is not a physical and a spiritual life-energy. There is only a physical life-energy which must be transformed into a spiritual energy of love.

That is the first thing we must accept about the nature of our love—that, though its flowering reach to the heaven of heavens, its roots are deep in the age-old earth. The second is equally significant, and contains in it the whole mystery and difficulty and adventure of being a man. In the first chapter, where we considered life as it is lived in the first physical level of being, we saw the organism animated by a single (however varied its expressions) and purposive life-energy. As its purpose was primarily the preservation and increase of physical existence, it rendered the organism active in regard to such objects in the environment as might supply its physical needs. To them it directed its attention, in them it felt its interest, for them it developed its liking, by them it might be frustrated, or stirred to anger and fear. And the important thing was that although, even on this first level, the life-energy was used in connection with objects in the environment, it was used on behalf of the organism's self. It was self-related — self-regarding — though only in the amoral sense of the term. And, used so, it was a life-trend.

This is important because, as soon as we consider personal life, we find mental ill-health, and actual inability to live, wherever the life-force is not used,

not only in connection with the other selves of the environment, but *on behalf of them.* And this we found to be, not a religious dictum, but a scientific fact abundantly borne out by the study of neurosis. From being essentially and necessarily self-regarding it must become other-regarding. In true human growth the life-force—or love-force—must therefore be lifted to higher and higher ends, must be turned from the self, outward. And the strange thing is that, whenever this happens with any degree of completeness, the human being in whom it happens becomes happy — he does not lose, but he finds, himself in the others whom he serves.

This would seem to be the one great difference of personal from animal and physical life. The life-force, which is naturally and rightly self-regarding in the first place, must in a man become other-regarding. And, indeed, it ceases to be natural unless it does so become. The life-force used by the human being for animal ends, is then less than animal and, in its worst aspects becomes monstrous —other and more horrible than anything in what is sometimes known as the "brute" creation. To liken it to the human "brute" would insult any animal that ever lived. That which an animal might "naturally" do is, in a man, grotesquely "unnatural". And one might almost put it that the story of the making of a man is quite simply the story of the life-force, abandoning its first nature as being physically self-regarding and finding its second, and human, nature as spiritually other-regarding. That complete *change* of nature which is yet, in personal life, the one entirely

natural thing, is what makes the paradox, the mystery, the difficulty and the triumph of learning to become a human being.

So the love-energy *is* the life-energy: and the life-energy is made into love-energy by the turning of its activity and its interest from its self to its fellows. "It is the intellectual and moral privilege of the human being that he can raise the energy contained in the instincts, the radical fault in most of which is their selfish egocentric character, to higher potentials; that is to say, by transforming the quality of this energy, he raises its power to accomplish its ends, as sexual passion has been transformed into love; and by changing the direction of this energy he endows it with a greater effectiveness of purpose. . . . So we may confidently hope that the pugnacious instinct will find scope in fields of social service in the fight for justice, purity and truth. . . . The sexual instinct, debased to the uses of fleshly lust, kills the soul and stifles all noble thought and feeling; but from the same soil there may spring the stainless flower of love, whence comes all that is pure and holy in human life."

The above, quoted from Dr. Hadfield's essay on the *Psychology of Power*[1] (the word "power" is significant), suggests in more detail how the transformation from life-energy to love-energy may come about. But for the fullest and most able account of it in psychological literature we must turn to Dr. W. E. Hocking in his *Human Nature and Its Remaking*. It is only possible to quote a few

[1] Op. cit., p. 97 *et seq.*

passages, but they give the heart of the whole argument.

Of the pursuit of "power-over"—that most terrible manifestation of the human will gone "wrong"—Dr. Hocking says: "The pursuit of power-over becomes the pursuit of power-for. . . . At its limit the exercise of power is indistinguishable from service; it consists in giving or in adding to the being of another. Christianity places itself at this point and defines, as the goal of the transformation of ambition, the conferring of spiritual life."

"It is only in the adoption of a creative attitude towards our environment, in the endeavour to save others, that the instincts and the will which is formed out of them, can find their complete and ultimate satisfaction. . . . This passion for souls we have described as the final transformation of the ambition of the public order. It is the same form of will as that which gave the final meaning to human love, the will to confer immortal life. It is likewise the last transformation of pugnacity, the will to displace evil with good. It is, in truth, the point in which the meanings of all instincts converge. . . . Conversion, or the second birth, means the translation of natural impulses into terms of this form of the will to power. . . . What it amounts to is this, that if the complete salvation of our individual will requires the transformation of *all* its instincts into the will to save others, *we must be saved by saving*."[1]

Dr. Hocking's statement is so completely ade-

[1] Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, pp. 375-80 *passim*.

quate that one point only needs emphasis—namely that, for personal life, the transformation of *all* our instincts is required. We cannot turn part only of our life-energy into love-energy, and leave the rest seeking self-related ends. Or rather we can, but in such divided living, we become unhappy and ineffective. We cannot transform one instinct to its higher potential and leave another serving a lower end. Or, at least, we can, but not without some sense of division and repression. Neither the life-energy nor the love-energy is so made that it serves two masters. In its first aims and activities it functioned as one—in its second it must be one also. That which was whole in its first nature of seeking for physical life must become whole again in its second nature of giving love.

That becoming whole again in its second nature is the meaning of psychological conversion, which is, in the end, the same as religious conversion, and which is demanded by psychology as absolutely as by religion. Using Freudian language one might put it that the id must become wholly at one with a purified super-ego which is, in its turn, seeking oneness with the will of God.

The power by which this psychological "conversion" becomes possible we shall discuss later. The interesting point here is that its demand is absolutely radical; thus it says, in effect, "ye must be born again". It asks that out of the elementary self-regarding impulses of our life we make other regarding sentiments—a sentiment of love that sees the enemy and the man wounded by the wayside as a neighbour, a sentiment of self-regard which makes it possible to cease to think of the self

altogether, a self-preserving sentiment which gives itself to death with a transfiguring willingness and love.

Now, if one may venture to take this possibility and fact of instinct-transformation as a description of the very meaning of human life, one gets a new understanding both of the individual and of the race. One sees how strangely, and with what a delicate balance man stands between God and the beast, man of whom is asked the tremendous achievement that he become divine—perfect as his Father in Heaven is perfect—while yet he has scarcely left behind him the old habit of the beast, while yet he must begin life in that habit, and can begin it in nothing else. One feels the difficulty and glory of man's destiny who

Partly is, and wholly hopes to be,

man who is a citizen of two worlds,

a thing nor God nor beast,

Made to know that he can know and not more:
Lower than God who knows all and can all,
Higher than beasts, who know and can so far
As each beast's limit, perfect to an end.[1]

So difficult it is; so bewildering; and yet without the difficulty and bewilderment personality as we know it at its best could never be.

If one looks into one's own heart one knows that all the small progress one has made in what we like to call " the good life ", has been made as one has in any measure got rid of self, as the life-energy

[1] Robert Browning, *A Death in the Desert.*

has been turned from the service of one's own ends to serve the ends of those whom one loves. St. Paul could not have written of the love that "seeketh not its own" had he not known the difficulty of what we are calling "instinct-transformation". "The law in his members," he called it, that "warred with the law of his mind."

Similarly, when one looks at the people one knows, one sees how those who have come to belong to the saints are just those who have stopped bothering about themselves; and one sees equally how those who fail are failing because for some reason —rarely blameworthy—nothing has helped them to get their life-force disentangled from the needs of their immediate selves.

There is no sin, no error, no cruelty, no oppression in the world that does not come from the use of human life-energy for self-related ends. War, industrial and economic oppression and greed, the prostitution of the sex-instinct, all these are nothing more than a wrong direction of life-energy—life-energy which has not become love-energy, and must then, because it is active in beings meant to be human, become death-energy.

There are fully grown-up people in the world, but the race itself is adolescent. And this moment of terrific suffering and struggle may be the moment of its growing up. The death pangs of the old national and social individualisms may be the birth-pangs of international and social solidarity—when man shall have learnt the religious, which is the psychological, truth that he can only save himself when he is concerned with saving his fellow. "It is difficult to imagine what good results might follow

if a quarter of the anger wasted in war or in internal strife were directed against such evils as poverty, bad housing, disease, and smoke; or if a quarter of the tenderness wasted in misdirected sex-activity were directed towards the sick and destitute. All this wasted energy might long ago have set human society on the road to a condition of social efficiency from which the avoidable miseries and injustices of the present order would disappear like a bad dream."[1]

So far, then, we have this concerning the nature of love—that it is life-energy transformed into love-energy by the redirection, from self-related to other-related ends, of each one of the instincts. Now we must go further. It is not just a matter of redirection. We do not just sit down in our armchairs and think thoughts of peace towards our brethren. We get up and go into the unpeaceful places and make peace. Love must *get busy* on behalf of that end and those persons to which it has been turned. It is, as Shand says, "only fully constituted when it has found its objects and been rendered active on behalf of them". It is not only an activity of feeling, but of apprehending and knowing, of striving and willing and doing. "Without action," says Dr. McDougall, "the whole experience of love would seem to be radically altered. We might still think of the object, and our thinking would still be coloured by the emotional quality; but the whole experience would be profoundly different; it would seem to lack its very essence, to be empty and unreal."[2]

[1] Thouless, *The Control of the Mind*, p. 97.
[2] McDougall, *An Outline of Psychology*, p. 321.

Thou shalt love means, therefore, *thou shalt act on behalf of the beloved.* But it is a promise as well as a demand, for love in action is not static. Love is not only constituted but *increased* in action, so long as it is action of a certain type. As we give we have more power to give. "The way to power," Dr. Hadfield says, "is not to harbour our resources and store up our strength by inactivity, but to find the way to tap the resources of power at our disposal, so that they may flood our life and fill it with energy. . . . Nature is economic in her gifts: she will not give strength to those who will not spend it. These remain uninspiring and uninspired. She is lavish with her gifts to those who will use them, and especially to those who devote them to nature's altruistic ends, for such ends are the harmony of the soul."[1]

Here, as so often, we are landed in a paradox. The very love which can only be fulfilled in action, is yet the empowering of the action in which it must find its perfect expression. It must not end in emotion, but without its existence as emotion, effort and will would be sterile or abortive. It is here that modern psychology has rendered us one of its greatest services. The old religious and moral outlook laid far too much stress on effort and will. If you were not a satisfactory person then you were refusing to "pull yourself together", and try harder. You were in fact "wicked".

Modern psychology lays great stress on "affect" —on the feeling part of life. Will and effort may indeed always be needed, but the power that

[1] Essay on "The Psychology of Power" in *The Spirit* (ed. Streeter), pp. 71 and 104.

renders them effective or ineffective will be the power of love. Where the will is impotent, where effort weakens and arouses to fear and despair, the modern tendency is to look for an inhibition of feeling, an inhibition of the outflow of love. "It is simply impossible," Dr. Pratt says in his psychological study of the *Religious Consciousness*, "for the divided self—the man torn between conflicting loves—to bring unity into his life by merely saying 'Go to, now, I choose this set of purposes and give up the others.' Long continued determination of this sort must indeed have its effect, but before the man can really will one set of ends in preference to another, he must really have come to love them best. Thus willing involves feeling as a very part of itself. Before the new ideals come to unify and dominate the life they must be *accepted* and *loved*; they can subjugate the old purposes and passions only by a change of emotional values."[1]

"A change of emotional values." "To change human nature," Dr. Hocking says, "is to change what it wants or wills."[2] One of the two great steps in self-making, Dr. Pratt writes, is "the victory of one group of harmonious purposes over all others, and the complete subordination of everything else in life to those *best-loved* ends".[3] "The possession of moral principles," says Dr. McDougall, "is an aid to following the straight road, but does not supply any motive for doing so. The proposition that knowledge is virtue is profoundly untrue. . . . They (the principles) are useful guides to right

[1] Op. cit., p. 124.
[2] *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, p. 14.
[3] *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 123.

action if we have the desire to act rightly."[1]

So, and this is vitally important, psychological conversion is not merely a complete redirection of all the instinctive energies; it is a redirection inspired and empowered by love. "In the last analysis, it is a change of taste—the most momentous one that ever occurs in human experience. It is an *Umwerthung alle Worthe.*"[2]

In the advice of the old English mystic, Walter Hilton, there occurs a passage so remarkably similar to these psychological statements that it is worth quoting. Hilton is suggesting that we do not let our sins "vex us", or "draw us over to mickle bitterness". "Strive not too mickle as thou wouldst destroy it utterly, for it is not worth for to do so. Thou shalt never bring it so about. But readily ordain thee to some other occupation, bodily or ghostly, after thou feelest thee disposed." "For so," he says, "bringeth love the soul into the fullhead of virtues, and turneth them all into softness and into liking as it were without the working of the soul; for the soul striveth not mickle for the getting of them as it did before, but it hath them easily and feeleth them restfully. . . . And that is a well of great comfort and gladness unspeakable"[3] —and the words come home with a fresh and poignant meaning when one reads the story of broken life that is the story of modern psychotherapy— "when it (the soul, the tortured, divided ego, call it what you will) feeleth suddenly and wots never how the virtue of meekness and patience, chastity and cleanness, love to his even-Christian and all

[1] *Character and the Conduct of Life*, p. 77.
[2] Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 164.
[3] *The Scale of Perfection*, p. 188.

other virtues, the which were to him travaillous, painful and hard to keep, are now turned into softness and liking and into wonderful lightness. . . . And all this maketh love."[1]

"And all this maketh love." To that, by very devious ways, and through many, many volumes, confronted by conflict, dissociation, fear, inadequacy, has the new psychology come. It has been met with the age-old quandary of man—"to will is present with me, but how to perform I know not". "What shall I do to be saved?" And it has said "Thou shalt love". It has seen that that part of us that seems to say "I will", proud though its boasting, cuts but a sorry figure on the stage of our life, but that that which says "I love" is endowed with all power, and all things are added unto it.

"Thou shalt love." It was necessary to look at this first in so far as it concerned the individual—as a power, that is, coming from within himself, and having a certain effect upon him. But it became more and more clear as we went along that this love from within, its nature, its fulness, its quality, its effectiveness, must depend largely on *what* it loves. Dr. McDougall says that "we experience emotional excitements of many distinguishable qualities". He then goes on to say that "in a general way the quality of our emotional reaction does signify the *nature* of the object". That is true as it stands, and true when it is reversed. We might well say that according to the nature of the object of our love is the quality of our life. In fact to talk of the transformation of instinctive energy is only one way of putting it. The other and better is the

[1] Walter Hilton, op. cit., p. 395.

transference of instinctive energy—to ever higher ends, and ever more lovable objects. In the process of transference the transformation will be worked.

But that is still only part of the whole. That one should love matters intensely, *what* one loves matters intensely, but most of all it may matter whether, and how, one is loved. In fact on that may depend whether we can love at all. There are many people living lives unhappy and unsatisfactory who have asked the question put by Dr. Hocking: "How is love to God or to men possible if as a fact I do not have it? . . . Or how is confidence possible if as a fact I am afraid? It is not possible, and my efforts to reassure myself, by confessing my fears, confirm them. But I can do a great deal to take heart at the summons of one who has it, or even at the memory of a voice which is charged with it."[1] It is well enough to say that we must love, but very often it simply is not possible, and all our will, all our desire to save ourselves, cannot work the miracle. But the whole difficulty might be solved "if there were, as the moving spirit of the world, *an aggressive lover,* able and disposed to break in upon my temper of critical egoism and win my response."[2]

With this suggestion of Dr. Hocking's we come to the second part of our inquiry. What is the nature of the love that is required, the love that responds, and what is its power upon a man? When Dr. Hocking speaks of an Aggressive Lover he means God, but for the moment we shall use the

[1] *Human Nature and Its Remaking,* p. 397.
[2] Ibid., p. 398.

idea, as it may be used, of those "aggressive" human lovers who are able and willing to break in upon the isolation of their unhappy fellows, and win their response in love. For it stands to reason, if the first half of this chapter be true, that so far as there are, and wherever there are, normally whole people in the world, there is also an activity of creative love. The strange thing is that, while the new psychology saw that the making whole of a man lay in the setting-free of this kind of love from within him, it almost entirely missed the significance and power of the love that was set free. And yet it gave us a picture of man starved, divided in himself and his loyalties, unsure of himself, afraid of life, just because of his lack of such fulfilment as would be given him by this active, responsive love.

Yet when once one begins to examine this new possibility of fulfilment — by the love that is received, rather than, and more than, by the love that is given—one sees the making of personality in a completely different way. In fact one can turn the whole argument upside down and back to front with a statement like that of Professor Grensted: "They knew that they were men remade, and they knew that the mode of their remaking was love."[1] The statement was made of the disciples of Jesus, and the love referred to was not the life-force within them set free and turned outward (although the result of it was that), but the love that they had received in the friendship of their Master. Looking at life from this new angle Dr. Matthews said: "Thus it is that the love of a friend is the great

[1] *Psychology and God*, p. 237.

instrument of progress."[1] "To be loved," Dr. Hocking says, "is a high order of validation. And if this private world of mine does not respond, I am left curiously uncertain of myself, as if I were somehow unreal, and for that reason unable to love rightly."[2] So we see now, not only that man the lover must be man the beloved—but that he is made lover in that he is beloved. He becomes lover and beloved precisely because, and only because, it is in the nature of his environment to be lover, too.

But there is more in it than this. Just as man does not remain as he is, but grows perpetually by his loving, so man, beloved, is both created and increased in being by the love he receives. "Through insight into the present nature of our friend we can perceive the good which is potentially his. Persons are the objects of love, and the purest love sees, in some measure, the good which may be for the person loved, and wills that it shall become actual. . . . The loving spirit is the true realist. He alone sees his fellows, not as shadows, but as concrete persons, since for him they are not simply factors of the conditions in which he lives, or units of a crowd; they are persons with an inner life not less vivid than his own."[3] That is to say they are not, as Freud's theories would suggest, convenient objects to which the libido may be attached.

For the love that creates both giver and receiver is much more than a convenient form of behaviour, or a convenient way to the wholeness of personality.

[1] *God*, p. 231.
[2] *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, p. 287.
[3] Matthews, *God*, pp. 230, 231 *passim*.

It is love that has an absolute value for the person loved. So that, as Dr. Hocking points out, the precept "Love your enemies" is not a convenient international technique for the avoidance of an inconvenient international war. "Unless I am, as a fact, so much a seer as to be a lover of my enemy, it is both futile and false to assume the behaviour of love." For the non-resistance "constitutes an appeal from the apparent self to the real self, or from the actual self to the self that may be. . . . It refuses to take a man at his own estimate of himself; it insists on the self of a more nearly absolute estimate, the self that *must be*, and which this resolve of the non-resisting will will help to bring into being." The non-resistance, which is the expression of love—which, for all its seeming passivity is therefore love in action—is an "act of creation". And so love is "that region of life which exists in giving life". The service of love "consists in giving or in adding to the being of another". It is the "conferring of spiritual life".[1]

If this—the will to confer immortal life upon our fellow—be the perfect attitude and the perfect work of love, it becomes clear that such love, when it is received, must be both the fulfilment of need, which, when unsatisfied drives to neurosis, and the empowering of effort which, unaided, may end in paralysis. It becomes clear also how creative is the attitude of the New Testament which demands of every man an absolutely valuing love for his every brother. And it reveals also, as no mere poetic exaggeration, the statement that "whoever hateth his brother is a murderer", because, if the meeting

[1] *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, pp. 351-75 *passim*.

with love be the way to the increase of life, so the meeting with indifference and hatred must lead to stagnation and death. And, for all the hatred and indifference that there is in people all over the world there is, in other people, exactly that much uncreated life, that much potentiality of being which cannot realize itself.

The self, therefore, is not created by the self in a tremendous activity of self-making. Self-creation actually is creation of, and creation by, our fellows. Moreover, if we keep to our belief, mentioned earlier in the chapter, that every living organism occupies itself in such ways, and with such objects, as best fulfil its own being, then the activity of the individual self in its will and desire to create its fellow, must be an activity satisfying also to its own need. The fact that devotion is given at all must imply an object or objects found worthy of it, and consequently calling it forth in ever-renewed activity. For if the self only engages in an activity that is satisfying, and for a satisfying end, then the activity of love must satisfy it, and the recipient of its love, its fellow, must be a satisfying object.

So the meaning of life is to be found not only in the giving of love, or only in the receiving of it, but *in the relationship in which lover and lover meet.* "Personal life, so far as we can see, always implies the responsiveness of the person to the environment, and the response of the social environment to the person. Personal life grows and exists in intercourse with other persons."[1] "What is a being (the beloved, or any other self-conscious being), if

[1] Matthews, *God*, p. 194.

not a process of thoughtful and active intercourse with its environment? "[1]

No one has said this more beautifully than did the late Dr. Scott Holland in one of his letters. "Personality lies in the relation of person to person. A personality is what it is only by virtue of its power to transcend itself and enter into the life of another. It lives by interpenetration, by intercourse, by communism."[2] "This yielding up of the ego (in love to the object of its love) is the assertion of its own autonomy. It has chosen the object of its love. It was free and it has surrendered its freedom, and in doing so it retains its dignity and personality."[3]

When once we have accepted this idea that the very meaning of personality is to be found in relationship, several other ideas follow naturally. The first is that it would surely not be unjust to say that modern psychology, implicitly at least, and sometimes explicitly, points to friendship as the meaning and end of human life. Its law is not only "Thou shalt love" but "thou shalt love one another"—thou shalt be friends one with another —thou shalt be and make and have a friend. Just as surely as the possibility of the developed flower lies in the seed, so surely there lies inherent in man's instinctive nature the possibility of his finding the meaning of his existence, the possibility of his becoming a friend. I say the possibility, because the actuality depends upon his finding a friend, and it is the tragedy of human life that

[1] Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, p. 359.
[2] Paget's *Life of Henry Scott Holland*, p. 306.
[3] From the author's notes of a lecture by Prof. Grensted.

man does not always find, or be found by, a friend as the seed finds the soil and the sunshine, so that it is often "out of great tribulation" that a man comes into the possession of his soul. It must have been this that Bridges realized when he said in his *Testament of Beauty*, that while friendship springs from "the old essence of self"—is implicit in the very beginnings of man's physical nature—yet "no friendless man can be truly himself".

> Friendship is in loving rather than in being loved,
> which is its mutual benediction and recompense;
> and tho' this be, and tho' love is from lovers learned,
> it springs none the less from the old essence of self.
> No friendless man ('twas well said) can be truly himself.[1]

Moreover, if it be legitimate to conclude that the meaning of personality is to be found in relationship, and the fulfilment of the individual life-force in the activity of friendship, then one must also conclude that the self is really an abstraction. If man is eternally made by himself, and yet eternally made by the other of his environment, then there is no self at all except in so far as it responds to, and is met by the response of, the other. There is no more a mine and thine, but only an ours. Self-realization is a "universal being in and for another". And what Bridges says of the Divine Lover might be said of the human lover, that he is

> self-expressed in not-self, without which no self were.[2]

We come here to an important divergence of

[1] Bridges, *The Testament of Beauty*.
[2] Ibid.

psychological outlook. Although there is complete agreement that the out-going of the libido which makes whole must be other-regarding—that we must lose our lives if we are to save them—there is some psychology that suggests that we lose our lives *to* save them (a kind of egoistic altruism), and some that suggests that we lose them "for my sake and the Gospel's"—for the sake of a person, a faith, an ideal outside ourselves—in which case we do, very definitely, but quite incidentally to ourselves, find them saved. The first way of self-losing follows the lines of the unfortunate old hymn which so ably incorporates the modern principles of big business:

> Whatever, Lord, we lend to Thee,
> Repaid a thousand-fold will be.
> Then gladly will we lend to Thee
> Who givest all.[1]

The other would accept Henry Van Dyke's

> Who seeks for Heaven alone to save his soul,
> May find the path, but will not reach the goal.
> But he who walks in love may wander far,
> And God will bring him where the blessed are.

To take a psychological instance of the first. Dr. McDougall, who gives such prominence to the self-regarding sentiment, speaks of the influence on developing character of "admired personalities",[2] but he seems to suggest that, out of a number of historical examples presented to one, one should choose that which most appeals to one, or is most in line with what one sees of one's own possible

[1] Op. cit.
[2] *Character and the Conduct of Life*, pp. 62ff.

development, and that one then proceed, from within, and by duly approved methods, to model one's own character in accordance with the ideal. This is one way, but a very self-related way, of acknowledging and accepting the influence of the other—a better way, perhaps, than not acknowledging it at all, but a way that appeals to all one's sense of value as very inadequate. It recalls a strange statement made by James about "saint-hood", which is interesting for our purpose, but in which he certainly does himself an injustice, for his philosophy of personality is generally a much more whole-hearted thing. He is looking back, at the end of *Varieties of Religious Experience*, over the different kinds of sainthood which he has been discussing, and suggests that we should discover each for himself "the amount of saintship which best comports with what he believes to be his powers"[1]—and then, I suppose, that we proceed to be that kind, and that amount of a saint. It is a conception that omits, almost entirely—except in the passivity of an example—the influence of the other.

A humorous example from Kipling's *Thy Servant, a Dog*, will make the matter still clearer. It is the part of the story where the kitchen cat, in a highly superior mood, sneers at the unhappy, masterless dog: "There was Cookey and broom. Kitchen Cat sat in window and said: 'Look at this Cookey. Sometimes this is thick Cookey; sometimes this is thin Cookey. But it is always my Cookey. I am never Cookey's Cat. But you must always have Own Gods with. Else you go bad. . . . You

[1] James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 377.

are like people who cannot be good without Own Gods to pat."

This, though it was not meant to, describes very trenchantly two kinds of people—those who are not greatly concerned with the nature of life or of people, and look at them from the point of view of the use they can make of them—and those who are life's, who belong to life, and cannot be happy without its response. Now we have been taking it that people are, of their nature, like Kipling's dog. They cannot be happy without "Own Gods to pat". They cannot be whole without the loving response of the object of their love. But it seems to me that much modern psychology would say of life and their fellow: "It is always my Cookey." They will say ultimately of God, as Leuba does, that he "is not known, he is not understood; he is used—sometimes as meat purveyor, sometimes as moral support, sometimes as friend, sometimes as an object of love."

But, on the whole, even according to the psychological testimony, the love that makes whole should not be, even indirectly, self-seeking. Therefore we may not admit that the object of human devotion—whether that object be God or man—can in any way be used as a lay figure, or a means to an end. If it is, the end will certainly be defeated, as it is continually being defeated in many social and international relationships to-day. No, we must take it that there do exist in the world objects actively loving and actually lovable who must be regarded as ends in themselves—for a relationship of use could never make whole.

Once that has been admitted, it follows that the

complete transformation of the instinctive energy into love-energy, and the complete spending of that love-energy in service and devotion, becomes much more possible than at first it seemed—may, in fact, become easy. And that is very important when we look back on what was seen to be the severity of the demand of reality on human life. Looked at merely from the point of view of the effort of the self to meet that demand, one seems to be confronted with a human impossibility. Looked at from the point of view of that reality being, actually in part, and potentially wholly, a reality of lovable objects, on behalf of whom one can, eagerly and gladly, use the whole life-energy, the task becomes not only possible, but desirable. Moreover, the reality-principle appears in a very new light when one takes into account the fact, not only that those objects are there, lovely and to be loved, but that they will come half-way to meet us, break in upon the isolation of the ego with their being and their beauty, attract to themselves, and draw out from us, the libido, the measure of whose freedom is the measure of our life.

This in turn brings us to the fact that we have so far been considering relationships as purely human. The love that, in its giving and taking, creates personality has been human love, unrelated to other than human values. What we have to ask ourselves now is this—are the needs which we have suggested as being fundamental in human beings of such a nature as to find complete satisfaction in the devotion, significance, courage and security which can be given by human love? Is

there anything in the argument that might suggest, if not the possibility of a theistic interpretation of the universe, at least the necessity for some reality that is more than either the physical or the personal reality, and in which both these can find a meaning which so far we have not been able to give them?

It is not the business of psychology as a science, or of psychotherapy as an art, to prove the existence of God, and it could not if it would. The judgment that admits it is a judgment of trust and not a judgment of knowledge. God is not, and cannot be, a scientific hypothesis. But science can describe conditions which take on a new meaning when they are interpreted in the light of a theistic philosophy. And one can at least ask whether a God of the nature of the Christian hypothesis—a God that is, of whose nature it is to love, and to be active and seeking in that love—" whose nature it is to live in the perpetual giving of himself "—could fulfil human need and human hunger in ways which human love, even in the utmost of its desire and activity, cannot do? Or to ask whether —for it is the same question—the belief in such a God might render human love powerful and effective where otherwise it were weak and unavailing?

CHAPTER VIII

THE NEED FOR GOD

We came in the last chapter to a new point of view, according to which the making and remaking of human nature was seen to depend, not only on the self, but also, and very largely, on the other selves of its environment. And this we found to be in accordance with the stress which we had laid throughout on the importance of the object of all instinctive response and all sentiment formation. We were faced, therefore, with a need of an object inexhaustibly good and lovable, to make possible an endless growth in goodness and love, and an endlessly renewed self-losing and self-finding. And we were compelled to ask whether, if man with his little transient life, with his tremendous and often devastating power of conceiving the vastness of the universe, and his own dependence, his isolation, his insecurity, his almost nothingness in the midst of it all, is so afraid, so unhappy, so alone, as Freud, Jung, and Adler have all shown him to be, the psychic background of human love were enough to reassure him and set him free? Even although, ultimately, in the love of his friends and the service of the community, he find a measure of peace and power, may it not seem too small a thing to fulfil the need which we saw to be, not only so deep, but so urgent? Might he not feel, even possessed of human love, that the universe was alien and

threatening, was, even, terrifyingly indifferent to him, craving as he was to feel and know the meaning and value of his life? Might he not feel that "the love of man, which is the key to all moral and spiritual values, is a thing transient, a shadow that departeth, unless it rests upon love undying, real, eternal, the love of God"?[1]

For we do each demand that our life shall have meaning and value, not only in our own eyes, or only in the eyes of our fellows, but also in the whole scheme of things. It is a tremendous claim, and drives one to ask what is the ultimate nature of the universe upon which it might reasonably be made. Life is impossible, self-giving is impossible, unless the self has absolute value. Of the urge within us to know ever more of the nature of reality Eddington says: "I doubt if we can really satisfy the conceptions behind that demand unless we make the bolder hypothesis that the quest (i.e. for reality) and all that is reached by it are of worth in the eyes of an Absolute Valuer."[2] It is not enough for us that a human valuer recognize it. We remember Browning's demand for an eye to appraise

> All I could never be,
> All men ignored in me.

and his passionate assertion:

> I know this earth is not my sphere
> Because I cannot so narrow me, but that
> I still exceed it.

It is an assertion which Dr. Eddington almost repeats when he says that "we want an assurance

[1] Grensted, *Psychology and God*, p. 122.

[2] Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical Universe*, pp. 287, 288.

that the soul in reaching out to an unseen world is not following an illusion. We want security that faith, and worship, and above all love, directed towards the environment of the spirit are not spent in vain. It is not sufficient for us to be told that it will make better men and women of us. We do not want a religion that deceives us for our own good."[1]

We have decided to look upon the personal environment as consisting in part of a love that is of its nature active, outgoing and creative, but we have thought of that love as human love. But if such human love be but a manifestation of a love that is of the nature of the universe itself, that was there eternally, apart from the creature and before it was sought of it—a love not only ready to respond, but actually seeking response—then surely in *that* love could be found the fulfilment of all need, an everlasting love, an everlasting security, an everlasting value. Dr. Hocking, in a passage already quoted, but which he actually used of Divine Love, said: "The question, How is love to God or man possible if as a fact I do not have it? would be answered if there were as the moving spirit of the world an aggressive Lover able and disposed to break in upon my temper of critical egoism and win my response."

May it be that this "aggressive Lover" as the moving spirit of the world, is in the end Watson's "attacking environment", and that our gloom is as Francis Thomson says,

> . . . after all
> Shade of His hand, outstretched caressingly?

[1] *Science and the Unseen World*, p. 42.

Robert Bridges, in the passage partially quoted in the last chapter, says that

In the fellowship of the friendship of Christ
God is seen as the very self-essence of love,
Creator and Mover of all as active Lover of all,
Self-expressed in not-self, without which no self were.

This is not psychology, it is poetry—although as a matter of fact poetry is psychology with the difference that the poet says in half a dozen lines what takes the psychologist half a dozen volumes. But it comes back to psychology in the end, and to this argument. For if human nature is such as we have found it to be, and if its needs are the urgent needs which we have depicted, then no mere vague theism will give the psychic background necessary to the restless mind and soul of man, but only an idea of God with a special definite content. We are governed in our seeking to discover the nature of the adequate Object partly by the nature of the being to whom it must be adequate—although, of course, the reverse is true. We best know the nature of the son of man by its nature as a son of God. We ask, like Browning, for that which " fits from head to foot ". Like Dr. Hocking we say: " God, who is truly said to explain man to himself, must explain *me* to *myself*. What I require to find in a god is that ' This is what I have wanted; this is what I have been meaning all the time; the world as I see it is a world in which I as a primitive, various, infinitely discontented will can completely live and breathe '."[1]

[1] Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 451.

The question that confronts us now is whether, if there be, "as the moving spirit of the world", a God whose nature is according to the Christian conception, man would find in him the fulfilment of his need, the environment in which he could most adequately live and move and have his being? Psychology does not answer the question, but it does very fully justify our setting it. It justifies it because it shows that in an environment of active, creative love man finds the abundance of his life. Now Christianity says that God *is* this kind of love, not passively there to be sought of the creature, but actively seeking the creature's good.

Dr. Pringle Pattison says that "the deepest insight into human life is the open secret of the universe", and feels that "deepest insight" postulates the Christian God, because He is "no God or Absolute existing in solitary bliss and perfection, but a God who lives in the perpetual giving of himself, who shares the life of his finite creatures, bearing in and with them the whole burden of their finitude, their sinful wanderings and sorrows, and the suffering without which they cannot be made perfect". The deepest insight of psychology into human nature would also seem to postulate as a necessary personal environment some such love as that. And Dr. Temple suggests that it—this kind of love—is "at least a basis for a coherent view of things. God because of His love, made other spirits 'to love and be loved f r ever'; precisely for the perfecting of that love, He permits evil in His world, that Love may be developed through sacrifice, which is at once the essential activity of love, and the means by which it wins its own

return".[1] "The essential activity of love" is according to this view an activity satisfying to the lover, and therefore fulfils the psychological law of activity—"it wins its own return". In its oneness with its environment it has given up its own particularity, its own self-indulgence, but it has found its "life more abundant".

There is, of course, an endless Christian testimony to this "attitude" of God as actively loving. The above is sufficient to show that according to the Christian conception the love of God is one with the love that, according to the psychological conception, man must receive of his environment, lest, not receiving it, he die. But one might well ask whether, if this conception is built up, as we have suggested, from our knowledge of human love and human need, why hypothesize the existence of a God at all? Why are loving men not enough? In a sense, of course, they are. "No man has come or can come to the Father except through apprehension and contemplation of that within himself and his environment which speaks of a higher than self and a beyond nature. Through the image of God, which is obscured, but still present in the creature, all approach to the reality of God must take place."[2] But having said that, there is still, even in psychological literature, a considerable testimony to the fact that faith in God has a healing and revitalizing effect. Jung himself, who insists that it is faith in a chimera, still admits its healing power, and talks of the transmuting and freeing power of the Chris-

[1] Temple, *The Nature of Personality*, p. 73.
[2] Matthews, *God*, p. 200.

tian teaching that the "true relation to the Godhead is love".[1]

"In some cases," Dr. Hadfield writes, "I have attempted to cure nervous patients with suggestions of quietness and confidence, but without success until I have linked those suggestions on to that faith in the power of God, which is the substance of the Christian's confidence and hope. Then the patient becomes strong."[2]

This is very much what Dr. William Brown says when he speaks of the healing power of faith. "Faith is, in its fullest form a determination to trust in the good. . . ." But it is more than a human, individual good. "It is a fundamental belief in the goodness which is at the back of things, a belief in the friendliness of the universe." He doubts whether merely the will to get well is a sufficient impetus. The mind must take up an attitude "which is an active thing. It develops the will to believe that it can get well, and there is a reason for that will—viz. a belief in the 'worthwhileness' of things, an appreciation of values. . . . In this respect it can be said that modern psychotherapy is in harmony with the teaching of Our Lord in the Gospels as regards the regaining of health."[3]

Dr. David Yellowlees sees many kinds of mental ill-health where religion "seems to come in very neatly to fit a psychological necessity. So neatly that it almost looks as if it had been made for it.

[1] *Analytical Psychology*, p. 173.
[2] Hadfield, "The Psychology of Power" (essay in Streeter's anthology *The Spirit*, p. 113).
[3] Brown, *Science and Personality*, p. 220 *passim*.

But which for which? Religion made for psychology or psychology made for religion? "[1]

We are reminded through all this of that need for security which Jung stressed so greatly. Man cannot—literally—act freely; he dare not—literally—let go, without some sense that the universe is friendly to him—that the nature of things is behind him in his self-giving. Talking of the restfulness of mind "so essential to the cure of nervous ills", and to the increase of the life-energy, Dr. Hadfield says: "Christianity also teaches us that to learn to rest, not only in moments snatched from our work, but by keeping a mind free from worry and anxiety, neither caring for the morrow nor fearful for the forgiven past, is to give ourselves the opportunity of drawing on that ample resupply which comes to those who do not fear to spend their energy for others. . . . The Psychotherapist, who is a physician of the soul, has been compelled to acknowledge the validity of the practical principles of the Christian religion, though he may or may not accept the doctrines on which they are based."[2]

Even Freud, despite his anxiety to have us sure that religion is an illusion, testifies, in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, to the fact that, as it is of the nature of man to be a hero worshipper, the Christian religion has been greatly wise in organizing its devotion and activity (the libido) around a personal hero, the figure of Christ. For, as man's need is so personal, and fulfilled by love of such a personal quality, it would seem to stand to reason that a religion at whose heart is a

[1] Yellowlees, *Psychology's Defence of the Faith*, p. 131.
[2] Hadfield, Essay quoted, p. 113.

personal God, and which sees as the very nature of reality the nature of that God, must be satisfying to him as no vague, impersonal religion, no deification of the life-force, could be. Moreover, if there be in the modern world at all the manifestation of such love, even though it be through human channels, as can make possible a faith clothed in those startling, daring, beautiful metaphors of Jesus —" not one sparrow falleth to the ground without your Father "—" If God so clothe the grass of the field "—" even the very hairs of your head are numbered "—" your Father knoweth "[1]—would not such a caring give all and more than all the love, the significance, the security, that a human being would need? " Caring is the biggest thing out," von Hügel said, " Christianity taught us to care."[2] It did more. It showed us reason in the great caring of a man to believe that a caring beyond all our asking and our thought was in the heart of the universe for us.

But it is not only the security that comes from the knowledge of this great caring that is needed by the human soul. It is not just security, but adventurous security that is needed. If the nature of God is to meet the psychological need of man He must represent not only love, value and safety, but adventure and an endlessly renewed possibility of growth. This, too, seems to be met by the Christian conception. If one look on the world, as the Christian does, " as an almost untouched reservoir of significance and value," then the love and meaning at the heart of life are inexhaustible.

[1] Matt. x. 29, vi. 30, vi. 32.
[2] Von Hügel, *Letters to a Niece*, XLV.

There is ever something more for us to grow up into, something that fits our never-finished, always growing self. For, in the words of Browning, "a man's reach must exceed his grasp".

Moreover, if there be such a God as Christianity describes, would not a further psychological problem be solved? For would not that God be the only adequate object of the master-sentiment which psychology demands? The love and service of human beings in which man finds his happiness—the interest in and devotion to art and science—the manifold activity that concerns family, friend, and stranger—these would provide a bewildering diversity of ways in which the life-force might spend itself. They would all mean a turning outward of the life-energy from the self, but they are so many and so various that proportion and harmony might be difficult to find and hold, just as the never quite-completed task of self-losing might become impossible if there were no "hierarchy" of objects, wherein all minor loves might be regulated and included in one major love—which would in a sense *be* all those minor loves, and yet would be something added to them all.

We can once again draw an interesting parallel between a religious statement of this way of organization and a psychological. Von Hügel, in one of his essays, said: "Man's personality, the instrument of all his fuller and deeper apprehensions, is constituted by the presence and harmonization of a whole mass of energies and intimations belonging to different levels and values; and not one of these can be left aside or left unchecked by

the others without grave drawback to that personality."[1] Dr. Hadfield, similarly, writes: "The completeness of the self can only be produced by the harmony of all the sentiments and complexes into one whole. . . . Throughout the whole realm of organic life, in biology, psychology, morality and religion, the craving for fulfilment and the urge to completeness is the most potent force which drives us to live and strive with persistent energy, till the ultimate goal of self-realization is reached. . . . Psychologically the right idea is one that can, by attracting all the instinctive emotions, bring harmony to the soul."[2]

Dr. William Brown speaks of man as a "one-and-many unity". "The individual inherits not only separate instincts, but also the tendency towards an organization of these instincts. . . . He is already a one-and-many unity, with his mind a plurality of part tendencies and processes, and his task in life is to carry that organization to a higher stage. . . . The tendency is towards the building up of an all-inclusive system of interests, a system of sentiments with one all-inclusive sentiment. This supreme sentiment will be a system of instinctive emotional dispositions centred about one supreme object. . . . What should that object be? Clearly it should be the universe as a perfected system, as the full realization of the Good, the Beautiful, and the True. Thinking in terms of personality, one would say that the object is a personal or a super-personal God."[3]

[1] Von Hügel, *Essays*, Vol. I, p. 46.
[2] Hadfield, *Psychology and Morals*, pp. 65 and 85 cf.
[3] Brown, *Science and Personality*, p. 79.

Shand, whose theory of sentiment formation we saw to be so helpful is weak just here, in that he has no adequate master-sentiment to suggest. He sees the instinctive emotions organized to a certain extent in the systems of the sentiments, but it obviously perplexes and distresses him that the love of man is liable to rove from object to object, and not to find any that fully satisfies it. He is afraid of this inadequacy of the object, as he is afraid of states of emotional satiety. Joy expands the self, and makes it capable of action, but the self degenerates with too much joy. Sorrow may deepen and enlarge the self, but too much sorrow will cripple it. Despair may be good as a goad to the overcoming of difficulty, but too much of it will lead to impotence. Hope in its measure is good, but not too much hope. Confidence is good, but too much confidence hinders growth.[1]

Might he not have solved his difficulties if he had thought of the God-sentiment as the master-sentiment, and seen life organized round an object whose nature presents us with an ideal ever greater than our attainment, or our wonder, or our service, or our love—whose care for us gives confidence, but whose desire for us excludes over-confidence, in whom the lesser loves of our life will find meaning and stability—in whose service the emotional state of "sorrowful, yet always rejoicing",[2] will make not for division, but for unification?

And further—if there be a God whose nature it is to express Himself in active, self-giving love, then it must be that we have not only found an

[1] Shand, *The Foundations of Character*, p. 485.
[2] 2 Corinthians vi. 10.

object for the most effective master-sentiment possible, but also a hitherto neglected way to the strengthening of that sentiment in the outward-going activity of recognition which we call worship. May not self-creation, self-integration, self-fulfilment, mean an attending to the object rather than to the self? If an environment of creative love be the healing and harmonizing force demanded by the new psychology, and if such an environment is actually to be found, is the way to personality much more than we have ever guessed the giving of that environment a chance? We "attend" to the things that satisfy us. "The saints," Evelyn Underhill says, "attended to God," and if, for saints, you just read those human beings whose whole life is harmonized and made fully active in love and service, then it may be that less harmonious, less happy beings are they who cannot, do not, have never had or been given a chance to attend to God. For the Christian hypothesis seems to mean this: If man needs love for his wholeness, and such love as he needs is there, then he must get the sense and knowledge of it into his being: if he needs value, and there is for him the absolute value of an Absolute Valuer, to that fact, too, he must attend. He must attend to God.

Even though it were not raised to the level of the Divine at all, it would still be true, as Walt Whitman had it, that "no man had ever yet worshipped half enough"—no man had ever yet sufficiently turned his eyes to "whatsoever he had seen of visibly divine in the world". "The effortful will" alone is powerless to transform personality. The "falling in love", that is worship, will pro-

duce just that " kindling of the personality " which is needed for its enabling and fulfilment.

Here again we come to a cleavage of psychological opinion. Some of the leading British psychotherapists—like Dr. Hadfield and Dr. Brown —and such Americans as Dr. Hocking and Dr. Pratt — do not see any difficulty in at least hypothesizing, if not affirming, that that which fits man's need most deeply and most surely—the environment of divine love—might therefore, reasonably exist. But much other psychological opinion —especially that of some of the great continental schools—appears, in this matter of the value of faith, to lend itself to a startlingly logical absurdity. It (this second type of opinion) admits that love and faith and hope in something more than human is a great healing power, but does not care whether the " something more " exists. It does, however, care immensely that the individual to be healed through that faith or hope or love should not know that it is all, so to speak, bluff. Dr. Jung, for instance, in a correspondence with Dr. Loy, said that those doctors " should be deemed clever—worldly wise in every respect—who understood the art of investing themselves with the halo of the medicine man. Not only have they the biggest practices. . . . They have also the best results "[1]— because the patient needs an implicit faith, and if he believe in the medicine man he must not be undeceived. He must not know that it is faith in an illusion. Jung finds himself able to suggest the Christian faith in God as one of the most healing

[1] *Analytical Psychology*, p. 238.

influences he knows, and yet say at the same time that it is an illusion, an illusion which will not work if once the patient is undeceived.

There seems to be only one possible answer to all this—" We do not want a religion that deceives us for our own good." If modern psychotherapeutic practice aims at the production of " grown-up ", fully developed men and women, then it cannot, or should not, hope to do it by a process of bluff. Even psychologically, the grown-up stature and faith in an illusion do not go together. If there is nothing in the universe that is " friendly " towards us, then Freud's attitude of desperate, not-to-be-broken courage is far more honest psychologically, and certainly far more religious than is Jung's acknowledgment of the healing power of a faith he does not accept. The difficulty of Freud's viewpoint seems to be that if man has in him the courage which would rather " go down in fair fight with destiny ", then at least it looks as if that courage pointed to some principle of courage at the heart of life as well as at the heart of man, a faith that has its roots down in the very thrust of life—a radical and invincible optimism that between the individual and the world there lies a possibility of fulfilment.

Even on the most human level it would be a *reductio ad absurdum* of all we know of the value and meaning in our personal life of our faith in our friend, and in the creative power of his friendship, if we were to accept for a moment the suggestion that, so long as we were not aware of the deception, it didn't matter at all whether our friend were there or not, or what he was like—or

if we were to believe that the idea of friendship would work, just as well as its actuality. We know that our friend *is* there, we know *what* he is like, and there is in our hearts for him the "worship" (worthship) of our recognition and our humility and our love.

Dr. Pratt, who has considered the fallacy of this kind of psychology in his book *The Religious Consciousness,* says that we must go deeper than this —deeper, that is, than considering whether faith without an object of faith will work—and ask ourselves whether in that case, we can go on believing that worship is possible at all for the modern, intelligent man. "Psychology may and should point out," he says, "that the subjective effects of prayer are almost invariably due, directly or indirectly, to some real faith in the objective relation. . . . Few people possess the histrionic ability and the volitional control over the imagination requisite for any notable effects from prayer without faith, and few even of those who possess these abilities would think it worth while to make use of them in such prayer for the sake of possible subjective benefits."[1]

Dr. Pratt asserts that the healing, freeing, and enhancing power of prayer, where it is inspired by "implicit faith" is incalculable, but he says, humorously, that "if the subjective value of prayer be all the value it has, we wise psychologists of religion had best keep the fact to ourselves; otherwise the game will soon be up, and we shall have no religion left to psychologize about".[2]

[1] *The Religious Consciousness,* p. 335.
[2] Ibid., p. 336.

All the value of faith would disappear once it became known that its value was merely subjective; and at the same time value is essential to the fulfilment of personality. On the lowest level of being it is universally accepted that hunger must find some "real" object of food (imaginary banquets are curiously unsatisfying) and, on the highest level, that the personal sentiments must find human objects of love and service. Why then, we may well ask, should the most fulfilling adaptation of all be adaptation to an "object" which does not exist?

There is no "proof" anywhere, but there is everywhere this fact of a psychological absurdity. And, if we are no nearer demonstrating that God, immortality, eternity, are more than the dream of man, projected by his need and desire on the universe, we have at least deeper evidence that he seems built to be at home in these things, and that without them he is homeless and alone. His restlessness, his evasion, his ill-health, his struggle, his fantasy and even his insanity, these may be but so many indications that the meaning of existence to-day is what Saint Augustine felt it to be long ago. "Thou hast made us for thyself, and our hearts are restless until they find their rest in thee."[1]

[1] *Confessions.*

CHAPTER IX

RECONCILIATION WITH REALITY

We have seen how much of the psychology of personality tends to look upon reality—that is to say on all the circumstances of human life, and on all the features, personal and physical, of its environment—from the point of view of that in which it denies us. Freud's view was the most extreme. Adjustment to life was for him quite definitely adjustment to a reality that denied. It was a needs-must, a make-the-best-of-it principle, courageous, but unfulfilling. It counselled a going round the chair to avoid the bruise, but it had in it no suggestion that the fact of knocking up against a chair, whose property it is both to bruise and serve the useful and pleasant purpose of a seat, may be creative and meaningful—may teach us ultimately how to move about in a world of potentially bruising objects in such a way as to find both happiness and meaning in them. For him the demand of reality is just a demand of necessity; and expediency imposed by circumstance. You abandon the pleasure principle because it defeats you. You cannot and you must not escape into fantasy—not because reality is better, but because fantasy, too, defeats you. It may be a poor best, but you do at least in the end get the best of it if you face up to things as they are.

Against this view let us put that of Dr. Hocking: "Having become self-conscious," he says,

" we have no choice but to see life for the good it is, and to be restless at the thought of exclusion from it."[1] There again is the idea of restlessness, but not restlessness because his circumstance treats man so hardly, but on the contrary, because he sees life for so great a good that he must push on and on, ever nearer the heart of it, lest he be disinherited. He must wrestle with life ever more valiantly, that it may bless him to its utmost power of blessing, to his utmost capacity for being blessed. And we do indeed find, in all kinds of ways and places, some invincible human sense—for ourselves and for each other—that, despite all appearances " life means intensely and means good ". We are restless and unhappy at our exclusion from any of that good as children are who, outside in the cold, look in through a window at a party that is going on in the warmth and light.

But there is a difficulty here. Hocking and Freud cannot both be right. What is to be the judgment between them? It is partly this. They are not describing two realities, nor is one of them completely right about it, and the other completely wrong; they are describing two fundamentally different ways of looking at, and dealing with, the same reality. Looking at the world of " objects and resistances " Freud saw that we must be careful to avoid the hurt they might do us. Hocking, looking at the same objects and resistances, saw a way of so dealing with them that they became the means of our gaining and conferring " immortal life ".

One thing is certain, the objects and resistances must be looked at, in one way or another, and

[1] *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, p. 143.

Freud is right in emphasizing that fact. To escape from them, and dream a world where they do not exist, may fashion the most wonderful castles in the air, but it will not build so much as a cottage on earth. It may rear the comparative shelter of neurosis or insanity, but it will have nothing to do with the making of man.

" There is one element in human destiny," said Robert Louis Stevenson, " that not blindness itself can controvert. Whatever else we are intended to do, we are not intended to succeed." That, perhaps is where Freud, usually so clear-sighted, is fumbling—in that he does not really know what we are intended to do. For McDougall there is a sense in which we only know any reality at all through its resistance to us. And this resistance is for him the foundation of our faith, not only in the reality without, but in our own reality. He would replace Descartes' " cogito ergo sum ", with " I strive, therefore I exist ". Hocking, thinking of life as an " inexhaustible plenum of meaning and goodness ", still says: " We must treat things in the day's work as if they were independent, naturalistic, over against us, and *against* us, or at least, not for us. Struggle to build a human habitation in the midst of an alien universe; unremitting effort to expel by the aid of science whatever is evil from our point of view; expecting no good from the universe except what we human beings can construct from the face of nature; and admitting no wrong as inherent in the constitution of things—this is the programme in which we join the realist."[1]

[1] *Types of Philosophy*, p. 446.

In *Mechanism, Life, and Personality* Dr. Haldane says: "With the here and now there is always the appearance of indefiniteness, imperfection, and ignorance. We may see that the universe can only be the manifestation of timeless personality; yet we cannot see in detail how this is so. It appears to us as full of mystery, imperfection, suffering and endless contingency; and yet over and through all these appearances personality enfolds within itself time, space and apparent contingency and imperfection." But it is not for him an imperfection and suffering which stultifies and destroys, but one which may impel to the realization of personality, which "manifests itself in constant seeking for and acting on duty and truth. It is only so that we realize oneness with God. The here and now, the imperfection, suffering and sin of the world are not something outside of, and indifferent to, God. As the New Testament teaches, God is in this world, here within and around us, amid the ignorance, sin and suffering, and not apart." We are coming thus gradually to a view of the obstacle as an essential to fulfilment and creation! It is the view which underlies the whole of Bergson's philosophy in *Mind Energy*. "Matter calls forth effort," he says, "and makes it possible. . . . By the resistance it offers, and by the docility with which we endow it, it is at one and the same time obstacle, instrument and stimulus." Far from being a principle of denial as it is for Freud, the resistance that the world makes to our efforts is the means of self-creation. A rough block of stone is not a frustration to Michelangelo. It is rather that which holds in its roughness, its formlessness, and its

intractability the possibility—the *sine qua non* possibility—of "David".

Without this "obstacle, instrument and stimulus" offered by matter there might indeed exist some other form of life (although it seems difficult to use the term life of anything but that dynamic creative force which makes the circumstances of life serve the ends of its vision and desire), but life as we know it would not exist. Nor does it happen that one gets an especially high type of life where the resistance of reality is lessened. Those men and women whom humanity, by common accord, accept as their greatest, have not once, but many times, come "out of great tribulation". Nor, in spite of Freud, do they wear the marks of the "bludgeonings of Fate", facing life with heads that are "bloody but unbowed". Rather they bear on their foreheads the mark of the peace that comes with the real "success" of life. It is they actually, and they only, of people who live at all, who look on the whole contradictory, intractable, bewildering mass of things and see that it is good.

This brings us back once more to the beginning of this argument. The reality, which is to say the environment to which man must make some kind of adaptation (because it holds the means of his life, physical, personal and spiritual), has always, at every point of life, and to the end of life, an element of intractability. Moreover, if the argument was valid, it is not only by facing, accepting, realizing this intractability, but actually by doing something about it, that man creates and increases his own being. And this brings us at once to an

important point which we had so far considered only by implication. We came to see quite clearly that man was of his nature a lover—that, therefore, he must have, and actually did have, in his environment, an object of love. But he is also, just because he is a lover, a creator, too. So, if he is to fulfil himself he must have in his environment that which is incomplete, and which needs for its completion the action upon it of just his power of creative love. A world of incomplete, intractable things might be unsuitable for other purposes—and indeed to those who do not especially want to grow up out of their own immediate will and desire it must seem unsuitable for all purposes—but it does lend itself to the making of men. For it offers them a sufficiency of incomplete, intractable things. There are the natural obstacles of the natural world. All his skill, courage, patience and endurance is needed to make them obedient and serviceable to the life of man—even to make them cease to threaten it. There are obstacles in himself—the obstacles of his indolence and self-love—and a place there for creation. And, most important of all, there are obstacles in his personal environment — undeveloped, unlovable people, which may be for him either a hindrance to his own life, or again an opportunity for creation, for " loving the unlovely into lovableness ".

The unfinished part of the world, in which the will to believe has its rightful play, is vaster than idealism usually represents. Human life as we find it *is* not free, sacred, immortal. It must be made free; its sacredness must be conferred upon it; its immortality must be won. In these respects

we are creators of our own destinies. Everywhere man is given the materials, but he is never given the results. Within him and without him there is the raw stuff of life, and it is for him to make it obedient to his ideals and purposes.

It is not in any way alien to man's nature that this should be so. It follows on all our argument that the environment to which man adapts himself must be such as will best fulfil his nature. This must be what Dr. Hocking means when he says "the human being is adapted to mal-adaptation". Of his essential nature he requires an imperfection out of which he can dream and work some perfection he sees. A Utopia with nothing to criticize or reform would give him no scope, which is probably why writers like H. G. Wells and Aldous Huxley show us a degenerate type of man in societies whence all difficulty has been removed. "Ill adapted for living an easy life," Dr. Jacks says of man, "he is well adapted for living a difficult one. It is precisely when his circumstances are easiest that he gives the poorest account of himself, and the best when he is fighting against odds. Never is he more at home in this universe than when he finds himself 'upon an engagement very difficult'." And what attracts us in human life is, in fact, not the perfect animal health of the athlete, but that quality of spirit which was shown by a Stevenson, and is shown by a Roosevelt, in the quality that takes physical and material difficulty and makes it serve the ends of personality. Looking at it from this angle "evil exists that it may be conquered of good, man that he may enter into the Kingdom". One gets a glimpse of how Robert Browning could

say "that's what the blessed evil's for", or how that seer who wrote of the making of the world in the first chapter of Genesis could imagine of God that He "saw that it was good".

Yet here, precisely, one must be careful lest one carry the argument too far, and so make it false, for whilst there is a sense in which man is "adapted to mal-adaptation", in which he must find that in his environment which meets the need of an ever-growing, never finished self, there is also a sense in which he is very definitely not adapted to mal-adaptation. He is adapted to obstacle and resistance; he is adapted to immense material difficulty, and equally to immense spiritual difficulty, *but he is not adapted to such an environment as gives him no sense at all of love or value or security*—no sense at all that he belongs to it, and that between it and him there exists a possibility of fulfilment.

The whole of this study would point to the fact that such an environment does not fulfil but destroys him, and, moreover, that it drives him to turn in upon himself, in fantasy introversion, the power which he should be using in creative activity on some one of those imperfect parts of life which are awaiting his action. It points also, as does the whole literature of modern psychotherapy, to the fact that many men are born into, and go on living in, such an environment. To so great an extent is this true that one can but agree with Freud when he says that the conditions which have driven some people into fantasy and neurosis are such that it would be neither merciful, nor possible, to try to turn them back. "I have myself known cases,"

wrote Baron von Hügel, "where much suffering had thoroughly soured the soul, and this, as far as one could judge, without any serious fault on the part of the poor soul thus soured." This, and indeed the whole story of psycho-pathology, is a tremendous indictment of modern civilization. Life, both personal and material, provides sufficient difficulty without the help of the social sin which allows not only difficulty, but a paralysing misery of poverty and unwantedness in whole masses of the population. This fact should be a challenge to the creator in man. It might well enlist all the love, all the service, all the creative power of any man, or of all men, and would therefore, in so far as it concerned those who turned to it creatively, afford a means of integration.

And actually it does happen that this—the challenge to displace evil with good—enlists the life-energy of many people. But it is true, also, that many people cannot hear the call, for, before men can meet such a challenge as this they must have reached a certain stage of development. They must have some self to give. The sacrifice and the effort which they make on behalf of others they must make willingly if it is to make themselves or those others whole. And to have the measure of love and security which will set them free they must have met, not necessarily much, but at least *some* love and shelter in, been given some value by, their environment. Just because there is in the last resource no love, no faith, no significance but that which comes — whencesoever it comes — through men to men, then in so far as there are not enough loving and fearless men and women in the world,

there is that much sheer tragedy, waste, and loss. There is no getting away from this, and that religious urgency which once drove men to save their souls from hell at whatever cost has been translated into a psychological urgency that there should be a sufficiency of free, creative love in the world to give people a chance, not to save their souls from hell, but to have any souls or selves to live with at all. And while all that we know of the beauty and grace and power of developed personality makes us know that it has grown out of—among other things—a willing acceptance "of all dangers and all losses", we know equally that danger and difficulty can stunt and terrify and deny —when, and only when, the environment yields no quota of love! That he be loved is the one affirmation that man asks of reality—with it all the rest may deny, without it nothing can fulfil. Equally it is the one quality that psychology would ask of the environment in which a man may find the fulfilment and meaning of his being—just that there shall not be that denial of love which will make him unloving, just that there shall not be that denial of self which will give him no life to lose, and therefore no life to find.

In the light of the human need for love we see in what circumstances man can fulfil himself as a creator, and in what circumstances that power within him which might create is turned in upon itself and lost. We see also in what sense he is "adapted to mal-adaptation", and in what sense mal-adaptation cripples and kills him. If man has love he inherits the earth, even with its evil, its

imperfection, its contingency, its apparent denial. Without love he is disinherited and lost. And it is perhaps noteworthy that the sense of power and fearlessness and victory that lay behind the triumphant "all things are yours; whether the world, or life, or death, or things present, or things to come; all are yours";[1] depended for its writer on the assurance of the love of God which was for him manifested in Christ.

Robert Bridges was once again writing good psychology when he said that it was to the "enamoured soul" that evil was irrelevant.

. . . yet to the enamoured soul
evil is irrelevant, and will be brushed aside:
rather 'tis as with Art, wherein special beauty
springeth of obstacles that have been overcome
and to graces transformed; so the lover of life
will make obstructions serve, and from all resistance
gain strength: his reconcilement with suffering is eased
by fellow-suffering, and in pride of his calling
good warriorship welcometh the challenge of death.

It is the *enamoured* soul which, "looking on any beauty falleth straightway in love". But what of the soul for whom there can be no falling in love just because love is the reciprocal relationship we have seen it to be—just because no other soul has come to meet it with love?

If life is to "mean intensely and mean good", it must actually be in that it offers the possibility of that reciprocal relationship in which man knows, by the incontrovertible sign of joy, that he has found himself; and in which also he knows, and knows only then, the bitterness of the exclusion of

[1] 1 Corinthians iii. 22-3.

all those of his fellows who are shut out from it. For when we sell our birthright for a mess of pottage it is because we think the pottage is good; and the mess of pottage is the self-love that we imagine will fulfil. But when we enter into the birthright of that love of our fellow which does fulfil, then we know the mess of pottage for what it is, and we must suffer in the deception of those who have not yet made the discovery.

It is this suffering-with, this compassion, which comes both naturally and inevitably to the enamoured soul which makes the Christian see the Cross—a cross—at the heart of life. Every devastation of personality in the world that is made through selfishness must be "brought back" by the self-chosen, sacrificial activity of the love which cannot let its fellow remain outside the good which itself has found. And we must note that it is precisely those men whom humanity has recognized as its greatest and sanest who have chosen this activity as the way of their service and their fulfilment. That must mean two things about humanity. It must mean that they are willing to admit as at least admirable, and as at most lovable, a reality which has a cross at its heart, even although that fact involve that they, too, must take up such a cross. It must mean, too, that in so far as they recognize the death of Christ on the Cross as one of the great self-affirmations of man, they recognize that they have it in them, too, to make such a self-affirmation. And actually, when men do rise to the heights of personality—which is to say to the heights of that active love which seeks not only oneness with, but the salvation of its fellow—any course but

that which accepts all dangers and all losses is self-denial.

If the death on the Cross could happen in a universe where the nature of things were not on the side of the Spirit that affirmed itself in the giving to death of its body, then life is worse than a farce or a cruelty, and whether it be the President of the Immortals, or the life-force, which jests with man, it would be well if the jest were to end. Freud's counsel of despair would be all that would be left, and it is doubtful if even that would serve. But in point of fact there is that in the nature of man which finds in the utmost self-giving the only way of love sufficient for him. Why, von Hügel asked, in the midst of all the cruelty and loveless-ness that so outrage our feeling and our faith, do we " persist in acting on the belief that love and devotedness are utterly the greatest things we know, and deserve the sacrifice of all our earthly gifts, of our very life? . . . It is surely that man's greatest action and disposition is not self-sufficing-ness or aloofness, but self-donation and love ",[1] and that, for this action and disposition, there is " a source and standard abiding, ultimate, distinct from, deeper than ourselves, a source Itself loving, Itself a lover, which, profoundly penetrative of our-selves, keeps us poor things rich with at least this sense of our poverty and with this our inability to abandon love (that very costly thing) as a chimera, or a mere fleeting vibration of our nerves."[2]

But it must be seen that sometimes to those who make the sacrifices of love they may, even in

[1] *Essays*, Vol. I, p. 112.
[2] Von Hügel, *Collected Essays*, pp. 111-16 *passim*.

some small measure, displace some part of evil with good, that the final end towards which they work is very remote, very unrelated to all that their personal life can know and mean. Those of us for instance to-day who are willing—or would wish to be willing—to make whatever personal sacrifice in order that some day men shall cease from war, know that still the world we know may crash around us *in* war. Yet we know, too—somehow—somewhy—that ultimately our sacrifice is necessary for the ends of love. We are like Lavinia in Bernard Shaw's *Androcles and the Lion*, who did not know quite *why* she should die for a God she didn't know very well, or quite *why* it mattered that she should not burn that pinch of incense to the image of Diana. All she knew was that she died for the "God of the world that was to be". So remote a thing—so strangely unknowable—when love and sunlight and the joy of the living body were near and known, and yet Shaw was right when he showed the compulsion as absolute!

Why? Because in some strange way that we certainly do not understand, time is an illusion, and the God who is to be is equally the God who is—closer than breathing, nearer than hands or feet. He is the one absolute Reality, and the soul which has found Him can work for the unknown and the unseen because, even as he works for what *seems* future, he is part, already, of that which includes, and fulfils, the future.

When Dr. Hocking asks who has the endless patience and energy necessary for the work of creation in love, he answers: "Only one who is in some way already at the goal, as the mystic is. For

him reality in its fulness is always accessible where he is: he is always in the middle of time and space and history: he is never neurotically anxious to catch the *dernier cri*, nor hurried on to a remote goal. He alone can labour with endless resources and patience for what yet may be; for he knows that the nature of things is with him. He knows that there can be no incommensurable relation between the task and the power to deal with it. He knows that what is in him is the same substance that has set the object and established its over-againstness."

" Reality in its fulness is always accessible where he is. He knows that the nature of things is with him."[1] And that remains true, even although, as we said, he may not know, either completely or in detail, what the nature of things is—even although he see it only " through a glass, darkly ",[2] approaching it more nearly only through his increasing faithfulness, only in proportion as he becomes less self-occupied, less self-centred, more outward moving, less obstinate and insistent, more gladly lost in the crowd, more rich in giving all he has and especially all he is, his very self. He *does* know that, *always*, at every point of his progress, in all its necessary imperfection and becomingness, there is that which answers his need and fulfils his aspiration. He has an environment for that essential ego—his personality which is and is to be—to which at any moment he can, if he so will, adapt himself, in the sense that he can find in it response to his need and desire, but to which he is never

[1] Jacks, *Religious Perplexities*, p. 96.
[2] Von Hügel, *Types of Philosophy*, pp. 447-9.

completely adapted because all his new growth will give him new need and desire for which he will seek and find new satisfaction.

In speaking of the challenge of life to man according to the Norse mythologies and comparing it with the challenge of Christianity, Dr. Jacks gives us an illuminating conception of the reality which can be either friend or enemy of man. "The man whom the gods love is the man who stands up to it (the challenge of life). If you 'withstand' him like a man your enemy proves himself 'beautiful': he becomes your friend at need; is found at your side at the moment when all seems lost; his strength made perfect in your weakness; his shield thrown around you; his right arm bare in your defence. . . . But if you fall to complaining and self-pity; if you go after your own ease and happiness; if you hire a substitute to carry your load, the beauty of your enemy shall never be seen by you."[1] But while Dr. Jacks' fighting philosophy of life is inspiring and challenging, it does not consider sufficiently the enabling power of love.

At the end of it all, psychology, like religion, has left us with a paradox—or rather, perhaps, with a series of paradoxes, which lead one to the other endlessly, but which work out with no beautiful, logical finality. For psychology, as for religion, man must lose his life to find it. He must make endless effort, and yet he must be at peace in his effort. His love, without works, is dead; but his works, without love, are futile, or wasteful, or do not exist at all. The world is "empty and mean-

[1] *The Challenge of Life*, p. 55.

ingless" to him, unless he colour it with his love, and yet if there be no objects in it alive and beautiful and loving, he himself is meaningless, and his life a futility.

Psychology has no solution of the paradox, except in so far as it sees that the things that a man needs for the fulfilment of his personality, must of necessity come to him from without. If he cannot ultimately give himself any of them, then, quite definitely, he cannot find his life by seeking it. For him the only necessity is that he put himself in the closest possible relationship with the other in whom is his life, and that relationship consists in his love, his service, and his worship. And that, perhaps, is the only solution that there is—the solution that there is no self except in union with the other.

And so, for psychology, it is the very reality of things that is driving man to relationship—that is impelling him to self-realization through self-losing in love. It is reality that is driving him to autonomy in the surrender of all his immediate, self-related demand on life, that is driving him to freedom through obedience to a vision and a purpose that is his own, and yet greater than his own. It asserts that life demands of him docility to the everlasting fact, teaching him obedience by the things that he suffers. But it also suggests that obedience is not negation, but affirmation, not a "do not" but a "do", and that the fact is a responding reality. It says that the laws of life are inexorable, but it suggests that we come to know them as laws of love, and that love is their fulfilling.

And in its story of the disaster that befalls us in our disobedience, of the leanness and barrenness

of soul that we find in the far countries of our ignorance of our own nature and of the nature of life—of the things belonging to our peace—it leads us to believe that it is better to fight for our lives and go down fighting, than to see nowhere a challenge that drives us to battle—that it is better to be driven into the Kingdom of Heaven—to arrive there halt and maimed and blind by our struggle to stay outside, than not to come in at all, for although the way is narrow and the gate straight, it does lead to life. What Dr. Hocking says of " the dialectic of experience " one might say of the dialectic of psychology, that " it may be understood as part of the strategy of the ' Hound of Heaven '. The world is so devised that ' all things betray thee, who betrayest me '; the will, apparently driven by dissatisfaction in its own false definitions of good, may, to a deeper knowledge, be seen as driven by the wind of a god's desire."[1]

> All that thy child's mistake
> Fancies as lost,
> I have stored for thee at home,
> Rise, clasp my hand, and come.

It is the strategy of a love which is restless till it finds the soul it pursues, and that soul asks the question in which is its ultimate assurance:

> Is my gloom, after all,
> Shade of his hand, outstretched caressingly?
> Oh, fondest, blindest, weakest,
> I am He who thou seekest,
> Thou dravest love from thee
> Who dravest Me!

[1] *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, p. 402.

It is the strategy of reality which is forcing us to von Hügel's tremendous affirmation. Not only because it is good for us to love—not even at all for that—not only because of our own need of love, nor even because of the need of our fellow, but because there is beyond us, before us and after us, at the heart of life and the universe, love, outgoing, creative, calling us to meet it with love, and to be of its nature, creating in love—because in fact God *is*, "we have our unquenchable sense of reality. Because He is love and Lover, we cannot let love go."[1]

Not because we see love as desirable, but because we are constrained to love that Reality which is Love and Lover, we must press ever closer to its heart in the union which has "no fault nor gap therein". Not because we love, but because God first loved us, and because we have known that pre-existing, prevenient love in some human being—

God is seen as the very self-essence of love,
Creator and mover of all as active Lover of all,
self-expressed in not-self, without which no self were.
In thought whereof is neither beginning nor end
nor space nor time; nor any fault nor gap therein
'twixt self and not-self, mind and body, mother and child,
'twixt lover and loved, God and man: but ONE ETERNAL
in the love of Beauty and the selfhood of Love.[2]

[1] Von Hügel, *Essays*, Vol. I, p. 115.
[2] Bridges, *The Testament of Beauty*.

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